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Abstract 
 The wave of the globalization, new and promising areas for development and new 
technology brought oil and gas companies to operate all over the world. Today, as some of the 
major oil companies have turned to the High North, there is a discussion on whether projects in 
this area can be environmentally and technologically sound.  
 Norway is widely recognized in the world for both its commitment towards preservation of 
the Arctic environment, and tough HSE regulations, while Eni's Goliat project is the first 
installation in the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea.  
 This said, this report was focused on comparing the main principles and approaches of the 
Norwegian regulations in the HSE milieu and these of Eni, keeping in mind that the regulations 
are essencially approaches towards risk management in HSE - this constitutes the first structural 
part of the thesis. The second part is dedicated to case study and the analysis of the ways the 
regulations from both sides are being applied in the project. The thesis is using qualitative data 
analysis for all parts of the analysis.  
 The study has revealed, that HSE regulations in the mentioned international company and 
Norway are, first, comparable and, second, similar in many overriding aspects, as the regulations 
find their roots mainly in a set of international HSE standards. Secondly, the analysis has shown 
that there are three interdependent realities, influencing the risk management process over a 
project in the Arctic: state, company, and location, while the risk management and, 
correspondingly, the alignment process between these three realities is built upon a set of 
fundamental principles, found in both sets of regulations. The mentioned principles directly 
influence the ten milestone actiones, the final finding of the study, which the company performed 
in order to guarantee compliance to state regulations and properties of the project's location.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 2	
 Preface 
 It is believed, that the interest in the Arctic region is shared by the so called Arctic states - 
countries which territories (or parts of their territory) are located within the Arctic Circle: Canada, 
Kingdom of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russian Federation, Sweden, United States of 
America. China and some other east – asian states are also considered a countries which will 
play an important role in the Arctic region because of their growing economic powers and 
population. But the list of the countries with interests in the Arctic region does not stop here. Big 
countries - members of the Arctic Council dragged the interest of researchers and scientists, 
while other countries, such as Italy, remained in their shadow.  
 One might think why a small south Mediterranean country would want to be present and 
especially to have any particular interest in the Arctic. The facts show, despite all prejudices, 
Italy’s presence in the Arctic has actually a historical background. The story of the Italian 
presence in the Arctic region has its origin in 1899, when Luigi Amedeo di Savoia, Duke of the 
Abruzzi, sailed from Archangelsk with ship («Stella Polare» - The Polar Star) to use the Franz 
Joseph as a stepping stone to reach the North pole on sleds pulled by dogs. This expedition did 
not reach it’s goal. In 1926 the next expedition took place. Umberto Nobile, together with Roald 
Amundsen and Lincoln Ellsworth (USA) took off from Rome on the Norge airship (designed and 
driven by Nobile) and managed to cross the Arctic Sea and were the first to reach the North Pole, 
where they dropped the three national flags (Nobile, 1959). Two years later Nobile went on a 
new Arctic expedition on a new airship called Italia. Operating from Kings Bay in Ny-Ålesund, 
Italia flew four times oner the North Pole, surveying unexplored areas for scientific purposes. 
We may consider it the first italian exploration activities in the Arctic. Unfortunately, on its way 
back the aircraft crashed north of the Svalbard Islands and lost nearly half of its crew. The 
wreckage was linked to adverse weather, including strong wind blowing from the northern side 
of the Svalbard Islands to the Franz Joseph Land: this wind stream, that was previously unknown, 
has been nicknamed after the expedition – Italia (Italy in the Arctic. Towards an Italian Strategy 
for the Arctic, 2015). 
 Thanks to the work of Nobile, as well as the later establishment of a Svalbard scientific 
base by the National Research Council and its activities («Dirigibile Italia»); to the Arctic 
oceanographic cruises by the OGS Explora research ship and to the activity of various Italian 
companies, like Eni and Finmeccanica, it can be said that the Italian record in the Arctic, is not 
only over a century old, but also that the Italian Arctic footprint has been steadily increasing over 
time (Italy in the Arctic. Towards an Italian Strategy for the Arctic, 2015). Moreover, in 2013, 
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Italy has been granted Italy the observer status in the Arctic Council (Arctic Council)1. Hence, 
Italy may be considered the most active state in the area among non-Arctic countries. 
 In the author’s opinion, the Italian presence in the Arctic has reached another milestone 
with the Goliat project, the first platform (FPSO) to start production within the polar circle, and 
the activities of Eni Norge AS, that developed and implemented this project. Eni Norge is a 
Norwegian subsidiary of the Italian integrated energy group Eni S.p.A. In round figures, Eni 
Norge delivered 41 million barrels of oil equivalent in 2014, its proven reserves are 409 million 
barrels in 2014, and the company is a participant and stakeholder in 60 licences on the NCS, of 
which we are operator in 18 (Eni Norge)2. 
 I was born in Italy, have graduated from a Russian school in Italy, and am a proud alumni 
of Universita Cattolica del Sacro Cuore in Milan. The double degree Master Program in 
International Oil and Gas Business between the Moscow State Institute of International Relations 
(MGIMO) and Nord Universitet in Norway has offered me to both study Energy Management, 
which I had a great interest in, and to explore a new country for the the author – Norway. During 
only six months I have stayed in this country, it has provided me with several great opportunities: 
to study and explore Norway in its fullness, to actively participate in the High North Dialogue 
conference, to be a summer intern in an Italian company operating in Norway – Eni Norge and 
be partly involved in the Goliat project, and now the possibility to submit my master thesis both 
in Norway and in Russia.  
 I have decided, that the master thesis should ecompass all my background and be focused 
on: Italy, Norway, High North, human – related and environmental aspects of oil and gas 
activities. This is how this thesis, entitled: «Managing HSE Risk in offshore projects in the 
Barents Sea: approaches of Norwegian regulators and Eni Norge in Goliat operations» was 
born. 
 Before anything, my strongest words of appreciation and gratitude go to my supervisor, 
Elena Zhurova, whose academic and motivational support was of a great importance for writing 
this thesis; to the Russian and Norwegian branches of Eni – whithout the advice and mentorship 
of people working there this work would not have existed; to Anatoli Bourmistrov, head of 
Handelhøyskolen i Bodø for his consultations, advice, and lectures during my semester in Nord 
Universitet; and finally to my parents, for their loving advice and support of all my endeavors, 
and my girlfriend Elizaveta for her care and support.  
 
																																																						
1	www.arctic-council.org. Observers	
2	www.eninorge.com. About Eni Norge.	
	 4	
Lastly, I would like to offer our thanks to the High North Center of of Nord Universitet 
for coordinating the study program, involving mutual semesters in two universities and countries. 
Hope, that this program would continue to exist and contribute to the cross-border knowledge 
base for future developments in the High North and Barents Sea. 
Knowledge is universal, youth is the future, and educated youth can turn everything 
around. What’s missing? More collaboration. My wish for the future is that Nord Universitet and 
Northern Norway become a globally known center for collaboration between talented young 
people from all over the world to create a future for the arctic region and for all of us. Together.   
 
 
Moscow, 17 May 2016 
 
 
Sergey Paramonov 
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Figure 1. Goliat FPSO (Photo credits: Marus Fiskum. Source: maritime.no)3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
3	www.maritime.no. Article “Nå er Goliat i gang” (2016)	
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Abbreviations & definitions: 
 AIS: Automatic Identification System 
ALARP: As Low As Reasonably Practicable 
BAT: Best Available Technology 
DNV: Det Norske Veritas 
E&P: Exploration and Production (division) 
EER: Evacuation, Escape and Rescue 
FPSO: Floating Production Storage and Offloading 
HQ: Headquarters 
HSE MSG: Management Guidelines in Health, Safety, and Environment 
HSEQ: Health Safety Environment Quality 
IAS: Impact Assessment Study 
IOGP/OGP: International Organization of Oil and Gas Producers 
IPIECA: The global oil and gas industry association for environmental and social issues  
IR: Infra Red 
ISO: International Organization for Standartization 
MD: Managing Director 
MTO: Men, Technology, and Organization 
NCA: Norwegian Coastal Administration 
NCS: Norwegian Continental Shelf 
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NEA: Norwegian Environmental Agency 
NOFO: Norwegian Clean Seas Association for Operating Companies 
NORSOK: Norwegian Offshore Cost Effective Initiative 
NPD: Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
ODR: Oil Detection Radar 
OHSAS: Occupational Health and Safety Advisory Services 
PDO: Plan for Development and Operations 
PIO: Plan for Installation and Operation 
PPM: Parts Per Million  
PSA: Petroleum Safety Authority 
PW: Produced Water 
QRA: Quantitative Risk Assessment 
RAC: Risk Acceptance Criteria 
RAC: Risk Acceptance Criteria 
ROV: Remotely Operated Vehicle 
SCIGR: Internal Control and Risk Management System in Eni 
SLAR: The Side-Looking Airborne Radar system 
SOA: Service – Oriented (Enterprise) Architecture 
TCMS: The Technical Control & Monitoring System 
WEA: Norwegian Working Environment Act 
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ALARP:  
1. «ALARP is a general approach or ‘a way of thinking’ regarding all HSE aspects, whereby 
there is no distinction between ALARP and the more general work performed in order to satisfy 
the technical and operational requirements concerning HSE aspects given in the regulations» 
(Vinnem, Witsø, Kristiansen, 2006).  
2. «An ALARP review is an exercise performed in a specific and predefined manner, at specific 
times, using specific methods and/or techniques to reduce risk beyond what is required in order 
to fulfill the minimum HSE level» (Vinnem, Witsø, Kristiansen, 2006).  
Barrier: "all systematic, physical, and administrative forms of protection found in the 
organization and in the individual workplace intended to prevent, or limit the consequences of, 
faults and erroneous actions" (PSA). In the 2006 White paper, barriers are defined as “technical, 
operational and organizational measures which, either individually or together, shall prevent or 
interrupt the course of specific undesirable incidents. Barriers can reduce both likelihood and 
consequences”. 
Contingency plan: is a course of action designed to help an organization respond effectively to 
a significant future event or situation that may or may not happen. 
FPSO:  floating facility, usually based on a (converted) oil tanker hull. It is equipped with 
hydrocarbon processing equipment for separation and treatment of crude oil, water and gases, 
arriving on board from sub-sea oil wells via flexible pipelines (Bluewater).  
Hazard: Accidents or near-accidents that have or may occur, as well as other factors that can 
lead to injury or material damage (PSAg, 2014, section 4).  
Legislation: Synonym for a law or a set of law, or similar legal manifesto. 
Operator: When activities are legislated by the Petroleum Act, the operator is any organization 
that is operating the day-to-day management on behalf of the licensee. When the activities are 
not subjected to the Petroleum Act, it is any organization that is operating the day-to-day 
management on behalf of the owner (PSAa, 2013, section 6)  
Pollution: A supply of solids, fluid or gas to air, water or the ground, as well as impact on the 
temperature with possible negative impact on the local or global environment (PSAf, 2014, 
section 11).  
Regulator: A public institution that is tasked with supervisory authority over safety, emergency 
preparedness and working environments for hydrocarbon activity in a country or legislation.  
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Regulation: A topical legal framework, often supplementary to a higher law.  
Responsible party: Any organization (including operators) that are conducting or participating 
in conducting petroleum activity, with the exception of non-operating licensees and owners of 
onshore facilities (PSAa, 2013, section 6) (PSAf, section 7).  
Standard: A document published by a standard developing organization (SDO). They are also 
known as recommended practices, specifications, bulletins, technical reports and publically 
available specifications (OGP, 2010).  
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1 Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1. Background conditions 
 
Despite the drop in oil prices we see today, total investments in the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf, according to the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, are expected to 
moderately rise after 2017. Additionally, the percentage of new discoveries is expected to 
almost triple in 2019 compared to 2016 levels (Figure 2). With new projects in the pipeline 
and new developments in technology, the relevance of HSE will be even greater than it is now, 
because of slow but steady move of the activities to the northern areas of the NCS – the 
Barents Sea, and the Eni's Goliat and Statoil's Johan Castberg projects are the clear 
representation of these processes.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Investments excluding forecast for 2015-2020 (Source: NPD, 2016)4 
The Barents Sea area is considered an environmentally vulnerable area to oil pollution, 
while also characterized by difficult and harsh climatic conditions compared to that on the rest 
of the NCS (DNV Consulting, 2005). A lot of research is being done and even more is coming. 
There are different opinions whether petroleum activities in the Arctic can be technologically 
and environmentally sound, and this thesis will try to contribute to this discussion. 
Nonetheless, according to the NPD, data showed that the majority of undiscovered reserves of 
gas and condensate lie under the surface of the Barents Sea.  
																																																						
4 www.npd.no. Article “The shelf in 2015-Investment and cost forecasts” 
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According to the analysis done by the The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies 
(University of Oxford) in the Outlook for Natural Gas Demand in Europe (2014), natural gas 
will still have a market in Europe, the primary consumer of the Norwegian fossil fuels. 
HSE, as mentioned, is the main challenge in the Barents Sea. The focus on influence 
on humans, e.g. on their safety, on the environment they live in, and their health and well-
being is deeply rooted in the oil and gas industry and was distilled in HSE risk management. 
However, the approached towards HSE management varies greatly from company to 
company – and from country to country. HSE management is mainly reflected in 
corresponding regulations. However, legal frameworks in HSE can be highly complex to 
elaborate on, and the amount of detail in these laws and regulations can be correspondingly 
very high (Berg, Malikova, 2015). The range of these frameworks can last from just a few 
pages to several thousands (OGP, 2010), and the potential scope can be huge.  
Today, companies have activities and interests all over the world, and international 
companies from the oil and gas sector are, maybe, the most noticeable examples. Companies 
investing in projects abroad come across the need to manage HSE risks in an unfamiliar 
institutional and legal environment. It may result in an emergence of various complications 
for the company, especially in such issues as risk management; organizational, managerial, 
and environmental challenges.  
This is due to the fact, that HSE as a concept has a lot of different meanings, because 
of its wide and differenciated scope of application. One these is the oil and gas industry. 
Concerning the available literature, there is a wide selection of it on HSE in oil and gas, either 
providing a general outlook, or covering different aspects of it. HSE literature was found to be 
mainly generic, but some of it is can be more specific to a single country or aspect (i.e. Risk 
management).  
In the author's opinion, the generic approach for studying HSE is not completely right, 
because this concept is, and should be coutry, company, or case specific.  
Secondly, according to the preliminary data collection, there are not many comparative 
and case-specific studies of HSE. For example, there is a study done by Berg and Malikova 
(2015) from the University of Nordland on differences between HSE regulations and culture 
in Norway and in Russia. Another study was done in the University of Stavanger by Hoem 
(2014), which compared the Norwegian HSE regulations and Shell global HSSE framework 
in light of several general principles. The particularity of this report is add a practical 
component to the current landscape of works, focused on a comparison of different HSE 
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regulations.  
According to the author's personal experience, the oil and gas industry is focused on 
reliable practices, rather than on theoretical aspects. Therefore, in the beginning of my work 
on thesis, there was a general understanding that I should show how different aspects of HSE 
regulations are actually being implemented in a real case scenario. Moreover, it would be 
interesting for future or current employes of Norwegian companies (and not only oil and gas 
companies-transportation, logistics companies personnel might also be interested), that are 
planning their activities in the High North to get insight from a case study, focused on the 
Goliat project. 
Thirdly, the available literature and studies does not prioritize HSE aspects, while in in 
practice in the oil and gas industry there is a clear gierarchy of HSE risks.  
This said, this thesis, starting from HSE regulations as the main reference, this study 
adds a much needed practical component to the research – the case of the operational stage of 
Goliat project in the Barents Sea. The aim of doing this is not only the conviction that this 
component is actually missing from the available research, but also an attempt to address the 
alarmists voices in the science community, calling for a ban of any activity in the High North. 
Moreover, this thesis is thinked to have the figure of a human in the center of the analysis. 
Therefore, in the analysis the concept of HSE will be bound with the concepts of safety and 
risk.  
From the very start of this work, it was also considered necessary to answer the 
question: Who will be interested in this study? The answer was that it would be interesting for 
companies newcomers to the NCS, considering the possibilities of the Barents region. The 
aim is thus to finalize the analysis in a comprehensive instruction, based on a real case, of 
what to expect and what needs to be done on order to obtain a high level of safety combined 
the the lowest possible level of risks.  
1.2. Purpose and problem statement 
 
The purpose of this study is to provide a comprehensive overview of the regulatory 
regime and main practices in addressing HSE issues in Norway and Eni, and to emphasize the 
main differences of these. After this comparison will be done, the research is then narrowed 
down to the case study, which will include environmental and climatic context of the Barents 
Sea and how these aspects have influenced the Goliat project in terms of regulations in the 
area of HSE.  
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Norway has always had international foreign companies operating on the NCS, and, as 
mentioned earlier, this work should be interesting for companies that are considering the 
possibilities of potential activities in the Arctic. Moreover, the report could interest regulatory 
agencies of other Arctic countries, which are thinking of allowing the offshore petroleum 
activities in their part of the shelf, and therefore searching for the right regulatory policy. It 
should be noted, that this study becomes even more relevant in light of the ongoing debate 
regarding the HSE issues of the possible move of oil and gas development further north (in 
the Barents Sea), and in the LoVe area (the area in Norway around Lofoten, Vesteraalen and 
Senja). 
This study has two main stages. The first stage is a comparative analysis of the health, 
safety and environmental regulatory regime in Norway and management of HSE issues in Eni. 
Second – the real life case study of the Barents context and the overview of the Goliat project 
with a focus on specific regulations and the Eni's organizational and management processes to 
address the HSE issues. 
An international company is always subject to the local regulations, while the concept 
of HSE is very context – specific. So it’s interesting to study the approaches in HSE 
regulation in both countries and companies; their differences and similarities. Bearing this in 
mind, it is important to show how a company addresses these differences if there are any, 
adopts the requirements, and adapts to the regulatory framework and ways of conduct in a 
specific country, and, most importantly, emphasize and illustrate these processes based on a 
real project. All this considered, the thesis therefore attempts to analyze HSE on an 
institutional as well as a company level, which both are then applied to a project.   
Thus, the problem is formulated as follows:  
«How company has aligned its own regulations and procedures to Norwegian 
regulations and guidelines in light of the operational stage of Goliat project?» 
At first, the problem statement was quite wide, because the initial intent was to analyse 
all of the stages of this project. Though, based on the feeback received from HSE department 
employees in Eni's Moscow office, the problem was then narrowed down only to the 
operational stage, which has actually started during the time this thesis was written. Therefore, 
this thesis will reflect mainly a «pre-operational» stage of the Goliat field development, that 
refers to preparations of the offshore installation to the production start-up. 
The problem statement, however, is still quite wide, because the final outcome should 
be the illustration of the company's activities in light of what is contained in both regulations, 
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the «usage» of the regulations. So basically, it is the following situation: you have an 
installation on the NCS and you are preparing to start producing. How would you manage 
your activities, and what would be your actions as related to the HSE regulations and 
guidelines in Norway? 
1.3 Methodologies and delimitations 
This study is unapologetically qualitative. It utilizes only qualitative data in the form 
of normative acts, the regulations, documents related to the Goliat field development, and 
descriptive data from the interviews.  
The primary data collection has revealed, that the literature covering aspects of 
petroleum activities from upstream to downstream, HSE, risk management, and project 
management is vast. Therefore a few focus areas had to be chosen. As it was already 
mentioned, the concept of HSE is multifaced, therefore the main focus of the report will be on 
the regulations. However, it is inevitable that management and technical aspects of HSE will 
also be partly covered. The regulations differ greatly among different countries, organizations, 
and companies, therefore this topic was narrowed down to one country and one company. 
Projects can have different stages, and it can take from 5 to 15 years from exploration to 
development, and 1-7 years from development to production. Of course, it was impossible to 
cover all project stages, therefore the author considered the installation of the Goliat platform 
the starting point for the case study.  
1.4 Structure 
The structure of the study is made accordingly with common requirements for all 
masters’ theses in Nord Universitet. The next chapter will introduce all the relevant theories 
that can be the foundation for the research questions and the analysis presented in this study. 
In the third chapter, the author will further elaborate on the thesis’s research design and the 
applicable methods for understanding and presenting the data accordingly. Fourth chapter is 
the main and most important body of analysis, considering the similarities and differences in 
the regulationss, and both analysis and findings are presented in this chapter. Chapter 5 covers 
provides the context and represents everything appertaining to the case study, also 
incorporating discriptive, analytical parts, and the final results of the study. The conclusion, 
based on analyses presented in Chapters 4 and 5 can be found in Chapter 6. Tables, figures, 
additional data and references can be found in the appendices.  
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1.5 Summary 
The report has several main goals. First of all, it pursues the aim of creating new 
knowledge on the application of state and private HSE regulations in the context of the Arctic 
areas. Secondly, this study pursues a goal to simplify complex subjects, such as HSE and risk 
management in the Arctic for non-Norwegian and Norwegian companies, which are 
evaluating the option or are interested in producing oil and gas in the Arctic region; 
governmental structures (other than in Norway), that want to structurize, optimize, or improve 
the regulatory regime for the oil and gas activities in areas, belonging to their continental shelf 
and located above the Arctic Circle; and independent parties, concerned with environmental 
issues of petroleum activities in the Arctic. 
This said, some of the parts of the report may be descriptive in order to present such 
subjects as regulations and specific aspects of the project Goliat. However, the overall 
structure, content, and the selected method of analysis and research design of this study will 
reflect the topic and the research question as much as possible. It should be noted, that there 
was almost no research on a similar topic and with a scomparable research question, so the 
author had to create a suitable research design from scratch. This process is shown in the 
methodological part of the study.  
All in all, everything in this study serves to the final purpose: to go through 
complexity to simplicity, and narrow down to the answer to the research question to a simple 
and brief statement.  
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2 Chapter 2. Theoretical framework  
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of the theoretical framework is to provide this study a theoretical base for the 
further analysis. And while this study is to a large degree rooted in concepts, these may be 
responsible for different tasks in the landscape of knowledge, and may apper different to the 
insiders as well as to the outside observer, and their demarcations are neither given nor totally 
arbitrary (Kringen, 2008). This chapter thus starts off with a discussion of the basic concepts 
relevant to this study: HSE, risk, and regulation. Secondly, it provides an outline the theory 
that will provide the framework for understanding the interdisciplinary topic that was selected 
for this study. 
 2.2 Concepts of risk, safety, and regulation 
First, as the basis for this study, the concepts of risk, safety, and regulations will be 
described. They have at least one attribute in common: they are all concepts that can be 
characterized by high level of abstraction. Most of all, they seem to just designate freely 
defined thematic fields. These concepts, according to Kringen (2008), fit the definition of 
hypernyms – «the linguistic term for super-ordinate concepts that cover a broad range of 
phenomena, themselves classifying a number of subordinate terms». For the purposes of this 
study, however, these concepts will be presented in simplified terms, under the lense of 
relevance for the oil and gas sector. The conceptual philosophical debates goes over and 
above the purposes of this study.  
2.2.1 The concepts of risk and regulations 
In simple terms, the concept of risk rests inbetween scientific perceptions of calculable 
probabilities and cautious perceptions of uncertainty and unpredictability, which are 
embedded within cultural, social and political environments, including also the normative 
valuations of the severity of the possible outcomes, against the possible benefits (Royal 
Society, 1992; Shrader- Frechette, 1991).  
There is no universal definition of what is risk, so, obviously, there are significant 
variations in possible explanations. There are several reasons for this flexible nature of the 
concept of risk. One of the straightforward explanations is that risk management, compared to 
risk assessment, is a relatively young field that is undergoing a rapid development (Conroy, 
Murrie). A second explanation for the wide gap in interpretations and definitions has to do 
with the social constructionist perspective. Risk is considered a humanly constructed concept 
that is not tied directly to any observable features of the universe, and from a constructionist 
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point of view, reality is socially constructed and given meaning by people (Easterby-Smith, 
Thorpe, Jackson, 2012). The actual existence of risk is also considered present by people. 
Considering the observation that people are different, it all comes clear.  
However, two factors were found to be present in almost every definition of risk: 
probability + consequence. For the sake of better understanding, let's consider an everyday 
situation. For example, if you don't brush your teeth you probably might (probability) get 
caries (consequence). Thus, an event or activity have different outcomes, and one of these 
outcomes is bad and carries risk. The probability, on its turn, is calculable, and if a harmful 
event has a high probability – a preventive measure or their combination can be applied to 
liquidate, or reduce the possibility that this event will happen to minimum levels. Thus, 
referring again to the mentioned example, brushing your teeth is an act of risk management 
because in minimizes the risk of caries, while, based on background and knowledge, a person 
evaluates the possible outcomes. The last can illustrate an act of risk assessment.  
A general procedure implemented for analyzing or assessing risks commonly involves 
three constituent stages: first, identification of the hazard, second, estimation of the level or 
magnitude of potential harms, and, finally, evaluation of its acceptability (Kringen, 2008). 
If we think about risk regulation and risk management, they appear to a large degree 
synonimous, because both are denoting the mechanisms of “shaping who can take what risks 
and how” (Royal Society, 1992: 136), pursuing the aim of minimizing the risk. In the business 
milieu, risk regulation involves a number of actors, ranging from the government, regulators, 
industrial actors to small independent bodies, each playing different roles in the general effort 
to manage risks, including the whole process of identification, estimation, and evaluation. It 
should be noted, that the process of risk management is usually a generalized and iterative 
effort, so it's impossible to define precisely the stages and elements of the process of risk 
management (Kringen, 2008).  
Today the process of managing risks will involve another criteria – effectiveness. Its 
presence can be explained by the need of allocating the proper amount of resources in a 
manner that would reduce risk effectively according to the overall valuations of both ‘costs’ 
and ‘benefits’. Evidently, the task of defining, identifying and measuring risks becomes even 
more difficult (Kringen, 2008) 
This extremely simplified outline provides the understanding of one important fact: 
anything to do with risks has a strong constructionist component. If we amplify this picture it 
becomes clear, that risk management has a wide scope of application: actually every 
economic subject can manage risks, and therefore can interpret risk differently, basing his 
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considerations on uncountable combinations of historical, economical, political, cultural, 
environmental, and many other variables. Additionally, this process can be implemented in 
different areas. For this study, the area of concern will be the HSE.  
2.2.2 The concept of safety 
The Cambridge dictionary gives the following definition of safety: it is a state in 
which or a place where you are safe and not in danger or at risk5.  
Alli (2008) gives the following definition of occupational safety: “...is generally 
defined as the science of the anticipation, recognition, evaluation and control of hazards 
arising in or from the workplace that could impair the health and well-being of workers, 
taking into account the possible impact on the surrounding communities and the general 
environment” (Alli, 2008, p. 7) 
The definition given by Alli incorporates all the essential aspects of HSE as a concept, 
so it is possible to conclude that area of HSE arises from the concept of safety. Additionally, 
the given definition incorporates all the aspects of risk and risk management process. Clearly, 
at this point the report is stepping into an interconnected or interrelated field of knowledge. 
It is now possible make an introduction to the concept of HSE in general terms. 
Simply put, HSE management aims to predict and reduce the probability of accidents or 
hazards with implications to humans and environment, and to minimize the consequences of a 
hazard in case it has happened, because the necessary measures were elaborated. However, a 
certain degree of ambiguity is still present with respect to the application and definition of 
HSE, since the implications of these aspect vary across coutries, governments, institutions, 
and organizations. 
What results from the definition given by Alli (2008), is that the term is viewed as 
conceptually dualistic in its core (Berg, Malikova, 2015). On one hand, we have a “health and 
safety” component, that refers to predicting and minimizing the probability of hazards, that in 
other words means improving safety of humans. On the other hand, we have the environment, 
which can imply to definitions – the working environment for people, and external 
environment in the sence of the influence to nature and environment by company's operations. 
Usually for oil and gas companies the environment means natural environment, and safe 
working environment is included in the aspect of safety. 
Following the logical path of the last two paragraphs it can be assumed, the concept of 
																																																						
5	http://dictionary.cambridge.org/it/dizionario/inglese/safety. Cambridge dictionary - definition of safety.	
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HSE primarily finds its origins in safety, which is inseparable from the human aspect 
mentioned previously. Being safe is laid in our genes, when prehistoric men and women 
searched for safe places to stay during the night because of the danger coming from predators. 
Safety is an activity of prevention from being exposed to hazardous situation. By staying safe 
the unpreductable consequences of a negative event can be avoided. (Chandrasekaran, 2016). 
The term safety is therefore always associated with risk. When the risks or one of the possible 
risks becomes too high, the situation can be considered unsafe or unstable. Therefore, when 
risks are assessed and eliminated, or minimized (e.g. regulated or managed) - safety gains its 
own ground and an activity can take place (Ibid). 
The focus of this study is management of HSE risks in oil and gas operations. 
Management of risk, as it was mentioned above, involves a number of organizations. Since 
risk management is an extremely complex issue, in simple terms, these bodies should use a 
plan. In case of the governmental actors, this plan is represented in regulation and legislation. 
The government itself, or other assigned regulatory organs, can be defined as regulators, 
because by means of free elections the citizens delegate a number of responsibilies, including 
these, to the state. At the same time, private actors have internal regulations and management 
systems, because they are responsible to stakeholders that have given a company the 
responsibility for their money. The organization, therefore, must have sound measures to 
guarantee the company’s activites are safe and won’t result in a loss of their money. It is 
interesting, how the lack of safety always leads to losses of something that is precious, but this 
should be the topic of a more philosophical study.  
The main concern for the petroleum industry in HSE, in author's opinion, includes two 
main factors: it is the participation, involvement of humans, and influence on them of such 
activities, and second - their effect on nature, environment, and ecosystems of the region in 
which oil and gas activities take place. All these are interconnected by the terms risk, safety, 
and regulation. 
2.3 HSE 
Following the discussion in the previous subchapter, the HSE standards exist because 
any activity, either industrial, business, societal, political, etc., even everyday routine is 
associated with risk and and therefore should correspond to safety standards. The connection 
between HSE and risk and safety can be illustrated in common everyday situations. For 
example, you wash your hands before you eat, because there is the risk to have bacteria on 
your hands and you might get ill; or you brush your teeth before you go to bed, because might 
get dental caries development. Wahsing your hands or brushing our teeth is one of the 
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simplest, but at the same time most common HSE standards, pursuing the same goal – to 
minimize possible risk. HSE standards thus exist in response to the need of risk regulation. 
Based on the primary research and study of the available literature on HSE, this 
concept is clearly abstract, interdimensional and multidisciplinary. However, the clarity 
comes if we think about HSE risk management. In fact, this study will be generally 
concentrated on the regulatory aspects of HSE, more precisely regulations and legislation on 
the levels of the government and that of a company.  
The author could define a number of the most critical aspects of the HSE regulations, 
as applied to the industrial activities, which are the primary subject of this study: 
organizational, managerial, technological, and contextual. All these aspects are presented in 
this chapter in relation to the specific properties of the concept of HSE. Schematically, the 
theoretical framework for this study can be represented in the following Figure:  
 
 
 
Figure 3. The illustration of the theoretical approach. Fundamental for the further analysis and 
the thesis in general 
The abbreviation HSE stands for health, safety, and environment. This concept can be 
viewed from different angles, because is applicable to many activities, which are not 
necessarily economic or industrial. However, the area of the application of HSE on which this 
study will be focused is oil and gas sector, especially on the regulatory aspects of a project. 
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2.3.1 Regulatory environment: legal and institutional aspects of HSE 
This study is specifically concerned with two levels of institutional reality: country 
level and the level of the companies.  
State perspective 
Institutionally, the management of HSE issues is, first of all, represented by set of 
governmental bodies who are responsible for HSE in a given coutry, and therefore in a variety 
of industrial activities. Secondly, HSE is regulated by a set of legislative requirements, laws, 
regulations, guidelines, recommendations and criteria published in one way or another by an 
authorized institution, responsible organization, or other governmental structures responsible 
for their issue (Berg, Malikova, 2015). All this formes what can be referred to as an HSE 
regulatory environment. 
The main instruments of the regulatory milieu in HSE are legal documents, i.e. laws, 
regulations, guidelines and so on. How these should be applied is subject to law studies, that 
are over the topic covered in this thesis. However, it is worth to mention, that the HSE 
regulations usually represent a set specific legislative acts, and these on their turn are 
extremely country specific, while the importance given to aspects of HSE, the ways of 
regulating and managing its aspects varies greatly from country to country, in some cases 
even regions (in countries with federalism). As emphasized by one of the Eni employees in 
Moscow, sometimes countries can have such low HSE standards, that companies operating 
there even have to implement their own standards (for example in Africa). 
The regulations that in the end can be traced in international law are not legally 
binding, and the available international standards, which are regulatory documents 
representing attempts of giving the HSE a more standardized approach in regulating the HSE, 
are also being adopted volountarily by the countries or companies.  
There are international organizations and associations with different sets of 
participants (countries, companies, independent experts or organizational bodies), that 
produce internationally applicable standards. These organizations sometimes are supported or, 
actually, consist of oil companies themselves, that, recognizing the need of homogenization in 
the sphere of HSE, agreed to contribute. Among these organizations the most notable are: ISO 
(International Organization for Standartization), International Association of Oil and Gas 
Producers (IOGP/OGP), IPIECA (“the global oil and gas industry association for 
environmental and social issues”). The are also several national and regional associations, 
such as Norwegian Oil and Gas Association, and the U.S. Oil and Gas Association produce 
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sound standards and sets of criteria, that can be applied to oil and gas activities (Berg, 
Malikova, 2015).  
The mentioned organizations typically pursue the issues that are for the common good 
for the entire industry. Two of them should be particularly mentioned. Fist, the ISO, is an 
independent, non-governmental international organization has published over 19000 
International Standards for almost every industry (ISO). The data collection has shown that at 
least Eni recognizes and incorporates into its corporate management guidelines specific 
standards, developed for oil and gas industry.  
Second organization, the IOGP, is specifically dealing with HSE related matters. The 
organization has published many scientific reports and, since it is an association of oil and gas 
companies, those taking part in this organization incorporate the scientific findings, standards, 
and guidelines the organization presents. For example, Eni's reporting standards are 
corresponding to the standards set by the IOGP.  
Company perspective 
From the perspective of economic actors having activities in a specific country, HSE, 
besides the explanations given above also signifies compliance with the regulations in this 
country. In order to address these challenges, companies have created HSE departments, 
specifically dealing with compliance and the issues that might arise (Berg, Malikova, 2015).  
The primary function of the the HSE departments and corresponding management 
frameworks today is, however, not only to just securing compliance with the requirements and 
regulations – they are now becoming the real guardians of the reputation of a company, that is 
reflected in the involvement of the HSE department in every project of a company. This is 
particularly important for oil and gas copanies, especially after the Deepwater Horizon 
catastrophy. Actually, these changes are not limited to just oil and gas or other big industrial 
companies. Today people are becoming more and more aware of the environmental problems, 
and consequtively almost every company has plans regarding sustainability; social, and 
environmental commitments. Nontheless, according to the mentioned processes, and a long 
history of deadly hazards compbined with the contributions of oil and gas industry to the 
climate change, society has started to consider petroleum companies as real threat to humanity, 
nature and the environment.  
On the company level, the understanding of the concept is even more different than 
that across different countries, because every company or corporation has its own business 
model, culture, management style, and set of rules. However, as preliminary study of the data 
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has revealed, each company elaborates its own standards, procedures, and management 
guidelines regarding HSE, that have proportionally the same power as the laws in a country 
have, but that are applied and function only within a company, its branches and for its 
employees.  
It should be noted, that HSE a structural component of the organization similar of any 
other department (Berg, Malikova, 2015), however the structure, management, and 
administration (and even the name of it) can be very different across companies. The 
functional aspect of the department is also very different, but in petroleum companies they 
incorporate legal aspects, technical and design aspects, environmental (nature – related) 
aspects, social, occupational health and safety aspects. 
So it’s not rare that oil and gas companies incorporate the country – specific approach 
to HSE. In the course of communication with industry representatives regarding this study, a 
representative from Eni has emphasized, that sometimes in case of operations in a country, 
where the HSE standards are lower that these in the company, they might use their own HSE 
standards. So what we see here is that there might be different shapes that form the overlay of 
state HSE – related patterns and those of companies. This is why the universal definition of 
HSE does not exist and can’t exist. Every state, industry, company; every person; even every 
project or a situation might give different meaning to health, safety, and environment, and 
these definitions will inevitably be formed by context, knowledge; cultural, historical, 
political, economical etc. background. 
2.3.1.1 Institutional theory 
As mentioned above, the HSE standards are represented in legislative documents, 
issued by the authorized authority. These sets of laws and other legislative documents can also 
be seen as institutions. Part of this study is the analysis of the regulatory environment of the 
oil and gas activities in Norway, therefore an introduction to the concept of institution is 
required.  
The institutionalization process is well described in Berger & Luckmann (1966) 
publication entiteled «Social Construction of reality». Basing their work on a fundamental 
philosophical dichotomy Subjective versus Objective reality, they declare knowledge, and 
therefore one's «reality» is relative, thus the external world is experienced differently from 
person to person. A society, on its turn, is formed by individuals that possess different 
experiences, background, and knowledge, but when we speak about a country we normally 
see a common ground and in most cases people actually share views, norms, and opinions.  
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In their work Berger and Luckmann have assumed that human activity in general 
combined with this common ground leads to similar behavioural patterns, that can be 
interpreted as sort of habitualization – i.e. the act of forming a habit.  Repeated action makes a 
pattern, and this pattern becomes a habit. A habit, on its turn, form way of conduct - a socially 
accepted way to act and behave. This assumption might seem restrictive, but that's what 
society has invented to introduce order to human actions: instead of being lost in multeplicity 
of diverse options, a person became able choose the «right» path, although the question 
«What's right» is still open. The government naturally also seeks to introduce order in the 
social behavior, that why constitution, laws, and other legislative acts are also an institution. 
When habits become an institution? Greif (2005) defines an institution as «system of 
rules, beliefs, norms and organizations that can jointly generate a regularity of behavior in a 
social situation». Barley and Tolbert (1997) define an institution as «historical accretions of 
past practices and understandings that set conditions on actions» (Barley & Tolbert, 1997, p. 
98). For rules, norms, and cultural beliefs to become an institution, the activities that produce 
and reproduce them must be attended to, modified and preserved (Scott, 2001). So all in all, 
institutions are based on the relationship between historically embedded processes, shared 
rules, behaviours, and repeated actions which derives from these rules, or expresses 
conformity to the mentioned common ground. To become an actual institution, these rules and 
norms must also be accepted, by an authority (Scott, 2001) . Institutions can be characterized 
as having high levels of resilience, difficult to change and modify, and having tendency to be 
passed from generation to generation, to be preserved and repeated. Most importantly, they 
can also operate across multiple levels, from global to local level and to interpersonal 
relationships (Scott, 2001).  
The information given in the previous paragraph should be narrowed up a bit. First of 
all, it can be concluded, that the external setting in which organizations have to function is an 
institutional environment. This environment can be on one side socially constructed, on the 
other – it can take its roots from the government. Normally, it is a combination of two. The 
institutions can be considered rules of the game, while organizations can be considered 
players in the institutional environment set by these rules. Institutions and organizations are, 
in fact, in constant interaction, and organizations are the primary subject to institutional 
change (North, 1990). 
Institutions consist of formal rules and informal constrains. Helmke and Levitsky 
(2004) define the dual nature of institutions as follows: «formal institutions are openly 
codified, in the sense that they are established and communicated through channels that are 
widely accepted as official … informal institutions are socially shared rules, usually 
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unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned 
channels». As for this study, only formal institutions will be considered, since the main 
subject of the study are the condified regulations 
2.3.1.2 Principles of regulatory policies 
There may be huge differences among different regulatory policies. Sappington (1993) 
identifies, that the differences can be related to three criteria: a) the objectives and resources 
of the regulator; b) the institutions of the jurisdiction in which regulation is imposed; and c) 
the characteristics of the industry for which regulation is contemplated. Each of these factors 
was found to influence the distinguishing features of regulatory policy to a large degree. 
Moreover, Mr. Sappington delineates three key dimensions along which the policies may 
differ. These are form, function, and scope.  
The form of regulation defines the procedures employed to design and enforce 
regulatory rules, the nature the rules, and the locus of the authority in the regulatory sphere. A 
more subtle aspect of the form regulations take is the extent to which decision-making is 
delegated. There are two extremes on this dimension Command-and-control (centralized) and 
delegatory regulation. As an example, the author states the case of a water purification and 
delivery company. With command and control regulations, the authority might «dictate the 
exact details of the purification process, the rate at which water is purified, the type of pump 
and conduit used in water delivery, and the exact price at which water is sold to all 
customers» (Sappington, 1993). In case of the delegation, «the firm will be free to choose the 
purification process it prefers and the delivery system it finds to be most effective» 
(Sappington, 1993). However, there are also othe types of the delegatory regulations. 
Incentive regulation implies setting goals or targets is typical of, and the firm is assessed 
according to how its actual performance compares with the established targets. With potential 
regulation no specific restrictions are placed to the activities, unless the company shows to be 
unsatisfactory according to a prespecified criteria, for example the satisfaction of customers. 
All this can be summarized in the following Figure: 
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Figure 4. The form of regulations (Sappington, 1993) 
The function refers to the main scope of the regulations, what the regulations are there 
to do. The main aspect of the function is the extent to which regulations serve to inform others 
about the activity, rather than dictate which activities will be allowed, therefore the regulatory 
acts can be informing or enforcing (Sappington, 1993). The key distinction between informing 
and enforcing regulation what is actually afforded to the final consumers of a product. 
Informing regulation enables consumers to make their own choices based on the available 
information (for example, the list of preservatives on the package of a food product, or 
allergies the food can cause), while enforcing regulation makes choices for consumers (a 
product should not contain the prespecified preservatives or cause any allergies, but there 
won't be any information on the package).   
The scope represents the extent of the manner of the regulatory supervision and control 
and the extent to which the regulations ecompass the activities of a company (Sappington, 
1993). For example, in some industries the authorities can control the prices, limit the 
earnings, oversee the quality of the products, its major investments and the markets in which 
the firm is allowed to operate. In other industries the regulation is often more partial, and less 
comprehensive (Sappington, 1993).  
2.3.2 The contemporary context for HSE in offshore installations 
Based of the author's experience, knowledge, and the preliminary literature study the 
relation between the HSE regulations and procedures could be assumingly influenced by 
external factors (such as public opinions, pressure groupes, etc.), as well as internal factors of 
the industry, such as competition, context, history of the industry, etc. Thus, theoretical 
consideration on the various aspects of HSE can not be detached from the internal context of 
oil and gas industry (the external factors are out of the scope and focus of this study). 
Therefore, it is important to answer a question: Why such importance is given to this aspect in 
the activities of petroleum companies?.  
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Today, HSE seems to gain greater importance as an academic and professional field 
then ever. This might be due to several factors: first, the information about accidents is spread 
much more quickly with social media being the primary source of information for people 
across the world; second, the living memory of such accidents as Macondo Well or 
Deepwater horizon; third, the environmentalist movement becoming more and more popular 
(the green parties getting more votes that ever is clear indicator of it); fourth, the consumer is 
becoming more concious about the environmental and social problems in the world, and 
wishes not only to buy something, but also make a contribution to resolution of these 
problems. This subchapter aims to describe why HSE is relevant specifically to the oil and gas 
industry; its increasing presence as a field; and finally its current role in the oil and gas 
industry.  
2.3.2.1 The role of HSE in offshore oil and gas  
Health and safety risks related to the offshore petroleum activities cover an extensive 
number of areas, both in terms of causes of hazards and in terms of possible outcomes. «Risks 
include a large variety of factors, such as helicopter transport, fires and explosions (of 
hydrocarbons or other substances), blow-outs from wells, lifting and crane operations, and 
falling objects. Outcomes include fatalities as the worst case, in particular within the scenario 
of major accidents; they include occupational injuries, from cuts and bruises to serious and 
invalidating accidents, and also occupational illness, often as the result of long term exposures 
to various hazards (like noise, chemicals, bad ergonomics, etc.)» (Kringen, 2008). Risk 
indicators are now broadly categorized in terms of major accidents, occupational accidents 
and occupational health. There has been an increasing focus on the interactions between these 
broad categories, particularly in relation to the effects that the general working conditions 
have for operational safety. Such problems as physical and mental stress or fatigue may affect 
not only the health of individual workers, but also operational safety in the execution of tasks, 
and therefore safety in general (Kringen, 2008).  
The main focus of this study will be on the risk regulations in the Barents Sea, 
particularly applied to the Goliat field development, that is a project in the Norwegian part of 
the Barents sea, offshore the Norwegian Coast. In recent years, that major companies in oil 
and gas sector went totally «safety first». HSE assurance has become essential for offshore 
petroleum industry since they are highly exposed to hazardous situations because of the 
complexity of the technological equipment being used and the severity of the possible 
accidents to humans, as well as to the environment. Therefore, there are several good reasons 
to have sound HSE practices: a) investments in the offshore industry are several times higher 
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than that in any other production or process, b) offshore are very complex and advanced in 
design and technology, therefore it is extremely difficult, almost impossible to reconstruct or 
repair them in case of any damage (Chandrasekaran, 2016).  
In the following analysis Chandrasekaran emphasizes the relevance of HSE to the 
offshore industry should be understood in connection with the issues in petroleum production 
and processing. Making sure the operations are safe takes identifying, addressing, and 
reassessing the potential hazards on every stage of the project development and, most 
importantly, of the operations. The assessment includes both qualitative and quantitative 
methods. The primary objective is to guarantee safety for workers and to people located in the 
area of operations, and prevent any possible injuries, effects of health, or loss of life. 
Moreover, pollution and contamination should also include into safety evaluations. One 
should take into account, that the lack of safety may cause huge losses both in financial terms, 
and in terms of company's reputation and consequent loss of stakeholders and clients. This 
said, it can be concluded, that safety may be the single most important aspect for oil and gas 
operations, since bids are extremely high.  
2.3.2.2 Accidents in oil and gas  
Unfortunately, oil and gas industry has a long history of major accidents (PSA define 
a major accident as “an acute incident, such as a major discharge/emission or a fire/explosion, 
which immediately or subsequently causes several serious injuries and/or loss of human life, 
serious harm to the environment and/or loss of substantial material assets”) linked to health, 
safety, and environment. Moreover, in the public opinion it is still considered among the other 
industries to have the greatest potential for similar hazards. This claim is partly supported by 
the fact, that although one can have an ultra - efficient and sound HSE Risk Management 
System, the so-called black swan events (the unknown incidents impossible to predict) may 
still happen with technically complex objects (Aven, 2014) 
Unfortunately, in case of petroleum activities there is a large probability, that the 
potential events may be extremely harmful for people and the environment. However, the 
figures that follow this paragraph show that, in fact, the quantity of accidents has been 
continuosly decreasing over the last years (the last data that was available is due to 2007, so it 
can be expected that the major accidents are on their minimal historical levels now). 
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Figure 5. Blowouts Resulting in Pollution, by Geographical Area, 1970 – 2007 
(Source: OGP, 2011) 
 
Figure 6. Breakdown of Number of Fatalities and Number of Incidents by Year Period: Worldwide, 1970 – 2007 
(Source: OGP, 2011). 
 
Figure 7. Breakdown of Fatalities by Geographical Area: Worldwide, 1970 – 2007 (Source: OGP, 2011) 
The last fatal accident in Norway was dated 2002. Fatal accidents have now reached 
an extraordinary focus and concern. However, Norway was not exempt from such accidents. 
«The first fatal accident occurred in 1967. Since then there has been 260 fatalities, including 
fatalities related to major accidents.
 
The capsize of the Alexander Kielland flotel in 1980 
account for almost half of these, and the majority of fatalities have thus occurred as a result of 
major accidents (53 percent); and if we include helicopter accidents (17,7 percent of the total), 
fatalities related to major accidents account for 73 percent of the total number. Occupational 
accidents account for 23,8 percent, and diving accidents for 5,4 percent. If we only considerer 
figures after 1981, however, occupational accidents account for 64 percent of all fatalities. 
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During the 1980s, a considerable reduction in the number of fatalities was achieved. Until 
1980 there were 88 fatal accidents on the shelf. From 1980 to 1990 (disregarding the 
Alexander Kielland capsize) there were only 13 fatalities, in spite of the fact that the level of 
activity had quadrupled. Seven of these were diving accidents. From 1990 to 2000, there were 
7 fatalities related to occupational accidents, and since 2000 there have been only 3» (Kringen, 
2008).  
It should be noted, that the Kielland disaster was a major milestone in the development 
of the safety regime on the NCS, which is one of the main aspects of this study. The 
investigation of the Kielland incident, has actually coincided with another deadly accident off 
Scotland – the Piper Alpha disaster, which took lives of 167 people. All this has left a deep 
mark on Norway’s consciousness, and is among the key events in the development of today’s 
NCS safety regime, in which the main role was played by Magne Ognedal, the PSA's ex - 
director general. He also played an important role in the investigation of Piper Alpha disaster, 
and that experience and lessons learned was later reflected in reviewed Norwegian safety 
regime, adopted in 1985. Under his supervision the regulatory regime was rebuilt, pursuing 
the reorganisation of government regulatory responsibilities (PSA).  
2.3.2.3 Defining the Norwegian context and perspective  
With the first oil from the Norwegian Continental Shelf came specific measures aimed 
at prevent accidents from happening. The regulatory framework as a whole, however, has 
always «reflected the tradeoffs between providing incentives for the oil companies to engage 
in, invest, and produce, and at the same time to maximize the values extracted for the public 
through taxes, levies/royalties, and direct participation» (Kringen, 2008). The consideration 
on the regulation of health and safety aspects of the petroleum activities, with its upsides and 
downsides, have been part of these general considerations.  
Many contextual and other factors have contributed to the development of the 
Norwegian regulatory system. It has had several turning points (which are, however, still 
subject to debate): first safety regulations of the exploration and drilling period from the mid 
1960s, the regulation of fixed installations in 1976 ; the introduction of the Working 
Environment Act in 1977; the introduction of internal control systems during the 1980s; the 
so-called NORSOK-process during the 1990s; and the new regulatory framework established 
in 2002 (Kringen, 2008).  
The first ever safety framework for the NCS was issued by Royal Decree in 1965, 
preparing for the first rounds of petroleum explorations. In 1967, the first set of rules was 
expanded to regulations, containing 130 sections, mainly covering safety issues in a manner 
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of establishing what is right to do and what is not for an industry carrying out activities. These 
regulations were to a large degree based on these in the UK, characterized by a heavy reliance 
on industrial standards and ‘good practice’ in the industry (Kringen, 2008). It should be 
mentioned, that at that time the political administration had little knowledge and limited 
resources to handle the emerging complex industry, therefore the industry was invited to 
cooperate and participate in the development of policies and regulations (Kringen, 2008). 
However, after a series of accidents, the heavy reliance on «self-regulation» of the industry 
was replaced with a more critical attitude, but in case of occupational health and safety such 
considerations were so insignificant, that the existing legislation for occupational health and 
safety was almost not applied at all, granting “a zone of regulatory exclusion” to the emergent 
industry (Kringen, 2008).  
The second point took place in the middle of 70's, starting from the establishment of 
the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD). The new body was given the task of resource 
management and safety regulation, while major legislative proposals rested with the 
Government and ministries (Kringen, 2008). Along with these events, the industry was 
steadily expanding, and the second generation regulations were adopted. They relied even 
more heavily on the idea of self – regulation of the industry, however, a new concept of 
«internal control» was first introduced and made part of the safety regulations. According to 
this principle, the industry, as a separate obligation, should implement a system of 
identification of the relevant requirements and comply to these, while taking corrective 
actions if needed. Evidently, these stronger and more prescriptive provisions provided a 
possibility for authority intervention. For example, these provisions could directly influence 
the technology and design of platforms: Statfjord B had to be reconstructed according to the 
new requirement of the NPD not to place living quarter on top of the installation (Ibid). This 
even has demonstrated the willingness of the authorities to adopt alternative solutions, if these 
demonstrate to be sufficiently safe. Moreover, the companies now had to report to the 
authorities, responsible for offshore safety.   
The next turning point, the introduction of the WEA, has «greatly improved conditions 
for offshore workers, regulating working hours, providing protection against unwarranted 
dismissals, and facilitating a more efficient involvement in decision making. For several years, 
a double regulatory track was thus followed, containing somewhat different regulatory 
philosophies, WEA and the safety regulations. The latter was more managerially oriented in 
emphasizing management systems and leadership responsibilities, while the former promoted 
and even presupposed active worker participation» (Ibid).  
After the Bravo blow-out in 1977 a discussion has appeared regarding the possible 
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«administrative and political goal conflicts in the regulatory system. As a result, health and 
safety issues were separated from the resource management. The NPD was left intact, but 
safety regulations were transferred to the ministry responsible for the WEA, and the agency 
was correspondingly split in two divisions, each reporting to their ministries» (Kringen, 2008).  
During the next years the development of this new concept was taken further along 
with the general move towards rules that simply state the results to be achieved: the 
regulations were gradually becoming more risk - and performance-based. As for safety 
regulations, the first guidelines for «self control» for licensees was issued in 1979, and in 
1981 these were developed as guidelines for «internal control», requiring that management 
systems for safety be developed (Ibid). So now it became up to the industry to supplement the 
vague requirements set by the authorities adopting more detalized norms internally (Kaasen, 
2014). «In 1980, the first guidelines for risk analysis were introduced, including partially 
quantified risk acceptance criteria (such as for the availability of efficient escape ways). Also, 
the guidelines introduced a quantified cut-off threshold related to the impairment frequency of 
types of accidents that could be disregarded in risk evaluations, the so-called 10-4 criterion» 
(Kringen, 2008)  
During the 1980s the internal control principles became firmly entrenched within the 
regulatory system. Goal oriented rules replaced prescriptive rules, and the new regime with 
systems audits and accompanying verifications was established (Ibid). The rules were 
becoming functional requirements, supported by sophisticated and detailed guidelines and 
recommendations. These last two legislative documents did not represent legally binding acts, 
but just inducations on how to fulfill legally binding requirements (Kaasen, 2014). However, 
«…regulatory interventions also included more direct interferences in designs, technologies, 
and solutions» (Kringen, 2008) 
Towards the end of the 1980s, a significant drop in oil prices reduced profits and 
increased competition on the NCS. This led to the establishment of the so-called NORSOK 
program, the main purpose of which was to increase the competitiveness of the Norwegian 
industry through joint actions of industrial actors and the state in elaboration of cost – 
effective and technological and organizational solutions (routines, procedures, and standards) 
(Kringen, 2008). The requirements that define safety goals, risk acceptance criteria, 
documentation of safety systems became more general and goal – oriented (Ibid). The new 
risk regulation was more specific in outlining the risk analysis process than risk thresholds 
and methodology (Ibid).  
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The regulations as we know them today imply a direct connection with the operator by 
the authorities, since today the requirements are almost totally generalized and the burden of 
proof and responsibility is on the operator. Additionally, the regulations might call for 
governmental approval or exemptions; the authorities can also intervene in case of, for 
example,  non-compliance with what is considered by them to represent a safe practice. The 
dry residue is, however, that the general requirements applied for every company operating on 
the NCS, today are usually accompanied by case-specific and subject-specific individual 
requirements (Kaasen, 2014). These are much rigid, detalized, specified, and sometimes hard 
to predict.  
2.3.3 Management of HSE issues  
The risk management in HSE is, to a large degree, product of the long history of 
accidents and the gradual recognition of the inportance of this aspect by the industry. Today, 
companies have elaborated effective and sound HSE management tools. One of the first 
companies to implement and extensive management system to deal with HSE-related matters 
was Royal Dutch Shell, when in 1984 the Enhanced Safety Management system was first 
introduced (Zijlker, 2004). This system is widely considered a milestone towards a more  
effective HSE management, especially due to the fact that it facilitated an implementation and 
improvement of HSE culture among the workers of the organization (Ibid). Other oil 
companies have followed the steps of Shell, and implemented their own systems for managing 
HSE.  
Speaking of the general risk management approach in companies, it can be illustrated 
in a Figure from the work of Terje Aven (2014) entiteled «Risk, Surprises and Black Swans). 
The author sees risk management as a fragile «balance» between the costs and benefits and 
risk assessment and acceptance.  
 
 
 
	 38	
 
Figure 8. Risk management as an act of balance (Aven, 2014) 
Having a widespread good practice and culture of HSE can be considered a common 
goal for the common good: to make sure the activities are safe and not dangerous for the 
environment is a good for the oil and gas industry, as well as humanity in general. 
Understanding their huge responsibility and addressing questions that arise from the public, 
today companies strive for transparency in HSE - related matter:  major international oil 
companies, especially those that specialise in upstream, e.g. Statoil, ExxonMobil, BP, 
Chevron & Eni – all have implemented and made publicly available their HSE and Risk 
Management Systems (Berg, Malikova, 2015). 
2.3.4 Technical aspects related to HSE in offshore installations 
In the subchapter 2.3.2.1 it was mentioned, offshore installations is a very complex 
system from a technical point of view. Therefore, any possibility of an hazard should be 
reduced to minimum possible levels. This subchapter was thinked only after the work on the 
case study – its aim is to provide a brief introduction to several technical properties of the 
offshore installations. The idea of doing this was triggered by the analysis of the Goliat 
project design and its plan for development and operations, that revealed a close attention 
drawn specifically to the following aspects of the design and technical equipment of the 
installation: barrier management, contingency strategy, water purification and reinjection 
system.  
Barriers 
Barriers are a measure to avoid or mitigate the consequences of accidents and have 
been a common practice in the Norwegian oil and gas activities for a long time. The 
Norwegian authorities, especially the PSA, have put a strong emphasis on barriers, especially 
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their technical properties, reliability and functionality (Røssland, 2012).  
There is a wide range of the definitions of barriers, however for this report the 
definition introduced by Snorre Sklet will be used. In his article «Safety barriers: Definition, 
classification, and performance» (2006) he gives the following definition of barriers: 
«…physical and/or non physical means planned to prevent, control, or mitigate undesired 
events or accidents. The means may range from a single technical unit or human actions, to a 
complex socio – technical system. It is useful to distinguish between barrier functions and 
barrier systems. Barrier functions describe the purpose of safety barriers or what the safety 
barriers shall do in order to prevent, control, or mitigate undesired events or accidents. Barrier 
systems describe how a barrier function is realized and executed. If the barrier system is 
functioning, the barrier function is performed. If a barrier function is performed successfully, 
it should have a direct and significant effect on the occurrence and/or consequences of an 
undesired event or accident». Barriers have three subcategories: organizational, physical, and 
technical. According to the requirements of the PSA, the Norwegian regulatory authority, «it 
shall be known what barriers have been established and which function they are intended to 
fulfill». Therefore, the primary requirement to barriers should be the formalization of their 
functions in relation to the specific hazards. In reference to the offshore operations, barriers 
represent one of the contingency measures to prevent the oil compounds to spread. 
Contingency plan 
The national contingency plan in Norway is standardized and co-ordinated, so in case 
a spill occurs the national contingency system will work together as a single, integrated 
response organization; the system is devided into three levels: private (industry), municipal 
and governmental. Each level is assigned a specific area of responsibility (Nerland, 2001). 
The requirements are primarily applied to the companies that conduct activities on the NCS: 
in order for the project to be approved the operator should present a sound contingency plan, 
that is essencially is set of measures the company is planning to undertake in case of an acute 
pollution. The primary objective of the contingency plan is to recover oil close as close as 
possible to the source of contamination (ITOPF) 6 . Additionally, since in Norway the 
responsibility for combatting pollution is subdivided in 32 intermunicipal preparedness areas, 
the company should hold consultations with the municipalities directly influenced by the field 
development. The removal of oil includes two two measures: physical removal and 
supplementary removal with chemical dispersals (Ibid). 
Several organizations provide the necessary equipment for oil spill removal: the NCA 
																																																						
6	www.itopf.com. Documents and Guides. Response Techniques	
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possesses and maintaints the oil spill response depots along the Norwegian Coast. Additionaly, 
it holds on contact several naval defence vessels capable of oil recovery. Vessels from civilian 
coastal patrol and fishing vessels can also be used, as well as an aircraft equipped with SLAR. 
The NOFO possesses a number of large supply ships, maintains five equipment depos and 
helicopters put on hold. The industry itself also maintains large stockpiles of equipment (Ibid).  
When assessing the oil spill contingency plan, the company should present an 
integrated, sound and detalized plan, that would have mobilized all the contingency 
possibilities the country provides. 
Water reinjection 
First it should be described where the water in offshore activities comes from. 
Normally the term “produced water” means the mixture of water and oil. Oil and gas 
reservoirs have a natural water layer that lies under the layer of hydrocarbons, commonly 
known as formation water. At a certain point in production, the water reaches the production 
wells and so the water production starts (Atarah, 2011). Norwally, the biggest amount of 
water is contained in the oil reservoirs compared to that in gas reservoirs. Moreover, 
additional water may be injected in the reservoir water layer to achieve more pressure, and 
therefore recover more hydrocarbons. As the reservoir becomes more depleted, the amount of 
produced water simultaneously increases. At the surface, the produced water should be 
subject to either separated from the oil compounds and then discharged, or reinjected into the 
wells or the reservoir. The last, however, can only be achieved implementing the newest 
technology (Elkins, Vanner, Firebrace, 2005).  
The properties of produced water and its volumes are different to each field, and 
therefore require an individual plan for separation from oil compounds and purification. In 
ordet to do this, the operator should do an analysis of produced water constituents, primarily 
concerning oil constituents. The organic and inrganic compounds of produced water has its 
influence on the selection of chemical additives for oil/water separation process (Atarah, 
2015). 
Hydrocarbons occur naturally in the produced water. They include organic acids, 
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), phenols and volatiles. These hydrocarbons are 
considered to contribute the most to produces water toxicity. The available literature suggests, 
that the components of the PW that represent the most harm are: PAHs – polycyclic aromatic 
hydrocarbons and alkylphenols (C6-C9 according to Frost (1998), and C4-5 according to 
Myhre (2004). According to a more recent research by Faksness (2004), 85% of the C4-C5 
alkylphenols dissolve in water, but suggests that more that 80% of PAHs reside in the 
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dispersed oil content (Elkins, Vanner, Firebrace, 2005).  
There is still a scientific discussion of whether substances that remain in the PW 
represent risk to the environment, which is correlated with the perception of risk – the concept 
that will be assessed in the next Chapter. In case there is no evidence that the produced water 
causes no harm to the environment (living species), there will be no reason for the further 
abatement of the regulations. However, the risk may arise from the perceptions that the PW 
causes harm or might potentially cause harm, whether or not there is an actual science 
underneath. According to the precautionary principle used in the UK regulations, the 
unavailability of research does not imply that the substances are not harmful (Elkins, Vanner, 
Firebrace, 2005). It should be mentioned, that the initial requirement for the goliath field was 
zero percent discharges to the sea. 
2.3.5 Organizational aspects of HSE 
2.3.5.1 Organizational theory 
The actions and behaviours of an organisation become significantly influenced by the 
institutional context in which they are located and various components of the institutional 
environment define what is deemed as appropriate for an organization operating within this 
environment (Barley & Tolbert, 1997)  
There is a wide selection of literature on the organizational behavior. Organizational 
theory depicts the organizations as agents that respond to certain circumstances and situations 
(Greenwood, Suddaby, Oliver, & Sahlin, 2008). In the 20th century organizations were 
viewed as systems responsible for mass production, while in the modern times, organizations 
are considered to be complex entities with their own culture, beliefs, social structure, and that 
pursue their own goals. The answer to the question why organizations behave in a certain way 
lies within internal (people, organizational culture and structure, managerial styles, etc.), as 
well as external dimention (environment). In fact, according to Hrebiniak and Joyce (1985), 
organizational acts may have managerial (management teams differ in successfulness of their 
choices in the same environment) or environemental origins (selection of strategy that works 
best for a certain environment).  
Other studies of organizational behaviour have shown that organizations are always 
part of a bigger social system, and therefore they seek legitimacy within it (Berg, Malikova, 
2015). It is expressed in congruence to the norms and values of the environment around them. 
If  the two systems are in line, the organization can be considered legitimate. In case of 
discrepancies between the two, the organizational legitimacy might be put in jeopardy. 
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“Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). The path towards legitimacy has two 
optional ways: passive conformity and active conformity.  
Institutional behaviours are “observable, recurrent activities and patterns of interaction 
characteristic of a particular setting” (Barley & Tolbert, 1997, p. 98). By modifying their 
behaviour to become isomorphic to institutions within their particular environment, 
organisations enhance legitimacy, and therefore their chance to survive.  
The behavioural modifications can take two forms. Institutional theory refers to 
passive conformity as in this case organizational legitimacy becomes sort of a side effect of 
organizational adaptation to particular structures, beliefs and behaviours – institutional 
environment, while subject to cultural and social pressure enacted from the outside world 
(Suchman, 1995). So in this case an organizationcc adopts what is considered «normal» in this 
society in order to comply, and therefore get legitimized. 
In contrast, strategic choice can be depicted as sort of active conformity, that views 
legitimacy as an operational resource organisations can extract and adopt, often competitively, 
from their environment in an attempt to meet their strategic goals (Suchman, 1995). Strategic 
choice focuses on analysing how characteristics of an organization are influenced by the 
internal settings and properties, instead of the external environment. 
Organizations are primarily formed by individuals, who might interpret the external 
environment differently. The mentioned interaction between organizations and rules of the 
game is all about choices. Individuals are the main actors in organizations, and they may 
make choices based on costs, benefits, basing their views on on subjective perceptions; 
sometimes (or usually) on imperfect information. All this can result in institutional changes 
(North, 1990)  
Key decision makers and those who possess more power are of particular importance 
in this context. They evaluate and define their position within the environment, and 
consequently take over only the necessary, or elaborate new institutional norms, behaviours, 
which in their opinion is in line with organizational goals and better suits the needs of 
adaptation and suvival. So in the described situation it is not the external environment that is 
forcing the organization to comply, but key people in the organization.  
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According to Johnston (2013), “Strategic choice suggests that an organisation’s 
decision makers are able to override the physical environment in which they operate; 
isomorphism is not inevitable for organisations within an industry sector”.  
Nonetheless, in reality, organisations are faced with both strategic operational 
challenges as well as institutional pressures (Suchman, 1995). Therefore, to effectively 
analyse the actions and behaviours of an organisation, one must look at the larger picture and 
incorporate the potential for duality of both these two concepts demonstrated by an 
organisation.  
2.3.5.2 Organizational isomorphism 
The contemporary context of internationalization and globalization implies that a 
considerable amount of companies from all over the world have branches, subsidiaries, and 
partnes in other countries. This means not only homogenization, but at the same time 
differenciation and further complication of the environment organizations exist in, that 
therefore patterns of adaptation to it.  
In practice this means, that the internatinal companies operating in a certain country 
become uniform to the organizational and regulatory context the operate in. This problem was 
examined in a study of organizational isomorphism by DiMaggio and Powell (1983). The 
primary objective of this research was to find common pattern of and triggers of this 
adjustment. This research lated has become widely recognized as a milestone of the 
organizational theory.  
The two scientists confronted Max Weber's point of view on why organizations tend to 
be so similar. He was of the opinion, that organizations, following the aims of rationalization 
and meeting competition with other organizations on the market, become bureacritized 
institutions and that's indeed the bureaucracy that makes them so uniform. The two scientists 
argue, instead of just being rational, organizations start to resemble each other when they 
grow bigger, become more structured and establish themselves in a certain field. This process 
was called isomorphism: this concept, according to the two scientists, has been already 
introduced in a classic study by Hawley (1968) in reference to the social behavior theory. 
Isomorphism was defined as a «constraining process, that forces one unit of a population to 
resemble other units, that face the same set of environmental conditions». 
The organizations follow the same path as described by Hawley, called «institutional 
isomorphism», that means organizations change their features and characteristics to match 
with the properties of the environment around them. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) found three 
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main mechanisms of institutional isomorphism: (1) coercive isomorphism: organizations 
become homogenized because of enforcements deriving from political systems they are in; or 
the need for legitimacy, both in a formal and informal sense, e.g. the laws, norms of a society; 
(2) mimetic isomorphism: organizations become homogenized, because an organization facing 
uncertainty in the institutionalized environment may copy another, more successful 
organization or an entity, that has been in this environment for a long time, and in this way 
methods to address this incertitude become similar between the economic actors willing to 
adopt safe and well established practices to mitigate risk of failure; (3) normative 
isomorphism: organizations become homogenized because their participants possess same 
knowledge, professional characteristics, personal qualities, or points of view because of 
similar education, background or professional network of professionals alike.  
Coersive pressure 
The research question for this study is to a certain extent in line with the types of 
isomorphism introduced by DiMaggio and Powell, however the three main isomorphistic 
mechanisms require a more thorough description. Coersive isomorphism can result in both 
formal and informal pressures by other organizations, and culture in which they function. 
These pressures can take different forms, sometimes organizations have to respond directly to 
the governmental dicisions, i.e. adopting new legally binding rules or regulations regarding a 
specific area of activity. (Ibid) Organizations, on their turn, come to reflect institutionalized 
and legitimized rules in a particular state, and therefore they acquire similarities that were 
formed because of the need to conform to a bigger institution (Ibid). Outside the 
governmental sphere of influence, similar patterns can be seen inside the big international 
companies, when branches and subsidiaries become subject to standardized management 
mechanisms, practices, and policies (Ibid). However, Di Maggio and Powell emphasize, that 
coercive isomorphism may be not so direct as in the stated examples, but rather more flexible 
and subtle.  
Mimetic pocesses 
Another type of isomorphism is referred to as mimetic, and the name itself reflects its 
main characteristic: imitation, because to mimic is to copy the behavior of others. Mimetic 
pressure occurs when an organization is trying to copy the behavior of other organizations in 
their environment to gain success or legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). While the main 
feature of the coercive pressure is dependence, that of the mimetic pressure is uncertainty. 
This characteristic aspect of the environment and objectives leads organizations to identify 
and adopt the practices of other, seemingly more successful organizations (Ibid). This 
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uncertainty can be understood as unclear goals and objectives; new technologies are being 
developed and put to use; the customer preference is unclear, and so on (Ibid).  
The concept of «uncertainty» in oil and gas is twofold: first, it is tightly connected 
with risk, second - with knowledge, understanding (of a certain aspect), or the lack of it, and 
the flaws in knowledge are in direct correlation the risk. Therefore, in the context of oil and 
gas, the organization would rather seek to identify and implement the necessary knowledge 
base and experience of the leading organizations within their own environment, organizational 
field, and georgraphical area.  
Normative pressure 
This mechanism is based on the concept of normality, i.e. what is considered to be the 
correct, right, and what is considered a publicly approved way of behavior. Normative 
isomorphism is therefore driven by adapting to the practice that is common within the 
organizational field and is practiced by other employees, which governed by professionalism 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Professionalism, as was understood by DiMaggio and Powell, is, 
firstly, the process adapting and cognitive base that is formed by the educational institutions, 
university specialists or scientists. Secondly, it is an effect of the professional networks, where 
it is not rare that people, who went to the same universities discuss ideas, their work, their 
palns, what their companies plan to do etc. All in all, it is a formulation of a collective 
understanding of the appropriate behavior, set of rules, and, most importantly, knowledge 
among the professional members of similar organizations (Ibid).  
The research question of this study of this study is how did Eni align it's regulations to 
the institutional environment it is in, so it is implicitly presupposed that several, if not all the 
mechanisms are present in the company. To thoroughly analyse these mechanisms in a 
specific organization, one should look at the whole history of the company’s presence on a 
certain market, which is way beyond the scope of this study. What is important for this thesis 
is try to understand which of these types of pressures were manifested in a particular moment 
of time in the company’s history, whether they blended together, or were not present at all. 
For these reasons, the three mechanisms will be brought back in the Discussion part of this 
thesis.  
2.4 Summary 
The Teoretical Framework for this study is quite large and has quite a lot of 
subchapters, because the concepts of HSE, risk, and safety - are complex and multifaced. 
Moreover, the context of the offshore oil and gas industry was also emphasized, because it is 
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directly connected to the fact that HSE risk management is so important. All in all, this 
chapter includes relevant theory that is related not only to the mentioned concepts, but also 
relevant for the further analysis of the regulations and for the case study was presented.  
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3 Chapter 3. Methodology 
3.1 Research design and philosophy 
Research design as all about making a choice: what will be observed and how. 
Moreover, a researcher should ask himself or herself what data will be collected, how, and 
from which sources, what should be primarily reflected in it; how this data will be analyzed 
and how it can provide answers to the main question(s) of the research or a study (Easterby-
Smith, Thorpe, Jackson, 2012).  
There is a variety of approaches that exist and are contrary to eachother, but it is 
widely accepted that a research design should create the best value, in a sense that it should be 
able to provide the unique and the most suitable approach towards a specific problem in a way 
to uncover the maximum from the underlying truth of the matter. This said, this part will be 
concentrated on finding research philosophy and design that will best suit the whole study, 
rather than describing the philosophical dabate and provide an explanation to every approach.  
What will be researched? Conceptually, this thesis acompasses three realities: one 
external that can also be considered institutional (legislative framework), second that is 
organizational (internal regulations), and third is the environmental and regulatory context 
applied to the Barents Sea. The case study will be based on a specific project and the 
assumption, that these three contexts have influenced the company's actions on a specific 
stage of a project. There might be also sort of an interaction between these three realities and 
the company's actions. The goal thus is to find the possible points of interation that define the 
company's actions. 
This assumption is based on the claim, that human constructed concepts such as HSE, 
risk, safety, and regulation appear to give wide possibilities for interpretations based on the 
context they are being used, therefore this study have several limitations, mentioned in the 
Chapter 1. The existence of this «context» means the presence of a hermeneutical component 
(a technique historically known for interpreting the Biblic writings - Dilthey & Jameson, 
1972), which, in fact, will be later described more specifically as applied to the research 
design .   
Starting from the conclusion drawn in the theoretical part, e.g. that the regulations 
represent the approaches of risk management in HSE, a descriptive/analytical part concerning 
Norwegian governmental regulations of the oil and gas activities and Eni regulatory 
framework of risk management in the company and its subsidiaries (Chapter 4), will establish 
this context for the research problem, while the Hypothesis 1 will be tested and consecutive 
conclusions will be made. Than it will all be narrowed to a case-study of the operational stage 
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of Goliat FPSO, which, supported by the information from the interviews and the 
environmetal aspects of the Barents Sea, will illustrate how these three contexts interact an 
being applied in a real project.  
The final conclusions are to be made in the conclusions to the study. In reference to 
the research problem it should be noted, that the company's «alignment» to the legislation in 
the country it operates is expected to be related to specific actions, defined by HSE risk 
management regulations, since, according to the theory and the Hypothesis 1, they are all 
different. 
This research, in fact, has essentially three sets of data to be assessed: the Norwegian 
HSE regulations for oil and gas activities, Eni internal regulations of HSE and risk 
management, Goliat documentation related to communication with the authorities, and 
interviews of personnel. All sets of data are socially constructed and it might be, in fact, the 
case when the data itself provides the researcher with the most suitable methodology, while 
the researcher starts with no presuppositions, and therefore free of bias. Will the presentation 
of the legislative framework on one hand and regulatory framework on another completely 
free from bias? One would say probably not, since a person presents the information, and this 
inevitably involves a certain degree of interpretation anyway. It’s true, that one should present 
the information in its integrity, but at the same time one also introduces it according to certain 
predefined criteria, that correspond to his/hers presuppositions on why the information you 
are referring to is important. But what is an interpretation? And to what degree it can be bias 
– free? It is hard to answer this question, but it is important to emphasize some considerations. 
Primary to the data collection, the author did not suggest there is either a similarity of 
huge difference between the two regulatory sistems. Niether did the author have any previous 
knowledge on how an international oil company manages its compliance with the legal 
frameworks of different countries related to HSE issues, or any idea on how these regulations 
were adjusted to the fragile environment of the Arctic. Moreover, the author of this study had 
no experience of studying reglations or legal aspects of the company's activities. The author 
has just inferred from his personal experience, some basic knowledge of the Norwegian 
context and the problems associated with the oil and gas activities in the arctic. So it is 
possible to say, that the author approached this study free from bias. 
The first indicator that the study is constructivist in its nature is that it has all started 
with an idea in mind, which was not only based on the available sources, but also on the 
author’s personal interest and experience. This said, it resembles more an educated guess 
based on a personal, and therefore subjective view of a situation in question. Nonetheless, also 
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according to the previous knowledge of the author (which is not only his knowledge, but more 
a general knowledge found in the mass media) there is one objective fact: the platform did not 
started producing as it was scheduled in the project development plan. So all in all, this study 
will deal with socially constructed realities (institutional level and company level) in a real 
life context of the opertional stage of a project. Thus in the end it is an interaction between 
subjective reality, and objective reality. 
Taking into consideration all the information above, the study should employ a 
qualitative methodology in all its parts. Moreover, the study should be mainly focused on the 
regulations as a representation of risk management approaches.  
The spotlight is thus directed on the combination of internal organizational processes, 
assumingly influenced by external environment while dealing with objective reality, which in 
this case take the form of the climate and laws of physics. In other words, all stated in the 
previous sentece can be described as managing uncertainty, and therefore risk. The 
approaches of risk management are reflected in the regulations and assumingly in the 
company's actions (on the operational stage of the project), which can provide a much more 
specific and clear picture, that just the regulations themselves.  
What can represent the main data sources for this kind of study? In this regard 
Mintzberg (1979, p. 586) states: “Measuring in real organizational terms means first of all 
getting out, into real organizations.  Questionnaires often won’t do.  Nor will laboratory 
simulations…  The qualitative research designs, on the other hand, permit the researcher to 
get close to the data, to know well all the individuals involved and observe and record what 
they do and say”.  Therefore it will only be possible to arrive to the final conclusion with the 
aid of the documents, illustrating the company's work on the Goliat project and interviews 
with relevnat personnel.  
According to several indicators mentioned above, it is also possible to state that the 
study is assuming an epistemological position resembling the social constructivist paradigm. 
There is, in fact, no objective truth to uncover, and thus the study is seeking to find knowledge 
through personal interactions (Easterby - Smith, Thorpe & Jackson, 2012). It will include in - 
depth interviews with industry representatives and staff from the HSEQ department in Eni 
Norge, and, accordingly, it would be wrong to assume that everything that will be heard is an 
objective truth, while it would be right to suggerst that the conversations, discussions, or 
descriptions will involve a certain persent of interpretations, e.g. constructionism. Moreover, 
the documents that will be analyzed usually have a specific format, layount, structure and, 
most importantly, the requirements regarding the information that needs to be presented.  
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Same consideretions can be applied to legislation and company's regulations. These 
represent sound, carefully evaluated and elaborated bodies of text, that include definitions, 
notions, facts, prescriprions, and principles. Nonetheless, the laws can be applied and treated 
differently, so it can not be taken for granted that the laws and legislation equals scientific fact. 
According to Kukla (2000), facts can also be interpreted in a different way.  
Another consideration regarding the constructivist nature of this research is reflected 
in how Rosbult (PhD) defines the truth as what actually is happening in reality7, or what 
actually did happen in reality. A humanly constructed theory claims to describe and/or explain 
reality, to understand reality.  «When we make claims based on a theory (by assuming the 
theory is true, and using "if... then..." logic by thinking "if this theory is true, then …") we are 
making truth-claims about the reality of what is happening now, or did happen in the 
past.  Our truth-claims are true if if they are correct, if they correspond to the truth of what 
actually is happening (or did happen) in reality;  and our truth-claims are false if they are 
wrong, if they do not match the truth defined by reality» (Rusbult). 
The opinion introduced by Kukla that facts are also being interpreted differently is 
perfectly in line with the claims of Ken Ham (2003) in the article “Searching for Magic 
Bullet”8. Referring to the creationist versus evolutionist debate, he come up with a point of 
view that all scientists are actually dealing with the same amount of data, observations, facts, 
nonetheless they interpret them differently, and that’s where the debate really is: “Ultimately, 
the argument (evolution versus creation) is about how you interpret the facts-and this depends 
upon your belief about history. The real difference is that we have different “histories”…, 
which we use to interpret the science or the facts about present”.  In other words, because of 
the fact that nobody knows exactly what did happen in reality, scientists have to interpret facts 
and make reality claims based on these facts, but the interpretations can be very different 
because simply everyone is different, although facts (or scientific evidence) are the same. 
These claims explain, why risk management regulations are so different.  
But what does risk management regulations represent? What is the purpose? Back to 
Rusbult, according to the postmodernist theory, the truth is relative and sometimes the 
perspectives on truth actually blur the line between belief and reality. Rusbult emphasizes that 
there is an important difference between humanly-constructed reality and human-independent 
reality. «A modern example of humanly constructed reality is the societal agreement, adopted 
																																																						
7 http://www.asa3.org/ASA/education/views/reality.htm. Article «Reality 101: Basic Concepts of Truth and 
Postmodernism (truth by correspondence or construction)». The article has no date. 
8	https://answersingenesis.org/evidence-for-creation/searching-for-the-magic-bullet/	
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by consensus and institutionalized in traffic laws, that we will stop at a red light, and that in 
America (and in continental Europe but not Britain or Japan) we will drive on the right side of 
the road» (Rusbult).  
«But if there is a collision, due to someone running a red light or driving on the wrong 
side or making some other mistake, humans do not construct the laws of physics that 
determine what happens during the collision.  Yes, we can minimize the harmful results of a 
collision by constructing cars with air bags, collapsible bumpers, and other safety 
features.  But we achieve this humanly-constructed reality (in which we have safer cars) by 
acknowledging and understanding a human-independent reality (involving the physics of 
collisions).  We can build safer cars by cooperating with reality, by designing cars within the 
context of the physics that really exists.  But we cannot build safer cars by denying this reality, 
by trying to overcome it through faith in a kinder-and-gentler physics we have 
constructed;  during a collison we would prefer this physics, but we cannot produce it» 
(Rusbult). 
So conceptually, risk management can be viewed as a meeting point of subjective – 
objective reality. From the previously mentioned theory more questions do arise on how we 
perceive information about the phenomena: whether it is a testament of an objective truth or 
socially constructed reality.  Generally speaking, the phenomenon studied in this research is 
HSE risk management on different levels – on a governmental level, and on the company-
level. Thus, the main point of the assumption is that this procedure arises from how the 
objective reality is perceived on different institutional levels, and how it is managed within a 
specific organization, and how external subjective reality influences these managerial choices.  
Nevertheless, the question then remains: why is HSE management not an objective 
truth? First, phenomena we would normally consider as more solid has in certain circles 
already been accepted as socially constructed. Especially considering the fact that this concept 
is not an observable objective fact. Although this notion is not similar to such concepts such 
as humanity, gender, race, emotions, which modern researchers tend to view as socially 
constructed (Kukla, 2000), it still can not be observed in nature, and therefore according to 
positivist methodology, is not an objective fact. Secondly, if HSE management was an 
objective truth, then more uniformity in definitions and approaches not only on different 
institutional levels, but in different societies would be observable. Nevertheless, what we see 
now is that there is, in fact, a great discrepancy between how the legal frameworks are created, 
formulated and exercised, and controlled – and there are also differences among how the 
companies choose to interpret the concept itself and HSE management as a procedure.  
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Berger & Luckmann (1966) study the relativity of reality and knowledge in society 
and between them, stating that a person’s reality and knowledge differs with his or her social 
setting. This paves the way for another argument, that individually, all people experience 
different realities and have different knowledge. The same statement can be applied to 
companies, which differ in their core business, goals and objectives, organizational culture 
and so on. Companies and governmental bodies consist of people, and some people have the 
responsibility for adopting a unique definition of, for example HSE and its management, that 
they consider the most applicable only in this company or country. Considering that this study 
is primarily concentrated on one company, it can be argued that the perception of reality 
would be fundamentally different among, lets say, board of directors of this company and any 
other company, which strengthens the argument that the concept of HSE, as well as several 
other concepts relevant to this study, are socially constructed.  
From the analysis conducted in the previous paragraphs it can be inferred, that this 
study is adopting a point of view that everything is constructed, except for the laws of physics, 
the external reality independent from people. This study, in fact, balances between the two 
versions of reality that were described in one of the previous paragraphs. It is a bridge 
between two realities: one is undoubtedly constructed (the governmental legislative 
framework, Eni's internal regulatory framework), and the other represents the objectivity of 
reality of the conditions in the Barents Sea, and the risk that derives from them.  
Both constructed realities are introducing order: in one case, it's order for operations 
and activities, that are ultimately related to well being of a nation, in another – order inside a 
company, which is vital for the company's future and reputation. The common thread is, 
nonetheless, an interaction that is assumed to be present between the reality that is a given, e.g. 
it is already there, established, and the reality that has to adapt to what is given. This 
adaptation and interaction, which is essentially what is going to be studied, is also constructed 
by humans, and therefore the knowledge that this paper is posing the goal to uncover what is 
socially constructed, e.g. made by humans. So it can finally be concluded, that a milder 
constructionist methodolody might be the best choice for this study, because the the problem 
does not imply an objective truth to be uncovered, but instead how constructed realities 
transform under the pressure of the objective facts, or human – independent reality, according 
to Rusbult. 
The problem of this study primarily poses itself a question «how». This implies the 
existence of an assumption, that is human constructed by its nature. The ideas on of socially 
constructed knowledge were described by Mannheim, Berger and Luckmann («The social 
construction of reality», 1967), Lincoln and Guba (The Natualistic inquiry, 1985), and later by 
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Lincoln and Guba (2000), Shwandt (2000), Neuman (2000), and Crotty (1998) among the 
others. One assumption is similar in all of these studies, that individuals seek to understand 
reality around them, in which they live and work, and the conclusions they come to becomes 
their knowledge, experience, e.g. the basis people recall when it comes to decision making, 
and what is prior to this – give meanings to situations they find themselves in. In order to gain 
more knowledge about the world a person might develop subjective, attributed towards certan 
objects and things meanings of their personal experiences. 
Following this logic, and considering the primary building block of amy organization 
are people, they will act in a similar way. This assumption takes the path introduced by North 
in 1990 further. It actually opposes his point of view: in modern day organizations the role of 
key decision makers decreases, and key decisions are more and more a collaborative, 
interactive effort, which not only involves actors whithin the organization, but outside it as 
well. 
The meanings, knowledge, experience – all together they form a caleidoscope of 
people's individuality and professionalism. Thus, the researcher cannot afford to narrow down 
the subject of the study, but instead should analyze it in its complexity. The goal of the 
researcher would be to rely as much as possible on the participant views of the situation being 
studied, a view that is a construction, the application of meaning to a situation. Often these 
subjective meanings are negotiated socially and historically. In other words, they are not 
simply imprinted on individuals, but they can also be formed through interaction with others 
(hence social constructivism) and through historical and cultural norms that operate in 
individuals. Finally, constructivist researchers also focus on the specific contexts in which 
people live and work in order to understand the historical and cultural context of the 
participants (Cresswell, 2003). 
In light of the above items it can be inferred the author will stick to qualitative 
methodology with a type of a constructionist research design to be used: case method.  Case 
study according to Yin (2003) should be considered when: (a) the focus of the study is to 
answer “how” and “why” questions - in such a setting, a case study would be an explanatory 
one (b) you cannot manipulate the behaviour of those involved in the study; (c) you want to 
cover contextual conditions because you believe they are relevant to the phenomenon under 
study; or (d) the boundaries are not clear between the phenomenon and context (Baxter, Jack, 
2008).  
Again, according to Yin (2003a, p.2) "the distinctive need for case studies arises out of 
the desire to understand complex social phenomena" because "the case study method allows 
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investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events," such as 
organizational and managerial processes (Kohlbacher, 2006). As it was already mentioned, 
case studies appear to be the preferred strategy not only when "how or "why" questions are 
being posed, but also when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus 
is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context (Yin, 1981, p.59, 2003a, 
pages 2, 5-10).  
The author believes that the study corresponds to most of the criteria defined by Yin. 
Consequently, the type of the case study should be selected, based on the overall purpose of 
the study. Yin (2003) and Stake (1995) describe the variety of the types of case studies 
existing. Yin categorizes case studies as explanatory, exploratory, or descriptive. He also 
differentiates between single, holistic case studies and multiple-case studies. Stake identifies 
case studies as intrinsic, instrumental, or collective. After a thorough assessment, e descriptive 
single case study loos like the approach that fits best the purpose of this study. This type of 
case study is used to describe an intervention or phenomenon and the real-life context in 
which it occurred (Yin, 2003). Clearly, the context of this study is the operational stage of the 
Goliat project, and the phenomenon to be studied is the alignment of Eni's internal regulations 
and the company's actions in the described above reality and environment.  
3.2. Data collection 
The data collected for this study is essencially qualitative. Firstly, because the basics 
and the context for this study are the Norwegian legislation for oil and gas activities and Eni's 
internal regulations concerning HSE risk management in the first place - the nature of these 
data sources is qualitative. Secondly, the research question («How») does not require any 
quantitative date to be evaluated since, as it was previously said, the zeitgeist of this study and 
the concepts in question is strongly constructivist. Moreover it's hard to say how the 
quantitative data will help to make the right conclusions and represent any value. Finally, the 
ethical conserns, such as asking a company for numbers should also be taken into 
consideration.  
The Norwegian legislative framework in HSE was taken mostly from the PSA 
webpage, the other sources can be found in the reference list. It might seem that the Chapter 4 
is quite descriptive, but approach that the author chose for this section was to imagine a 
situation when a new company considers to start activities on the NCS and seeks a brief and 
simple introduction to the Norwegian legislative system for this kind of activities, which is 
quite different from that in other oil exporting countries (i.e. Russia) (Berg, Malikova, 2015). 
For this part, only the English translation was examined. The Eni internal HSE risk 
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management rules and guidelines were available partly in Italian, partly in English, so 
relevant parts were translated from Italian.  
The data collection regarding the case - Goliat project and its operational stage is 
twofold: on one side the author will use the disclosed documentation on the FPSO and other 
materials in public access that were provided by Eni Norge, on the other side will be in-depth, 
semi-structured interviews with HSE staff from Eni Norge, directly involved in Goliat project. 
The prior knowlegde acquired through analysis of the Norwegian legislative regulations and 
their principles, as well as Eni regulations and information on the development of the Goliat 
project will serve as a foundation for the interview guides with the informants, who were 
available for an interview. 
The semi-structured interviews were considered the most viable option for this study 
because of several reasons. Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Jackson (2012) consider both semi-
structured and unstructured interviews appropriate in three conditions: when it is necessary to 
understand the specific constructs, such as language, professional terminology etc., in our case 
this would be related to HSE. At the same time, according to the same authors, the objective 
of the researcher in case of an in-depth interview is to develop an understanding of the 
respondents's views in their integrity in order to obtain the «whole picture» of a particular 
situation, to understand the unclear logic of a specific situation, or the interviewee might be 
much more open about the mentioned situation confidentially in a one-to-one conversation. 
All the mentioned pre-requisites were found applicable to this study. As it was already 
mentioned, at a certain point the data flow will be narrowed down to the case study, where 
personal views, experiences, and stories might be essencial to uncover the information that 
can provide an anwer to the research question of this work. The case being studied is very 
specific, and the aim is to uncover some practical issues, so the interviews are, actually, the 
keys for the research question answer. At the same time HSE management, especially for a 
project that is currently in the spotlight in the oil and gas world, a project that will define the 
image of the company, might be a sensitive topic for it. This is the case to where a less-
structured interviews, where people can open up more and feel more relaxed and personal, 
might be of a well use.  
3.2.1 Setting and participants 
All interviews took place in Eni Norge's office in Stavanger, in a room which is 
usually used for Goliat project team meetings. The interviews were thinked to take place in a 
relaxed atmosphere, but in practice they were not. The fact that the interview took place in the 
company's office during the working hours didn't positively influenced the mood of the 
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interviewees, thus providing some limitations to the research. However, feedback from the 
conversations with other Eni employees from Moscow, as well as excerpts from primary 
communication with HSE personnel in Eni Norge will also be used in the study.  
3.3 Data processing and analysis 
Following the initial mindset of allowing the ideas and hypotheses to be sort of a 
continuation of the analysis being done, an overarching research design was born during the 
elaboration of the methodology for this research. The methods that will be applied in this 
study are hermeneutics and content analysis. Nonetheless, the methods of data processing will 
be slightly differ relatively to the stages of the study. The next chapters will cover how the 
data will be gathered and assessed, following the approaches of content analysis and 
hermeneutics; why they provide a suitable strategy for the analysis for each stage of the study.  
3.3.1 Content analysis with traces of grounded theory for qualitative data 
analysis  
Content analysis is considered as a flexible method for analyzing text data by 
researchers (White, Marsh, 2006). It is subdivided in a family of analytic approaches ranging 
from impressionistic, intuitive, interpretive analyses to systematic and strict analyses of the 
text (Rosengren, 1981). In fact, the intuitive analysis might be a good approach for this study. 
The specific type of content analysis approach chosen by a researcher varies with the 
theoretical and substantive interests of the researcher and the problem being studied (Weber, 
1990). Although this flexibility has made content analysis useful for a variety of researchers, 
the procedures to be applied in content analysis are not defined precisely, which has limited 
the application of content analysis (Tesch, 1990).  
The main part of the study starts with the descriptive analysis of the two regulatory 
systems, that are allocated on different institutional levels: one is on governmental level, 
another is applied only in one company. But the actual evaluation and framing of this data 
applying existing methods might represent quite a challenge.  
Content analysis starts its long journey in 18th century in Scandinavia (Rosengren, 
1981). Initially researchers used content analysis as either qualitative or quantitative menthod, 
but now it has all gone to long established controversy quantitative versus qualitative. The 
strong support for quantitative content analysis was recognized after Harold Lasswell’s 
publication “Power and Personality” where it was first introduced. Bernard Berelson (1952) 
took Lasswell’s approach further and in his work “Content Analysis in Communication 
Research” proposed a definition of content analysis which, from this point of view, is 
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emblematic: «a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of 
the manifest content of communication». After Berelson, qualtitative content analysis gained 
strong support and popularity as a primary tool for content analysis, with text data coded into 
specific categories and then described using statistical tools (Hsieh, Shannon, 2005). 
Nonetheless, now both qualitative and quantitative tools for content analysis are becoming 
purpose – centered: quantitative tools are increasingly being used for analysing social trends 
and opinions in mass media, social networks, big data, while qualitative methods are used in 
social and humanistic studies.  
This has happened because of several fundamental differences in these two methods. 
Zhang and Wildemuth (2009) emphasize several of them: quantitative methods usually imply 
deductive reasoning , while qualitative content analysis usually takes to the inductive 
reasoning, allowing the inferences and assumptions emerge from the raw data after careful 
assessment; data sampling in quantitative content analysis should not be carefully picked as in 
its qualitative counterpart; and finally, as perviously mentioned, the output of quantitative 
content analysis is usually statistical or at least has something to do with statistics, while after 
the qualitative assessment a researcher will hardly get any numerical output (Ibid).  
Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Jackson (2012) state, that a researcher can make use of 
the content analysis approach in case of a data interrogation for constructs and ideas that were 
previously defined. Simply put, this approach, partially influenced by quantitative 
methodology, (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, Jackson, 2012) indend creation a matrix or a scheme 
that can be used to give sense to a text and capture constructs that can lead to can lead to a 
main idea, the meaning of a text or other set of data. Nevertheless, this matrix can only come 
into being from a starting hypothesis or assumption. This is true for this work, but not 
completely. Grounded analysis on its own turn is closely linked to the concept of grounded 
theory and provides an opportunity for a more open approach towards data interpretation and 
analysis.  
This corresponds to the approach that was initially taken for this study: before the data 
collection even started, it was almost clear that the initial assumption will not be the only one, 
and the initial (contextual) sets of data will provide the ground for new hypotheses, especially 
considering the fact that the data was completely new for the author. This is in line with 
considerations made by Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Jackson (2012), who emphasize that 
although these two approaches are considered competing, it is more a continuum between 
these two than «one or another». This being said, a mixed approach can be implemented for 
this study. Moreover, the hypotheses that might arize, combined with the information from the 
mentioned two sets of data can constitute context in which the conclusions from the content 
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analysis of the interviews can be consequently placed. Or conversely, they can provide the 
matrix for the content analysis itself. Finally, it can be a combination of these two 
considerations. Schematically the selected «mental map» for the data processing is illustrated 
in the following Figure: 
 
 
Figure 9. The «skeleton» of the research design  
Seven steps are usually used in all approaches to qualitative content analysis. All of 
them imply a similar analytical process, including formulating the research questions, 
selecting the sample to be assessed, defining the categories to be applied, outlining the coding 
process and the coder training, implementing the coding process, determining trustworthiness, 
and analyzing the results of the coding process (Kaid, 1989).  
Coding is essential for the success of a content analysis, its usage is necessary in all 
variations of content analysis, both qualitative and quantitative. The basic coding process in 
content analysis is to organize large blocks of text into few content categories (Weber, 1990). 
The coding strategy stands for assigning a special code or label to language 
construction inductively from raw qualitative data a researcher was able to get (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998). This method can take two forms: one (the most basic) is referred to as open 
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coding, that is defining the word or a construction that represents value for a researcher, or 
carries information the researcher is looking for; second is called axial coding, which is 
structuring a group of codes on a higher level (Ibid). This type of coding can involve 
hierarchical (sortable) and non-hierarchical (non-sortable) coding while grouping codes into 
categories (Ibid). Hierarchical axial coding allows to add other layers, utilizing sub-codes 
within certain categories. The approach to coding that is commonly used is to code the 
complete text, and look for relationships and determine the axial codes afterwards.  
The method of coding will be used in the Chapter 4 of this study, to extract the core 
feature and characteristics in the regulations of the two companies. However, this will not be 
the same process as described in the last paragraphs. As for the extraction of language 
constructions, the process will be similar to that described by Strauss and Corbin (1998), and 
the method that will be used is open coding. But the codes in this case will represent the 
unique fatures of the regulations, and sometimes there might be a necessity to infer them. 
Nevertheless, this approach will be minimized to an extent less possible in order to exclude 
any bias.  
According to Hsieh and Shannon (2005), qualitative content analysis has three more 
specific approaches: conventional, directed and summative content analyses. These 
approaches differ mainly in ways of coding the data. Conventional content analysis is 
considered appropriate when there is not much existing theory or literature on a  phenomenon 
that is being studied available. Researchers avoid using preconceived categories (Kondracki & 
Wellman, 2002), instead allowing the categories and names for categories to flow from the 
data. Researchers immerse themselves in the data to allow new insights to emerge (Ibid), also 
described as inductive category development (Mayring, 2000). Many qualitative methods 
share this initial approach to study design and analysis. So when this approach is beoing used, 
open codes and axial codes (categories) are being extracted from the text directly, letting the 
text (usually interviews) determine the categories (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).  
Directed content analysis is mainly used when there is a prior research, theory, or 
knowledge on a specific topic, and a new research is usually seeking the goal to extend or 
validate the existing information (Ibid). This said, the researcher will therefore rely on the 
previously developed categories. They will be consequtively used in the coding scheme, that 
is commonly represented by the research findings of the previous works. The researcher then 
continues to search for information or constructions that fits the pre - defined categories 
(Ibid). Existing theory or research can help shaping the research question. It can also help 
assuming the main variables or the possible relationships between. All this can help to 
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determine the initial coding scheme or relationships between codes (Mayring, 2000). The 
strength of this approach is that you know what you are searching for.   
Finally, a summative content analysis is rooted the quantitative approaches. It implies 
representing certain words or content in text with numbers.  The purpose of doing this is 
understanding the contextual use of the words or content, counting the linguistic constructions 
and comparing them  (Ibid) After this quantification is done, the more subjective search for 
meaning commences, but this research is not centered specifically on meaning, but rather on 
the exploration of usage (Ibid). The presence of a particular word or content in textual data is 
also referred to as manifest content analysis (Potter & Levine-Donnerstein, 1999).  
The order in which these approaches are presented reflects a scale from more 
deductive reasoning (content analysis) going down to inductive reasoning (summative 
analysis) (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). As it was already mentioned, the primary approach for 
this study was kind of a tabula rasa meaning not the full absence of any primary research or 
theory in a similar field, but rather an aspiration for an «exploratory», bias-free mode. 
Nonetheless it's necessary to admit, that a bias of conclusions made by existing theory and the 
initial data represented by the regulations from both sides had an influence on the research, for 
example the fact that the concept of risk can be different depending on the circumstances. 
Since the essence of this study is expected to be derived from the interviews, the most suitable 
approach will be a conventional content analysis.  
The elaboration of the suitable methodology has significantly altered the already 
mentioned «mental map» with which this study was initially approaced (Figure 9). At the 
same time, this map took form of a schematic representation of the research design. One 
might think this research lacks a structured approach and he might be even right, but the 
author not only intentionally allows the hypotheses and assumptions to pop up, emerge from 
the analysis and the data, but also the ideas for research design and methodology as well. This 
is an attempt to interact, to communicate with the information, interpreting it and giving a 
voice to the plain data and theory all at the same time. But how this attempt match any 
theoretical or phylosophical methodology?  
3.3.2 Hermeneutics 
Both for theoretical comparison and the case study it mst be useless and unnecessary  
to try to apply existing concepts or create coding categories, since it is is not a research in the 
sphere of legislation and law, nor an institutional study. Likewise, there is no point in 
comparing the two sets of rules and regulations word by word. Thus, another methodological 
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philosophy should be applied for the legislative comparison. As it was mentioned, the goal of 
presenting the two regulatory systems was to establish the context for further digging for 
answers to the main research question. Hermeneutics philosophy might be in line with this 
perspective.  
The term hermeneutics (from the Greek hermënuetikós) originates from mythological 
character of Hermes, the messenger god of the ancient Greeks. In order to deliver the 
messages from the gods, Hermes had to be familiar with their language as well as with that of 
the mortals for whom the messages were destined. Thus, Hermes had first to understand and 
interpret these messages for himself in order to know what the gods wanted to communicate 
before he could translate, articulate, and explain this to mortals (Mueller-Vollmer, 1986). 
After the twentieth century hermeneutics has been established as a methodology organazied 
around the problem of interpretation, both linguistical and philosophycal, making 
interpretation and language a point of departure for this new promise in philosophy 
(Garagalza, 2013).  
The main contributors to this new movement were Martin Haidegger and his student 
Hans – Georg Gadamer, who revived the problem of interpretation, making it a necessity, 
characteristical for all human beings (Ibid). Following the already mentioned property of 
hermeneutics, «the interpretation appears in connection with language and is presented as a 
universal problem, affecting our experience as a whole, our awareness of the world, and our 
self - knowledge and relation to the other. This problem may, therefore, provide us with a 
guiding thread to the universe of human discourse in its totality and as a guide for our 
reflections on the human and its world. It could be said that the human cultural universe is a 
fabric of words, models, concepts, theories, hypotheses, and so on, that is to say, of 
interpretations, mediating between human beings and reality - interpretations, within which 
both (humans and reality) acquire their specific configuration and determination. 
Hermeneutics studies, precisely, this interpretative relation between the human and the real, 
and it treats this relation as a starting point for the rethinking of philosophy as a whole» 
(Garagalza, 2013). Based on the information introduced, using hermeneutics for this study 
will presumably allow to understand the context around the research problem, at the same 
time allowing the context help the author to formulate the hypotheses and assumptions, based 
on which the next part of the study will be concentrated.  
There are nonetheless several properties of hermeneutics the shouldstill be considered: 
hermeneutic circle, the whole and the part, and language. The whole and the part refers to one 
of the core ideas of hermeneutics, resulting from the practice of interpreting ancient texts. The 
approach derives from the assumption that certain concepts of a text cannot be represented in 
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its entirety, unless the full meaning of a text is delivered (Dobrosavljev, 2002). Thus the part 
is inseparable from the whole, and the terms and concepts can be called “the part”, and the 
full text “the whole”. However, the essential part of this consideration is the meaning, or 
understanding of a full text. It can not be fully understood without any knowledge of the 
context it was written in. This claim can find its confirmation in the literature classes: 
introducing and new piece, the teacher also provides the author's autobiography and the 
historical context it was written in, so the perseption of the part becomes more understandable 
and meaningful based on the understanding of the whole. The the point of view of the 
described situation, the context that can be a continuation of the whole and part relationship, 
the context becoming the whole, and the text itself – a part. Therefore, the perceived meaning 
of the part or of the whole can both change with respect to examining the one or another, or 
all together. The last option is, of course, preferable. This interdependence between the whole 
and the part can be considered universal, and is the foundation for the cognitive understanding 
(Ibid).  
Hermeneutic circle, according, again, to Dobroslavjev (2002) is «the basic structure of 
cognition in general», that it simply the cycle of «understanding» (Figure 11). This circle is 
free from the strict logic, allowing a «flow of time and meaning» (Ibid). It develops the 
concepts in a flexible and changeable outline. These possible changes in understanding mean 
the awareness of the limitations deriving from the preconceptions. They does not imply 
personal limitations, character or biased approach: according to Gadamer, preconceptions are 
not more than prejudices, that does not influence the whole (Ibid). The last clame is extremely 
important for this study since the preconceptions were present and were assumed to cause bias. 
Now it becomes clear that they are not, and the study is free from bias.  
Considering the information above, it is possible to assume that the hermeneutic circle 
ties all the preconcepts, assumptions and ideas together. Figure 11 describes the basic 
relationship between the whole and the part, and how their interdependence influences the 
whole understanding of a certain source of information. The circle also constitutes the basis 
for Figure 12, which further elaborates, following the steps of Berg and Malikova (2015), on 
the relationship between the researcher and the participant – in case of this study, the author 
of a text or the interviewee in an interview, continuing and reflecting the interplay between 
the whole and the part.  
«The continuous whole/part idea is operationalized on both participants. Both circles 
represent the basic hermeneutic circle: and within each circle; within each person, lies a set of 
prejudices that will be broken down. So the interesting phase of the process is the one that is 
market in red, in the mutual area of the circles. In this area, there is a melting of understanding, 
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i.e. the understanding is mutual between the interviewer and interviewee. They will exit from 
the circle at the exit point, where they have reached the end of their mutual understanding. In 
the event that it is possible, it is important that both parties verify and accept the 
understanding that has emerged» (Berg, Malikova, 2015).  
In the aftermath of the information provided in this Chapter, it becomes clear that the 
last two notions turn up to be a common thread for the research design and methodology of 
this study. Referring to this, the two Figures are to be done in order to represent crucial parts 
of the research design.  
 
 
 
Figure 10. Basic hermeneutic circle  Figure 11. Hermeneutic circle with two 
participants 
Based on the previous considerations and the attributes of hermeneutics, the overall 
research design is represented in next Figure, and will be further assessed in the next few 
chapters.  
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Figure 12. The research design. 
3.3.3 Hermeneutics with content analysis as a research design 
The considerations from the previous parts permitted to elaborate the final research 
design represented in the Figure 13. It should be noted, that the previous research was almost 
absent in a similar field and with a similar approach, focused on the practical relevance of the 
study and simplification of complex matters, so the research design was elaborated from 
scratch, uniquely based on the author's view. Hermeneutical understanding is the red thread of 
this study and will be applied in every stage of the research. The main tool for the data 
analysis will be different methods of content analysis, based on their suitability for each 
specific data source. The design looks like an inverted pyramid, because the whole research 
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goes «from general to specific and from complex to simple». The following subchapters will 
elaborate more on what should be done on each stage of the analysis.  
3.3.4 First stage: undertanding the regulatory frameworks  
In order to be able to compare the two regulatory framework, the specific criteria 
should be defined. The understanding of the regulations will be based on two levels of 
analysis: first, the analysis of the policy design theory, second – that of the main features of 
the regulations, based on the content analysis and the context, in which the regulations were 
elaborated, how, and what is actually being regulated. Then, the features of the regulations 
will be assigned a label, based on the author's method, illustrated in the Figure 5. 
The research question starts with the word «HOW», and this gives the primary 
indication, that «HOW» is not reflected in the PRESENCE of certain concepts in the 
regulatory frameworks, but instead is the reflected in the main REGULATORY PRINCIPLES 
and features, established in the mentioned documents.  
The whole process, which finds its rootes in content analysis aided by the 
hermeneutical philosophy and methodology, will look as follows: 
1. Presentation of the Norwegian legislative framework (introduction, risk concept, main 
governing bodies etc.) 
2. 1 level of analysis: policy design principles 
3. 2 level of analysis: main features and aspects of the regulations (by direct content 
analysis+accessible literature) 
4. Summary and conclusions 
1. Presentation of Eni regulations  
2. 1 level of analysis: policy design principles 
3. 2 level of analysis: conventional content analysis of the regulations+cross lingual 
interpretation where needed 
4. Summary and conclusions 
1. Comparison of the two regulatory frameworks: merging the main principles between 
the regulations and defining the points in common if any of them will be found.  
2. Conclusion and findings 
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3.3.5 Second stage: case study 
Maintaining the overall research design, interviews and documents provided by Eni 
Norge become a «part» of the whole, which is the oil and gas activity in a specific context. In 
fact, previously this part is thinked to provide a proof or denial of the assuptions made in the 
previous stages of the study, but after a thorough analysis this part is actually thinked to 
provide additional information to the summary of the two regulations and make a final 
contribution to the answer to the research question. For these purposes a combination of 
conventional content analysis and direct analysis (the last one is aimed at defining the 
principles of the regulations, explicitly or implicitly reflected in the documents, which 
illustrate the activity of the company), was considered the best tool.  
The thesis is layered on two stages for several purposes. First, it's a ladder for the 
«whole» to the «part», from general to specific, and the research design reflects this. Secondly, 
it is an elaboration of data aiming at a colclusion which will make sense, going from general 
to the specific.  
The institutional level of HSE (the sum of the legal frameworks) is the most rigid level, 
and can almost be accepted as a constant. The company-level management of HSE is flexible, 
and is also the level that requires adaptation so long as compliance remains the imperative for 
the company. Therefore, one precedes the other: the thesis is not about how the legislations 
will change to meet the practices of the companies: it is about how the companies adapt to 
meet the requirements of the legislations and what practices are implemented in the 
Norwegian context. This adaptation is assumingly reflected in specific activities and 
procedures implemented by the company, and defining these with a high level of probability 
is the final destination for the research. 
3.3.6 Third stage: discussions and difinition of practices adopted by the 
company to meet the requirements 
The fianl third stage of the study is aimed at providing a comprehensive, simple 
answer on the research question, based on all the analysis done. Most importantly, the specific 
solutions and actions of the company should be defined. This part will also define the 
fundamental principles, according to which the Goliat project was developed.  
3.4 Validity and reliability 
Newton (2009) in «Reflexivity, Validity and Roses» elaborated on what does 
«validity» mean. She emphasizes, that validity is often said to represent the differences in 
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epistemology amongst researchers, because everyone has an individual understanding of what 
is a valid research. She comes to a conclusion that a researcher, regardless of whether it is a 
qualitative or quantitative research, makes a contribution to the construction of the meaning of 
its own research. Therefore, one should be self-reflexive enough on his/her findings, 
regardless of whether it is a «social construction» or not. 
Validitity of the qualitative studies, according to Sandberg (2005) can be elaborated 
according to three criteria: communicative, transgressive, and pragmatic validity. 
Communicative validity involves a continuous dialogue between the researcher and the 
subject that is being studied. For example, in case of an interview the researcher should ask 
open-ended questions, be open for a discussion and collaborate with the interviewee on 
certain subjects or aspects – all this can ensure communicative validity (Ibid). Certainly, it 
may be the case for this study, because during the time this thesis was written the author 
continuously collaborated and spoke to people involved in HSE in Eni and Eni Norge and a 
lot of information, especially particular details, gathered from this communication was later 
included in the final version of this thesis.  
Secondly, pragmatic validity, according to Sandberg (2005), involves testing the 
knowledge in action. This is achievable by testing the knowledge/statements/interpretations of 
a particular subject in the interview (Ibid). This technique was also employed for this report 
and the interviews were structured accordingly. Many questions in the interview guide (see 
Appendix 3) were designed to see how a particular statement (in the regulations, for example) 
has worked in practice, or to check whether an assumption/own statement on the subject in 
question was right or wrong.  
Finally, transgressive validity means to examine validity from various standpoints of 
whether the conclusions reflects the «indeterminate fulfillment» (Ibid). One of the ways to 
examine transgressive validity is to check for «differences and contradictions in a lived 
experience» (Ibid). Sticking to this method, the author deliberately checked for similar 
conclusions or methods used for other works – no similarities were found.  
3.4.1 Relevance of the theory 
The theoretical framework of this study should support the research question and 
findings. Accordingly, all the information presented in the theoretical part was elaborated 
according to the aims of this research, the problem, and the key concepts (risk, safety, 
regulation). The theory that was presented is an overview of the relevant scientific that are 
related to the research question, and at the same time information relevant specifically for this 
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study in light of its general method, because, as it was already mentioned, many aspects of it 
were elaborated by the author specifically for this report.  
3.4.2 Ethical considerations 
Before starting this research, the author has committed himself to several ethical 
considerations. First of all, any real names of the personnel from Eni and Eni Norge will not 
be disclosed. Moreover, during the interview the source was against the usage of the recording 
equipment, therefore only the author's notes were used in the case study. Most the company's 
documents used in the analysis are public, and a permission was given bythe infromants to use 
the internal documents as well.  
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4 Chapter 4. Comparison of HSE regulations in Norway and in Eni. 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter is the main body of information in this assessment. To start it off one 
might need remember the problem/research question: «How Eni has aligned its own 
regulations and procedures to Norwegian regulations and guidelines?». The problem lies 
within the intersection of two regulatory environments: that of the state and that of the 
company. The assumption to be tested in this part is to understand, whether the regulations are 
different or similar in their general principles of policy design. Therefore, this Chapter will 
represent the first stage of this study, which, according to the elaborated methodology, is 
aimed to explore and describe these in Norway and Eni. However, the author will approach 
this chapter with view, that the state is the regulator, and the company is subject to its 
regulations.  
The primary subject to the state regulations is Eni's Goliat project, so it will be 
interesting to see how the two regulations influenced the process of the project development, 
especially if there were some differences. The project will be analysed only from the point of 
view of the regulations in HSE. Moreover, the case should provide an a comprehensive 
overview and illustration of how the Norwegian regulations are being applied in a real case 
scenario. 
This chapter will be structure in the following way: first, a brief introduction to the 
Norwegian legislative context will be given, second, these will be analysed in relation to the 
three principles of policy design: form, function, and scope. The third stage will dig deeper 
into the regulations to extract the key aspects or criteria stated in the regulatory framework 
regarding the HSE risk management. This last part of the presentation of the legislation will 
also take into account the primary analysis of the main regulations and literature regarding the 
regulatory regime in Norway. 
The same process will then be repeated for Eni HSE management regulations. The key 
features in HSE of these regulations will also be emphasized. However, the basis for this 
analysis will be the main principles of the Norwegian regulations, because, in case of the 
company operating in a certain country – the country’s legislation comes first, it is explicit. 
This whole process is aimed at finding differences and similarities between the two sets of 
regulatory documents, because the main focus is to understand the process of alignment in 
case the regulations were different, and the interactions between the state and the company. 
The main features of the regulations will then be assessed in light of the Goliat project 
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development, that will supposingly provide an insight of how they work in a real case 
scenario and whether there were additional requirements to this project. 
4.2 Norwegian regulations and guidelines in HSE and their main 
features 
4.2.1 Risk concept and risk management approach 
In the theoretical framework it was concluded, that before one can analyse the 
legislative framework related to managing risk in HSE, it is necessary to start with the basics: 
the understanding of risk and safety. It is important, because the definitions to these basic 
concepts differ greatly, so one should look at the definition in each specific case. In Norway, 
HSE risk comprises the threat of accidents, personal injuries, occupational illness and 
environmental damage. The regulations require that risk analyses are conducted to identify 
possible hazards during operational stage, and the consequences these may have of human, 
environmental and economic character (The Management regulations, Section 17, 18, 19). 
According to Petroleum Safety Authority, the main organ, responsible for overseeing 
compliance with the regulations, and maintenance of high standards of HSE on the NCS, risk 
can be defined as «the consequences of an activity with the associated uncertainty» (PSA, 
2016). The Authority introduced this new definition of risk, in order to avoid important 
decisions to be taken without adequate knowledge. While it is quite hard to compare the 
components of this definition to standard components of what can be defined as risk, which 
opens wide space for interpretations, this definition is fundamental for the risk assessment and 
the risk management processes for the oil and gas activities in Norway.  
The Section 11 of the Framework regulations gives the following instruction to risk 
management: «In reducing the risk, the responsible party shall choose the technical, 
operational or organisational solutions that, according to an individual and overall evaluation 
of the potential harm and present and future use, offer the best results, provided the costs are 
not significantly disproportionate to the risk reduction achieved» (PSA, 2014). 
«If there is insufficient knowledge concerning the effects that the use of technical, 
operational or organisational solutions can have on health, safety or the environment, 
solutions that will reduce this uncertainty, shall be chosen» (PSA, 2014). 
The term uncertainty in the definition is related to the potential consequences of the 
activities. The guidelines to Sect. 11 of the Framework regulations say «the uncertainty relates 
to which incidents can occur, how often they will occur and  which detriment of or loss of 
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human life and health, environment and material assets the various incidents can lead to. As 
regards the external environment, the uncertainty also relates to which environmental harm 
the operational discharges can result in» (PSA, 2014). 
The Management regulations require the operator to implement their own risk 
acceptance criteria for major accident risk and environmental risk. The Management 
Regulations Guidance defines the need for the operator to determine whether risk criteria are 
met. The terminology of Risk Acceptance Criteria (RAC) is also used in NORSOK Z-013, but 
a value is not given and the standard just gives further guidance. Values are given for the 
maximum tolerable impairment frequency of critical safety equipment (NORSOK Z-013, 
Appendix A.1.2).  
In the Norwegian regulatory environment, the ISO: 31000 represents the basis for the 
risk management process (Principles of Barrier Management in the Petroleum Industry - PSA, 
2013). 
 
 Figure 13. Risk management process (Source: ISO 31000) 
According to the Framework regulations, the risk acceptance criteria should be set up 
for the evaluation of risk analysis. The Management regulations specify that the risk analyses 
and therefore the derived risk acceptance criteria (maximum allowed level of risk) shall be set 
for (Section 9 of the Management Regulations):  
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1. Risk to personnel as a whole offshore as well as offshore and to personnel groups 
exposed to specific risks 
2. The loss of main safety functions as mentioned in the Section 7 of the Facilities 
regulations 
3. Acute pollution or pollution from the facility 
4. Damage to a third party 
HSE Framework Regulations (Sect. 9), provides the following measures to reduce 
risk: «In effectuating risk reduction the party responsible shall choose the technical, 
operational or organisational solutions which according to an individual as well as an overall 
evaluation of the potential harm and present and future use offer the best results, provided the 
associated costs are not significantly disproportionate to the risk reduction achieved» (PSA). 
This definition is gives a definition almost equal to what is understood by the concept of 
ALARP. Additionally, according to the Paragraph 9 of the regulations, this principle should 
inculde a qualitative, as well as quantitative component. Therefore the second interpretation 
(see Abbreviations & Definitions) of the ALARP principle corresponds to the dominant view 
on risk reduction in Norway, that is also defined in the regulations. 
However, the main particularity of the Norwegian regulations is that the regulations in 
Norway does not include any statements on lower tolerable limit or negligible risk, and 
therefore no lower limits that would show when further risk reduction is not required. 
(Vinnem, Witsø, Kristensen, 2006). 
Another difference in the Norwegian regulations is that there are no explicit 
requirements on the ALARP evaluations. These differences on the levels of risk show, that the 
companies also have to form their own range of processes, evaluations, documentation, 
criteria, and guidelines, which might be different from interpretations and assessments of the 
PSA. The operating companies are thus relatively free in choosing the best possible solution, 
but at the same time they must provide proof that a specific solution in treating risk is the 
most viable option.  
4.2.2 Structure and main governmental bodies 
The petroleum companies operating on the Norwegian Continental are subject to an 
extensive number of regulations and laws. Speaking of petroleum activities, the fundamental 
legal framework consists of: 
1. Act of 29 November 1996 №72 pertaining to petroleum activities (Petroleum Act) 
2. Regulations to the Petroleum Act, laid down by Royal Decree 27 June 1997 
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(Petroleum Regulations) 
3. Technical Regulations 
4. Other safety (HSE) Acts/regulations/guidelines/white papers 
The exclusive property and resource management rights to the oil and gas deposits 
belongs to the Norwegian State. The management of these resources is executed by the King 
in accordance with the provisions of the Petroleum Act and the decisions made by Stortinget 
(the Norwegian Parliament).  
The regulatory regime for the petroleum activities in Norway is license-based. The 
licenses to explore and produce oil and gas on the Norwegian Continental Shelf are time-
limited and are granted under the Petroleum Act by the King in Council as the highest 
representative of the Norwegian State. The major development projects that are considered 
matter of public importance must be approved by the Parliament. The government holds 
executive power over petroleum policy and is responsible to the Storting. Several ministries, 
supported by the subordinate agencies and directorates, are responcible for applying the 
policy (Figure 14). 
The safety management consists of two main elements: the prescription of safety 
norms (directly or indirectly affecting safety levels), and the activities designed to check 
whether the norms are complied with. The strong interaction exists between the two. The third 
element is the means to enforce compliance to the safety norms. (Aven, Vinnem, 2007). In the 
author’s opinion, the same could be applied to health, safety, and environmental norms all 
together.  
All in all, the state regulation of the oil and gas activities in Norway has two pillars: in 
represents governmental entities responsible for administrating, regulating, controlling, and 
supervising the activities offshore as well as offshore (e.g. relevant Ministries, NPD, PSA, 
NEA and others), on the other – the body of legislative framework for the petroleum activities 
in Norway. This framework was created and is kept updated by the Parliament under the 
King’s approval. The Parliament passes legislation, adopts propositions, and discusses and 
responds to white papers related to petroleum activities. 
As for companies who have decided to go for a project on the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf, two main documents must be submitted to the Norwegian Authorities: The Plan for 
Development and Operations (PDO), and Impact Assessment Study (IAS), according to 
Section 4.2 and Section 20 of the Regulations relating to the Petroleum Act. Guidelines for 
the content of these documents are published by the NPD in the year 2000 (PDO for Goliat). 
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Matters related to HSE in petroleum activities are delegated a number of governing 
institutions: three particularly relevant Government bodies, and several less important but also 
relevant for HSE regulation. The most important governmental institutions are Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy, Ministry of Labor and Social Inclusion, and Ministry of Climate and 
Environment. But they do not directly participate in controlling the offshore activities on the 
continental shelf. As it was already mentioned, they are supported by several governmental 
entities: The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD), the Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA), 
and the Norwegian Environmental Agency (NEA) (Figure 15) (Berg, Malikova, 2015). It 
should be noted that they do not depend on government or the ministries; they are completely 
independent organizations that insures their work is properly done and transparent. 
 
 
Figure 14. The Norwegian HSE authorities and governmetal bodies responsible for the 
Norwegian petroleum sector 
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In reference to the Norwegian governmental structure it is important to mention, that it 
is not characterized by hierarchical structures and sometimes it may not be exactly right to 
define an Agency as “subordinate” to a ministry, since the Agencies are in many cases 
independent bodies with flat organizational structure. Probably the most accurate definition 
will be, that they are “controlled” or under Ministry’s “supervision”, but in this report the 
author will still use the word “subordinate” for better understanding of the overall structure. 
When it comes to the approved projects, companies must share their interest in the 
project with: 
1. Petoro AS, a state owned company that manages the Norwegian state’s direct financial 
interest  
2. Statoil ASA, in which the state has 67% ownership stake through the MPE 
3. Gassco AS, an independent company-operator of the integrated system for 
transporting natural gas from the NCS to Europe, also owned by state 
The overriding legislative Acts in the Norwegian HSE for petroleum activities are:  
 
The Petroleum Act, which is the basic and essential legislative document for any 
petroleum activity in Norway, covers overall requirements for the award of licenses, 
exploration, field development and infrastructure, joint activity and unitization of fields, 
decommissioning and cessation of activities. The general principle of the petroleum activities 
The Norwegian Petroleum Act of 29 November 1996 (“The Petroleum Act”) and 
several Regulations relating to this Act 
The Petroleum Regulations 1997 June 27 (last amended in July 2012) 
Act 21 December 1990 № 72 relating to tax on discharge of CO2 in the petroleum 
activities on the continental shelf (last amended in 2008) 
Additional Acts: 
Working Environment Act (Not suitable for offshore floating installations. Instead, he 
2007 Ship Safety and Security Act and the 1977 Seamen’s Act may take care of safety 
aspects on board) (Vinnem, page 112) 
Act of 13 March 1981 No.6 Concerning Protection Against Pollution and Concerning 
Waste (Pollution Control Act) 
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on the NCS under the Petroleum Act is that oil and gas operations must be conducted in 
compliance with a reasonable standard of care, taking into consideration the safety of 
employees, the environment and the economic values represented by installations and vessels. 
Moreover, according to the Act, a high level of safety must be maintained on all stages of a 
project, while the best and latest available technology must be implemented.  
These regulations have been issued by competent directorates and agencies. Each of 
these regulations covers a different aspects and issues of HSE. It should be noted, that all Acts 
and regulations have corresponding guidelines and interpretations regarding their application. 
The legislative regulatory environment in Norway can be presented in the following figure: 
 
 
 
Figure 15. The Norwegian regulatory system (Source: Svein Erikssen, PSA) 
The regulations prescribe specific goals and requirements regarding a wide range of 
technical design factors and management processes and require a significant number of 
strategies, records of activities and management plans to be prepared and submitted and 
mainly audited by the PSA. Moreover, they require the Operator the establish risk level for 
each of its activity and to manage its activities accordingly. The general principle of the 
regulations is that they do not provide the specific solutions, instead, they delegate the 
responsibility to select the best one to the company (Svein Erikssen, PSA) 
Pursuing the goal of safety for the oil and gas activities, the guidelines define a set of 
international and national standards as recognized norms, so the authorities expect the 
Operator to use. The use of these standards is considered equal to compliance. The standards 
may imply certain solutions, however, the PSA regulations allow other solutions in case their 
safety level is comparable to that set by standards. In case the Operator provided a solution 
Laws
Regulations
Standards, codes, 
and guidelines
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different to the standard, it is are therefore expected to provide sound proof of effectiveness of 
the option (Svein Erikssen, PSA).  
The international standards can be considered keys to the doors of the Norwegian 
regulations. The 66% of the PSA guidelines are based on international standards such as 
NORSOK and ISO/IEC (44 and 38 standards correspondingly) (Svein Erikssen, PSA). These 
standards should give a maybe less experienced company a hint of what is expected from an 
Operator on the NCS. 
In order to facilitate the following analysis, the main regulatory organizations in 
Norway overlooking HSE and risk management on the NCS should now be introduced.  
The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate.  
The final beneficiary of the oil and gas activities in Norway is the Norwegian Society. 
The responsibility for petroleum activities under the Norwegian jurisdiction and promotion 
the value of the industry for the benefit of the society as a whole is allocated to the NPD. 
Therefore, the primary objective of the Directorate is to contribute to creating the greatest 
possible value for society from the oil and gas activities. The second main function of the 
NPD follows from the previous statement: keeping a wise resource management based upon 
safety, emergency preparedness and safeguarding of the external environment. The third main 
function of the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate is the overall evaluation of PDO’s and 
awarding licenses for companies to conduct the activities on the shelf. At the same time, it 
makes sure the activities are safe and comply with the Norwegian environmental standards 
and requirements.  
There are three offshore - related Acts that fall within the jurisdiction of the NPD:  
• The Petroleum Activities Act 1998 No 104 amended to 2009 is principally concerned 
with the fiscal arrangements associated with licenses although it also includes the premise that 
petroleum activities should only be carried out with pragmatic regard for operational safety 
and the environment 
• The CO2 discharge Act, which is also a fiscal measure to limit the discharge of natural 
gas and the flaring of petroleum products offshore through the imposition of a tax on 
quantities discharged 
• The Scientific Research Act, which applies to scientific research of the seabed and the 
exploration for subsea natural resources (Morgan, Hook, Budgen, 2010) 
In addition to these three, the NPD has also published guidelines to the PDO’s and 
PIO’s, where, for example, there is a detailed description of the content regarding technical 
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aspects that shoud be assessed in IAS’s. It can be concluded that the role of the NPD is 
primarily fiscal and the supervision over the HSE compliance of the projects is rather a 
pragmatic general assessment. Today, almost all responsibilities regarding the HSE 
compliance on all stages of a project are taken over by PSA. Health and Safety regulations 
under the Petroleum Activities Act also fall under the supervision of PSA. 
This said, it now boils down to three main governmental organs that carry out all the 
activities related to the HSE: Petroleum Safety Authority, the Norwegian Environmental 
Agency, and the Board of Health.   
The Petroleum Safety Authority 
 The PSA was created as a separate, independent petroleum specific legislative 
regulator in 2004 and, although it is under to supervision of the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs, the PSA has total regulatory responsibility for safety, emergency preparedness and 
the working environment in the Norwegian oil and gas industry. The published remit of the 
PSA includes its coordination and cooperation with other regulatory organs with independent 
authority in the HSE. With regard to offshore activities these include the Norwegian 
Environmental Agency (formerly known as SFT and the Norwegian Climate and Pollution 
Agency), The Norwegian Board of Health and the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, 
which is subordinate to the Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care Services.  
As emphasized by a representative of Eni Norge, the Norwegian Petroleum Safety 
Authority is the main regulatory organ of oil and gas activities in Norway. It manages the 
everyday safety activities, guarantees overall Occupational Health and Safety of the petroleum 
activities, as well as general compliance of offshore installations to the HSE regulations and 
guidelines. The control and supervision is carried out by audits, verifications, investigations, 
consents, meetings with industry representatives and surveys.  
The regulation of the Norwegian petroleum industry falls within a number of Acts, 
Regulations, and Guidelines to them. The regulations and guidelines are providing further 
details on regulations and basic Acts and the modalities of how the requierements are to be 
used and applied. The regulations and guidelines must be applied together. The following 
table is representing the structure of the regulations that fall under the responsibilities of the 
PSA (Berg, Malikova, 2015): 
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The Framework HSE Regulations (NHSER) amended to 2009, concerned with health, 
the environment and personal safety. This document is fundamental for HSE management of 
any oil and gas activities in Norway. The regulation delineates the main principles of the 
application of the requirements and several important specifications. The complience with the 
Framework regulations is assessed by the PSA (Morgan, Hook, Budgen, 2010).  
The Framework regulations provide a framework for HSE regulation and all the oil 
and gas activities. It delineates the common scope of application of all regulations, their 
common purpose and definitions, who is responsible for comlying with all the regulations, 
and the main principles for health, safety, and environment that must be shared by the 
companies in case they conduct petroleum activities in Norway (inclusing the overall HSE 
culture in actors responsible). In light of the Framework regulations, the other regulations 
only provide further details of what is required in each specific area of HSE – related matters.  
The Management Regulations (NMR) amended to 2004, which describe the 
requirement for the management of petroleum activities. The regulations prescribe specific 
requirements regarding a wide range of technical design factors and management processes 
(brings in light four main areas relevant for managing offshore facilities: barrier management; 
objectives, internal requirements and decision-making process; analysis; notification of 
relevant authorities and applications for consent. The regulations require a significant number 
of strategies, records of activities, and management plans to be prepared and submitted and 
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audited by the PSA, while also controlled and supervised by Norwegian Environment Agency 
(NEA) and the Health Authorities (Morgan, Hook, Budgen, 2010).  
The Activities Regulations (NAR) amended to 2010, emphasize the right way to 
conduct different activities that involve offshore petroleum installations. The compliance with 
the regulations is also controlled by the PSA, NEA, and Health Authorities (Morgan, Hook, 
Budgen, 2010).  
The Facilities Regulations (NFR) amended to 2009 is a technical set of regulations 
which are to be applyed which stipulate requirements relating to the design and outfitting of 
facilities. Issued and controlled by PSA, NEA, and the Board of Health. To the mentioned risk 
– based approach in HSE management two specifications are added: the various risk 
thresholds and the risk monitoring (Morgan, Hook, Budgen, 2010).  
The Information Duty Regulations (NIDR) amended to 2010, which identify the 
information requirements that have to be met by the managers of a petroleum installation and 
by the managers of services, suppliers of equipment, and third parties are being provided to 
such an installation. Moreover, the communication with the authorities, fishermen and local 
communities also fall down to these Regulations (Morgan, Hook, Budgen, 2010).  
This communication with the PSA mainly undergoes through audits, however there 
are other means mentioned above. The audits represent a systematic examination of 
management and control systems the operator of a specific oil field has implemented. These 
audits are considered essential for safe oil and gas operations and are supported by all types of 
measurement – based verifications, tests,  inspections, checks – all these are done to ensure 
that the actual circumstances conform with the regulatory and management system 
requirements.  
The party responsible, e.g. the operator, shall decide on the extent of controls, the 
method to be used in, and the degree of independence of the assessment, in order to record 
that the requirements and standards of health, safety, and environment were met. Such 
verifications shall be carried out according to an overall and unambiguous verification 
programme and verification basis. The operator shall establish the verification basis for the 
total petroleum activities after having determined the scope, method and the degree of 
independence of the verification. The operator shall also carry out an overall evaluation of the 
results of verifications that have been carried out. The Petroleum Safety Authority may order 
the operator to have verifications carried out, or otherwise carry out verifications by itself. 
 
	 81	
The audits must have several important characteristics, according to the Ministry to 
which PSA is subordinate: the audits must be risk – based and system oriented, they should 
not replace the internal control by the industry representatives, and finally it must strike a 
balance between its role as a high risk and technology regulator and a labour inspection 
authority, at the same time contributing and collaborating with companies and unions 
represent a crucial requirement for and principle in the PSA’s activities. 
The regulations require the risk assessment to be undertaken by the Operator. As it 
was already mentioned, the responsible party must communicate with the regulator, providing 
them not only all the information that is required by law, but also data the agency might 
specifically ask for.  
The Authority also execute the general development of the risk level in the offshore 
petroleum industry in Norway, which is analized and presented on an annual basis. The scope 
of this assessment covers all aspects of HSE within the authority's jurisdiction (Vinnem, 
2010). The methods used to collect and evaluate data and the risks were developed in «Risk 
Level Project» (RNNP). Since the first report the Project and the methods that are being used 
for evaluation, were in constant development and updated in cooperation with different 
industry players, groups, and external parties (PSA, 2012b) 
The RNNP is outlined using statistical, engineering, and social science methods, and 
provides a broad illustration of risk levels, including risks that derive from major hazards, 
incidents that may represent challenges for emergency preparedness, as well as risk 
perception and cultural factors. Moreover, the reports also include information and data from 
databases (i.e. Environment Web Databases) (Vinnem, 2010).  
 The PSA makes their assessment using the following indicators (Trends in Risk 
Level in the Petroleum Activity, 2012): 
• Indicators for events related to major accident risk 
• Indicator for barriers related to major accident risk 
• Indicators for serious occupational risk and diving accidents 
• Indicators of events related to transportation accidents (helicopter) 
• Indicators for working environment factors 
• Indicators for events with consequences of lesser extent and significance for 
preparedness 
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The evaluation also includes: 
• Experience of risk 
• HSE climate 
• Qualitative evaluations related to the issues 
In case of a hazard, the main tool used by the PSA to investigate more thoroughly into 
detail and perform an extensive analysis of the causes that can lead up to an event is the 
MTO-analysis. The MTO stands for Man, Technology, and Organization, and this method is 
based on the claim that both human, organizational, and technical factors should be 
considered as the factors that could potentially lead or cause hazards. «The MTO-analysis 
involves the use of an ‘event - and cause - diagram’, a ‘change analysis’ and a ‘barrier 
analysis’. The event-cause diagram provides a linear account of the event sequence in a block 
diagram, and includes the attribution of ‘technical and human’ causes in the sequence. The 
change analysis describes how the series of events have deviated from earlier events, a normal 
situation, or from common practice. The barrier analysis identifies human, technological, or 
organizational barriers that have failed or are missing in the course of events» (Kringen, 1993). 
The analysis is done in order to is to identify how the flow of events could have been broken, 
and what the organization have done in the past in order to prevent the accident.  
The Norwegian Environmental Agency 
The Norwegian Environmental Agency is responsible for evaluating the environmental 
impact of oil and gas activities on the NCS in general, as well as in specific cases and project. 
The aim of the agency is to guarantee that quality of the water in marine areas, in order to 
preserve the species and ecosystems. Moreover, it aims to make sure the human health and 
well being is not influenced in any circumstances by the oil and gas activities and the amount 
of greenhouse gases is on a level that does not harm the climate system and the atmosphere 
(NEA). 
The documentation assessed in the case study provided additional information on the 
authority: the Agency is also involved in the assessment of PDO's, IAS's and various 
applications for permissions regarding activities, that may involve pollution, emissions, 
influence to the marine areas and ecosystems. Moreover, it evaluates, conducts consultations 
and issues decisions on the proposed solutions regarding emeissions, pollution, discharges, 
usage od chemicals, waste management, and contingency measures. Finally, the NEA also 
executes audits and inspections to secure compliance with requirements, prescriptions, and 
recommendations are being followed and maintained by the Operator.  
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4.2.3 The policy design 
Several sets of information were considered for this subchapter: the theoretical base on 
policy design, the history and the context for the Norwegian regulations, and the main 
regulations themselves (Table 1), implementing the method of content analysis. Going into 
details on policy design does not belong to the scope of this study, so this chapter will provide 
only general considerations.  
As for the form, the regulations are clearly delegatory. Starting from the self – 
regulation approach in the 70s, when the petroleum industry in Norway was in its infancy, the 
responsibility of regulation of HSE aspects of the operaations was delegated to the companies 
operating on the shelf. Since then, the regulations have developed drastically, but today a lot 
is up to the companies, while the regulations specify what is to be achieved, and not how 
(PSA). The text of the main regulatory documents clearly proves this claim, and, actually, this 
approach was found in almost every Section of the Regulations and Guidelines. The 
regulations, therefore, set specific goals, and the Operator should present its solutions and 
suggestions. This last consideration is perfectly in line with the definition of a variation of the 
delegatory approach – the incentive regulation. Therefore, in relation to the form of the policy 
design of the Norwegian regulations in HSE it is possible to claim, that they are delegatory 
and incentive - based. 
The main functions of the regulations can be narrowed down to the essentials: to 
maintain high standards of safety and keepin the minimal level of risks in the operations. But 
it is quite complicated to define whether the regulations are informing or enforcing. In this 
situation, one can think about the final beneficiary of oil and gas activities on the NCS – the 
Norwegian society. As we know, in the developed democracies the society can execute 
pressure on the industry if they consider, and there is evidence, that its activities can be 
potentially harmful for them. What provides them evidence of that? The information. So just 
as in the example with food in the study of the theory, the information is the key component 
to understand whether the regulations are informing or enforcing. In our case the regulations 
are informing, because the preliminary data collection has revealed, that a lot of documents, 
information, the results of audits and so on available in the Internet and thus accessible to 
every one. Additionally, transparency of operations is one of the main objectives of PSA. 
Before the case study it is, however, hard to emphasize the scope of the regulations, 
because for now it is not possible to trace how the regulations are being applied in reality.  
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This analysis has revealed, that the Norwegian regulations are characterized by 
incentives and goals. This said, the next part of the study should emphasize, what are these 
incentives and goals, which will be represented in light of the features of the regulations.  
4.2.4 Main features of the regulations 
The main regulatory principles can be summarized according to the history of the 
Norwegian regulations, the content of the main regulations, study of the additional literature 
and publications, and other information publicly available, i.e presentation of a PSA employee. 
Moreover, the policy design analysis conducted in the previous chapter has revealed, that the 
Norwegian regulations rely very much on incentives and specific goals. Now it is time to 
uncover what are these goals. For the purposes of better understanding of the analysis, these 
specific points reflecting what is expected from a company – Operator will be hereafter called 
features.  
The Norwegian regulatory system today to a large degree is founded on the 
assumption of the fundamental wrongness of the prescriptive – inspection based approach. 
This system is considered reactive at its core, incapable to inspire continuous improvement – 
the fundamental element of any sound HSE management approach. Obviously, the red thread 
of the Norwegian regulatory approach is the principle of the minimization of risk in oil and 
gas activities in Norway. The regulations are therefore risk – based ( this means that audits or 
verifications are planned in terms of an overall assessment of where the risk is highest - PSA), 
that is expressed in Section 11 of the Framework Regulations throughout the regulations. It is 
the overriding principle for all petroleum activities.  
An underlying notion to the principle of the minimization of risk is “prudency”, 
meaning that any activity under the Norwegian legislation must be sound and carefully 
assessed to reduce risks – both with regard to overall, as well as detailed assessment of all 
relevant factors that might influence the activities. Each assessment is separate, and 
considerations must be given to specific conditions of the factor (PSAa, 2013, section 10). It 
is implicitly understood that risks represent harm or danger to people, environment or material 
assets, and the risk level to these must be as low as possible.  
The common scope of application for regulations is generally explained in the Sect. 1-
4 of the Petroleum Act, with adjustments resultant from the parallel provisions in othe acts 
upon which the Decree is based. The Petroleum Act covers all aspects of activities that can be 
reasonably considered to be related to offshore petroleum activities and relevant HSE issues 
in these activities, including activities in or related to special facilities onshore (Vinnem, 
2010).  
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Every company conducting activities in Norway must adhere to the fundamental Acts, 
regulating the petrolem activities in this country. After a company starts cunducting any 
petroleum activity in the country and on the NCS, it becomes considered the operator of the 
these activities, or the responsible party.  
The Framework regulations contain the definition of a responsible party. The 
regulation states «the operator and others participating in the activities are responsible 
pursuant to these regulations» (Section 7, paragraph 1). The operator is subject to the law, and 
the notion «others» means both companies and individuals. This implies that company 
engaged in the petroleum activities has to guarantee the compliance with the Petroleum Act 
and the regulations by other actors involved, and guarantee, that these activities respresent a 
minimum risk to health, safety, and the environment. Besides this, the operator carries a 
responsibility to make sure that anyone who carries out work on his behalf, either personally, 
through employees, contractors or subcontractors, must comply with the HSE requirements. 
By this, the operator is expected to assume a central role, and therefore main responsibility. 
This is the second main principle of the regulations – all actors involved in the petroleum 
activities must meet the requirements, and main responsibility for this is allocated to the 
operator. 
As mentioned above, the primary objective of the Petroleum and the regulations is to 
set a high standard for safety, achieve a «systematic implementation of measures» (by the 
responsible party) to fulfil the HSE requirements and objectives, and, secondly, to «further 
develop and improve the standards». While the first and the last of these objectives aim 
directly at the fundamental goal of any HSE – related legislation, the second objective brings 
a slightly different direction: in order to systematically implement the necessary measures and 
ensure continuous improvement (Section 17 of the Framework Regulations) to comply with 
the regulations, the party responsible has to establish an administrative and organizational 
structure for this purpose. This objective therefore constitutes the incentive for establishing a 
system of internal control (Vinnem). This principle should be applied by “adopting 
administrative management tools which allow the company to check its own operations in a 
systematic manner” (PSA). Therefore, it’s the internal control system that is expected to make 
the legislation effective (Vinnem). 
In other words, the responsible party is responsible to make the legislation work, while 
the legislation itself implies the adoption of best possible solutions. Making sure the solution 
is the best available, on its turn, is also a responsibility of the operator and depends on its 
collaboration with the relevant authorities. If, however, a company decides to implement 
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another approach or specification than what is described in the Guidelines - it is acceptable, 
but the company must then generate sound evidence that the selected alternative method is is 
not worse than that described in the guidelines. 
The principle of collaboration mentioned above is actually deeply rooted in the history 
of petroleum development in Norway and this story is worth to be mentioned. When the 
activities on the NCS have just started, the Norwegian government had lack of knowledge in 
regulating this kind of activities and in this industry in general. So the companies (mainly 
foreign companies) were given a big degree of responsibility to come up with their own rules 
and decide what’s best.  
Another principle is that the requirements are performance based and functional, in 
sense that they set a particular level for aspects, characteristics or qualities of products, 
processes or services, that the government consideres able guarantee the high level of safety 
and minimization of risk to the environment and health of people involved in the activities, 
and the Norwegian society in general. However, they do not set specific technical or design 
solutions that the Operator should use. The requirements are fulfilled by the companies by 
presenting a solution that is both the best possible and best available in each specific case.  
The guidelines accompanying the regulations are not legally binding, but the 
regulations and the guidelines have to be regarded and applied together, in order to get the 
best possible interpretations of the provisions and how they are to be met. If, however, a 
company decides to implement another approach or specification than what is described in the 
Guidelines it is acceptable, but the company must then generate evidence that the selected 
alternative method is is not worse than that described in the guidelines.  
The last principle of regulations is the the requirements, contained in the documents 
are generalized. This means, that all the requirements in the regulations must be implemented 
for all stages and for all operator's activities, depending on the applicability and the stage of 
the project themselves.   
It should be noted, that developing and improving the HSE standards has another 
separate objective. This element of regulations has a dynamic meaning applied to it, because 
societal and governmental views on acceptable HSE are actually changing over time. 
Therefore, the regulations should emphasize the required HSE criteria are not static. 
The regulations also require that specific quantitative risk analysis is carried out to 
provide evidence and justifications of the management of hazards. It is stipulated that such 
analyses address major accident risk, emergency preparedness and environmental risk and 
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specifically address the intended working environments and thus contribute to improving the 
health, well being and security of the employees, and preventing personal injury, deaths and 
work related disease. 
All in all it is possible to state, that there are no preferred or prescriptive solutions for 
the petroleum activities in Norway. Instead, the operators are expected to evaluate and 
identify the best suitable solutions for every aspect or issue arised.  
4.2.5 Summary 
All in all, the Norwegian regulatory regime reflects the complex nature of the concept 
of HSE itself. Moreover, an attempt was made to establish a regime that will fit this 
complexity in a best possible way. It is mainly reflected in the flexibility of the regulations, 
and their non – prescriptive and goal – oriented targets. The main pressure and responsibility 
is delegated to the operator, while compliance is verified through audits. However, under new 
safety – management model there are the minimum standards for structural and operational 
integrity for such issues, as well control, prevention of fires and explosions, and worker safety 
(Svein Erikssen, PSA, 2014).  
The Norwegian regulatory system is also associated with duality. The State – company 
dichotomy in the Norwegian context evolves in what can be called flexibility for state agents 
– flexibility for company dichotomy. The Norwegian regulatory regime can be briefly 
described as incentive based with self - regulation as a dominant principle. In this context the 
main regulatory player is provided with the freedom of authority to answer the question 
“What is best or good enough?” while the responsible party is given the freedom of 
responsibility to answer the same question, and propose its suggestions to the authority. In this 
way, a constant cooperation and collaboration between the two parties is established. Norway 
has a long-standing tradition of a more collaborative approach: the so-called threepartite 
communication between state, companies, and third independent parties. 
The regulations are generally wel received by companies. Since it involves 
international standards, for a company it is easier to understand the level of quality and 
performance of, say, technical assests, while the regulations are always interpreted in a similar 
way, so it reduces the possibility of inconsistencies or misinterpretations. However, it also sets 
very high level of requirements for smaller companies, with less competence and experience.  
Since he regulatory regime is goal oriented and in many cases might not have clear 
requirements and the general approach towards safeguarding this regime is highly 
participative and collaborative, this might lead to differences in interpratations from both 
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sides. However, it triggers a more co-operative attitude from oil companies, since, in the end, 
safe petroleum activities are a good for all.  
4.3 Illustrating the main characteristics of the Norwegian 
regulations 
It should be remembered, that the following approach repeats the author’s method of 
studying HSE regulations, emphasized and illustrated in the Figure 3. The following figures 
are presented based on the analysis conducted in the Chapters 4.1 – 4.2 and are essentially a 
brief, simple, and comprehensive overview of the main features and characteristics of the 
regulations - just in line with the main approach for this study “from complexity to simplicity”. 
In the end of this chapter, the Norwegian regulations will be compared to the regulations of 
Eni, summarized exactly in the same manner. 
 
 
Risk 
«The consequences of an activity with the 
associated uncertainty» 
 
Regulatory 
policy 
design:  
• Delegatory and incentive – based 
• Informing 
• … 
 
 
ASPECT MAIN FEATURES WHERE 
General Goal oriented and non 
prescriptive 
Characteristic of all regulations 
General Requirements are generalized 
(regulations and guidelines 
should be applied altogether) 
Characteristic of all regulations 
Management Risk - based Section 11 of the Framework Regulations, other 
regulations 
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Management, 
technology 
Continuous improvement Core principle in all regulations 
Organization, 
management  
Communication and 
consultations 
The Information Duty Regulations, also an 
overriding principle 
Organization, 
management 
Internal control + Audits as a 
controlling measure 
The Framework regulations 
Organization, 
management, 
technology 
Delegation of responsibility to 
the Operator (responsible 
party) 
The Management Regulations, the Framework 
regulations 
Technology Functional and performance – 
based (best practices and 
best available technology) 
Guidelines to the regulations 
Management, 
technology 
Quantitative and qualitative 
aspects 
The Management Regulations 
Management, 
technology 
Precautionary principle Inferred principle related to risk management from 
the set of regulations studied 
Organizational, 
management 
Compliance to the 
regulations is mandatory 
Core principle (Sanctions – Management 
Regulations) 
Technology, 
management 
Implementing good solutions 
without running into 
substancial costs 
Principles of Barrier Management in the Petroleum 
Industry (PSA, 2013) 
 
Table 2. The main principles and characteristics of the Norwegian regulatory framework 
If we look back on the aspects of HSE legislation emphasized by the author, and 
assign these in form of labels to the overriding features and characteristics of the Norwegian 
regulations, the most of the labels will be management and technology. Keeping in mind the 
basic concepts of risk and safety, the essence of the Norwegian regulatory regime, in the 
authors opinion, is that: 
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• Best technology is the final product of good management of safety and risks, and, on 
its turn, it is the main warrant that the activities are safe, with minimal risks to people's health 
and to the environment. This claim represents a hypothesis to be tested in the case study.  
 
4.4 HSE regulations and guidelines in Eni 
4.4.1 Introduction and availability 
A representative of Eni in Moscow provided the author the company’s regulations 
related to HSE. The protection of health, safety, environment, and public safety is a priority 
objective for the company. The company operates in accordance with principles, procedures 
and behaviours oriented towards standards of excellence (Eni HSE MSG).  
The method of the analysis of the Eni regulations was different from that implemented 
for the Norwegian regulations. Since the was no primary knowledge of the regulations and no 
literature that could help with the assessment, the method of the content analysis was partly 
direct, partly grounded: the regulations were allowed to speak for themselves on their policy 
design, but as for their main aspect and features, the research was based on the feature of the 
Norwegian regulations.  
4.4.2 Eni Regulatory System: structure and main actors 
Commitment to excellence in HSE in Eni takes its roots from the Global Compact 
initiative, launched by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. The initiative aimed at creating 
a pact between the UN and world business covering human rights, labour, and environemtal 
protection, to which Eni has adhered.  
The Eni’s regulatory system is codified in a substancial body of guidelines, 
instructions, and other documents that represent a consistent and reliable framework. It also 
includes By-laws, Code of Ethics, Corporate Governance Code, Model 231 Principles, SOA 
Principles and the CoSo report. Each component of the Regulatory System is reflected and 
integrated in the Company’s Code of Ethics that identifies the fundamental values of the 
company. 
Eni's regulatory sistem is standing on 10 policies, same for the company and all its 
branches and subsidiaries. (Figure 17). Generally speaking, the 10 policies constitute the 
integral principles, based on which the company functions. Compliance with these policies is 
guaranteed by 40 Management System Guidelines (hereafter also referred to as MSGs). The 
main MSG is the MSG of Regulatory System that guarantees the proper management process 
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of the Regulatory System, while all guidelines are considered fundamental for all company’s 
operation and activities with compliance on all levels.   
The whole regulatory system has two intergral levels: the management level (10 
policies and 40 MSGs), that guarantees the overall management of all activities and processes 
within these activities; and operational level, that guarantees proper procedures, operational 
methods, definition of functions, and execution of company’s oprations on the level of 
everyday activities.  
 
  
 
Figure 16. The main regulatory policies and documents in ENI (Source: Eni corporate website) 
4.4.3 Risk concept 
As in the previous case, before presenting the HSE regulations, the case – specific 
definition of risk should be presented. In the Eni HSE Risk Management and Reporting 
Instruction the following definition of risk can be found: «a combination of the likehood of 
an occurrence of a hazardous event or exposure(s) and the severity of injury or ill health 
that can be caused by the event or exposure(s)». Reference is being made to OHSAS 
18001:2007 standard. Key points of this definition are likehood (probability) + hazard or 
exposure + severity (consequence).  
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Risk categories are also defined in the instruction, that refer to potential areas of 
impact: «P» - people, «E» - Environment, «A» - Assets, «R» - reputation.  
According to HSE MSG, all Eni subsidiaries are allocated to risk clusters, based on the 
specific activities they perform (Eni Norge, for example, belongs to «elevated» HSE risk 
cluster due to exploration and productiono activities). Eni Spa and all its subsidiaries manage 
thier risks through implementation of intergated HSE risk management systems, according to 
modalities issued in «Clusterization criteria based on HSE risk».  
Those companies that belong to «elevated» risk cluster can address, coordinate, and 
control HSE-related issues themselves. Nonetheless, the management, control of HSE risks 
and fulfullment of requirements issued by the headquarters is an obligation of all of the Eni 
subsidiaries, just each of them acts independently in different external institutional 
environment and performes different activities, therefore risk levels may vary.  
In can be concluded that risk mangement in the company is decentralized, the 
detection, assessment, and elaboration of relevant risk management measures and control is 
assigned to subsidiaries, while high level of the company's management is responsible for 
overlooking, coordinating, and keeping the regulations updated. 
It should be noted, that in any case any risk associated with fatality for a person or a 
group of people is under unacceptable in any circumstances. 
4.4.4 Regulation of HSE 
The commitment towards the protection of health, safety, and environment has 
resulted in an internal system of risk control and regulation, which is, according to the words 
of Eni representative in Moscow, a «cascade» - type system (which also can be defined as 
inclusive gerarchy). The system keeps under centralized control all the risks spread on 
different levels of company's operations, while guaranteing compliance with internal 
regulatory system on all levels (Corporate Management – Business areas, i.e. upstream – 
Entities, e.g. Eni SpA and subsidiaries – Processes). This system is entiteled Internal Control 
and Risk Management System (hereafter also referred to as «SCIGR»). «Eni has integrated 
this system into general organizational and company policy structures and has defined the 
SCIGR in line with main frameworks and relevant national and international best practices” 
(Eni corporate website). The main set of risks overlooked by the System is: strategic, 
operational, compliance, and reporting. 
The Board has approved management guidelines (Management System Guidelines, 
hereafter referred to MSG) and instructions (or operating procedures) to these guidelines to 
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ensure the implementation of the same procedures and operational methods of Risk 
Management System, and their compliace with the 10 basic principles of the Regulatory 
System for the company's activities. 
It is represented «by all the tools, organizational structures and internal regulations 
aimed at allowing healthy and correct business practices in line with the company objectives» 
(Eni corporate website). The system primary means are «an adequate process of identifying, 
measuring, managing and monitoring major risks, as well as by means of suitable structuring 
of information flows aimed ar guaranteeing the dissemination of information» (Eni corporate 
website). Based on a combination of top down and down up approach, SCIGR makes use of 
reporting tools and flows in a way that allows information generated by the personnel of the 
company to get all the way up to the Company's top management. 
The Internal Control System has several institutional levels: Corporate level (highest) 
(Board of Directors, Board of Statutory Auditors, Control and Risk Committee; Compliance 
Committee, Risk Committee – oversees the risks in general), first level of control  (risk 
owners, usually line managers), second level of control (has two additional internal levels: 
one ensures Compliance Objectives are met, the other that Strategic, Operating and Reporting 
objectives are met; consists of two process owners, one risk specialist, and several relevant 
departments to which determined by the risk management model special functions are being 
assisgned), and third level of control (done through internal audits, that can also be 
outsourced). The essencial principle of functioning of these levels is that they must be 
separate and independent from eachother and from actors outside of the company (SCIGR).  
The basic principles around which the process of SCIGR is built up are information 
and communication. The process is and should be customizable for the specific nature of the 
individual company or process, applicable regulatory framework, dimension and 
organizational structure, skills and number of people involved, e.g. each subsidiary develops 
its own procedures, which nonetheless are integrated and in compliance with SCIGR 
framework. The process involves all bodies and resources on all organizational levels (from 
the Board of Directors to personnel on all levels).  Finally, the Internal Risk Management 
System is established to promote the achievement of the company's objectives, and is 
company specific, that means it is ultimately based on the company's characteristics (business 
model, strategy, activities, geographic presence and structure of the company) (Eni corporate 
website). 
The process can be described briefly as a combination of measures (risk management) 
- audit/evaluation - reporting. Although SCIGR process can more formally be described as 
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following:  
1. Definition and implementation of the Internal environment; 
2. Identification, assessment and treatment of risks; 
3. Definition and implementation of Control activities; 
4. Monitoring, 
5. Review and evaluation of the entire system and Information and communication 
As emphasized by a manager in Eni Moscow, that the additional instruments of risk 
control are: Anti – Corruption Compliance Prorgam, Ethical Code, Model 231, Financial 
Reporting, Whistleblowing Reports (if an employee notices lack of compliance or suspicious 
activities – he/she can report to the risk owner), Market Abuse, Related Parties, and Antitrust 
Code.  
The main goal of this integrated system is to provide an «organic and comprehensive 
view of the Company's main risks, greater consistency among internally – developed 
methodologies and tools to manage risks and strengthening of the organization awareness, at 
any level, that suitable risk evaluation and mitigation may influence the delivery of corporate 
targets and value» (Eni corporate website). 
4.4.5 HSE risk management and main approaches 
Folowing the principles of the UN initiative, Eni has created an implemented an 
Integrated HSE Management System, where “Eni SpA and the operating companies/divisions 
are assigned different roles. Eni SpA is responsible for defining and updating Group 
guidelines, ensuring the coordination of HSE system planning and auditing at company sites, 
promoting the dissemination of information and best practices, while also consolidating HSE 
performance indicators” (Eni HSE Report, 2011)9. According to the same Report (2011), 
divisions and companies are responsible for planning, executing, and controlling the 
operations, while pursuing the objective of continuous improvement.  
In Eni the HSE is recognized as a fundamental aspect of the company's business 
because of several reasons. First, it is highly important aspect in the definition of the business 
strategy, because it guarantees sustainability; second, it is a complex issue because of national 
and international regulatory framework, technical and other regulatory aspects; third, because 
of peculiarities of the legislative systems in the countries in which Eni is conducting activities; 
																																																						
9	https://www.eni.com/it_IT/attachments/sostenibilita/cop-ita-web.pdf. HSE Report «Eni for 2011». Available only 
in Italian	
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and finally because of its strong transversality and impact on all operational and management 
activities, that influence other processes in the company. 
Commitments to managing HSE issues are therefore an integral part of planning and 
controlling of industrial and commercial activities. Moreover, divisions and companies should 
operate in compliance with the latest international standards in HSE and current best 
practices. The main documents addressing the HSE Management issues in Eni Spa and its 
subsidiaries are: Eni HSE Management System Guideline (hereafter referred to HSE MSG), 
and a corresponding Professional Operating Instruction: Risk Management and Reporting. 
The responsibility towards HSE management is distributed among three main actors: 
the firsl level of responsibility is allocated to so – called “datori di lavoro” (“work givers” in 
Italian), e.g. those who are in power of a production unit or organizational structure, simply 
put those who operate and act near the fonts of actual risks, and thus better understand them 
and are able to address and mitigate them most effectively. According to the HSE MSG, they 
are also empowered to autonomously organize their production units, and identify those 
empolyees with necessary HSE competence (HSE MSG). 
The second level of responsibility is allocated to top management of the business units. 
They must address, coordinate, and control the general path of HSE management in their 
company’s business units, which have the duty to address, coordinating and controlling the 
overall performance of HSE management in their own sphere of competence and on security 
policy supervision, health, environment and public safety of the company. The top 
management of the business units identified as part of Eni SpA are, in particular, invested 
with the role of proxies under Italian law or otherwise provided with adequate powers of 
attorney. In carrying out these activities, the senior management of the business units makes 
use of specific organizational structures, specializing in HSE issues (HSE MSG). 
At the third level of HSE responsibilities attribution is Eni SpA itself, which is 
entrusted with the tasks of guidance, coordination, support, and control over the general 
performance of HSE management in the business units. To this end, the "function HSE", 
carries out the activities of direction, support, inspection into the business units, and also in 
order to ensure the conduct of these activities, develops, implements and maintains an 
adequate regulatory system HSE, in accordance to what is described in the MSG (HSE MSG). 
This said, it could be assumed that the HSE management is also based on a system of 
responsibilities and delegation of authority.  
The overall process in management of HSE issues stated in HSE MSG is based on the 
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principle of guaranteing the continuous improvement of the activities and the company's 
performance. Therefore the general process of risk assessment include several stages: 
planning, implementation and operation, monitoring and corrective actions, management 
review.  
Additionally, Eni SpA and all its subsidiaries manage the HSE risk through the 
implementation of integrated HSE management systems, according to the procedures 
contained in "Criteria for clusterization based on the HSE risk" (Eni HSE MSG). This implies 
that the company has a system of risk clusters, based on which Eni subsidiaries are grouped 
according to their activities. 
According to Eni's HSE Risk Management and Reporting Instructions, that are and 
addition to the HSE MSG, «management of HSE risks is an integral part of the management 
of the business and requires the total concerted effort of the organization, focused on the 
objective of protecting people, the environment, assets, the business and earnings from 
potential losses». Clearly, it can be concluded that safety for people, assets; protecting 
people's health; environmental protection are the primarily goals of company's activities. 
Moreover, it is emphasized that HSE management is fundamental for the business, growth, 
and earnings of the company. It is understandable, because any failure in this area will bring 
irreparable damage to the reputation, and therefore to the company's revenues, especially in a 
climate of growing public scrutiny and concern for oil and gas companies, since they are 
widely considered the main contributors to climate change and potential culprits of such 
catastrophic events as Deepwater Horizon. 
The risk management process and risk tolerability criteria are referred to the following 
areas: people (health protection and promotion), Critical Equipment Protecting Personnel 
(damage or loss), Environment (damage), Assets and Operations (damage to the environment 
deriving from operational activities or from incidents), Reputation (damage to business, to 
«License to Operate», or the overall damage to the value of the Company deriving from HSE 
risks), Social context (society in general) (damage to external stakeholders). It is mentioned, 
that any activity that carry some degree of risk – entail risk for more that one of the above 
areas. Although it is difficult to define to which area more importance should be given, it is 
generally accepted that damage to people's health is given the priority (Eni HSE Risk 
Management and Reporting).  
Risk, according to Risk Managenet Instruction, is a peculiar event associated with a 
specific, discrete scenario (helicopter crash, oil spill, etc.), and is usually assessed 
qualitatively – through what has been called Full Qualitative Approach (Figure 2), as well as 
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quantitatively – through Semi – Quantitative approach for each area of risks (Figure 3). Risk 
Matrix is a tool inspired by the ISO 17776 standard, which is used for setting risk tolerability 
criteria. The matrix axes reflect the definition of risk: the vertical axis represents potential 
consequences, and the horizontal axis reflects the measure of likehood/probability/frequency 
of the occurrence of a hazardous event. 
 
 
Figure 17. «Full Qualitative Approach» (Eni HSE Risk Management and Reporting) 
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Figure 18. Example of «Semi-Quantitative Approach» (Eni HSE Risk Management and 
Reporting) 
The risk management process in built up in several stages, that are continuous and 
iterative (Fugure 19). 
The first stage of the process of managing risks in HSE is establishing the context 
(analysis of internal as well as external factors that must be considered in the management 
process). Internal factors include corporate risk management standard, internal organization 
and delegation of responsibilities, capabilities of people who operate, maintain, and manage 
activities at the facilities); external factors are applicable legislations, codes and standards, 
and key stakeholders (also partners, regulators, local communities, NGO's, major contractors 
and suppliers) (Eni Professional Instruction). 
The next stage is communication and consultation, that includes identification and 
involvement of key local figures outside the company to ensure a consultation with them is set 
up in the process of risk assessment (Eni Professional Instruction). 
The third stage is the risk assessment itself. It consists of risk identification, risk 
analysis (frequency evaluation + consequense evaluation), and risk evaluation (assessment of 
tolerability of risk to people, environment, assets and reputation by comparing risk level with 
the relevant tolerability criteria). In order to interpret HSE risk means of measurement of risk 
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are required, such as: fatalities/occupational illness per year, spills per transfer operation, 
financial losses per year (risk to assets) (Eni Professional Instruction). 
The fourth stage is risk treatment (identification if effective risk reduction measures 
needed to reduce the likehood/probability/frequency, therefore to prevent, and/or control 
incidents – limiting the extent and the duration of a hazardous event, or to mitigate the 
consequence of an accident) (Eni Professional Instruction). 
The final stage of the process of risk management is monitoring and review (a measure 
to guarantee the entire process continues to be effective, and verify whether the barriers 
continue to be effective). This stage is particularly important whenever a significant change in 
the instalaltion occurs, which can potentially affect its integrity (Eni Professional Instruction). 
 
Figure 19. Risk Management Process in Eni (Professional Operating Instruction: Risk 
Management and Reporting) 
For every possible risk in activities found to be present in he process of the risk 
assessment, the main areas of HSE associated with these risks in all operating units/projects 
(exploration/development/operation), including normal and temporary activities (e.g. 
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operation plant, warehouse, marine base, headquarter, guesthouse, drilling activity, seismic), 
should be recorded in the Risk Register (Eni Professional Instruction).  
The Risk Register should demonstrate that:  
• all hazards, effects and threats have been identified  
• the likelihood / probability / frequency and consequences of a hazardous event have 
been assessed  
• controls to manage potential causes (threatened barriers) are in place  
• recovery preparedness measures to mitigate potential consequences have been taken.  
The Register should include the most significant hazards (together with their 
consequences and the probability of occurrence, which, in case they happen, can have an 
adverse affect on the Company, with consequent negative influence on its HSE performance 
and reputation. The Risk register is a live document, that shall be updated minimum once a 
year. The document can be replaced by a tool requested by the local authority, but the 
Register should be kept updated for reports to the HQ and internal usage (Eni Professional 
Instruction). 
The HSE risk should be reported to company's E&P Division in order to them to be 
aware and keep track of the main HSE risks associated with their operations, and be informed 
about the progress in reduction of those risks classified as medium, high – medium, and high. 
All the risks should be stated in the Risk Report (sent to Eni E&P by end of June each year) 
(Eni Professional Instruction). 
For the high risks identified in the process of Risk Management and Action Plan 
should be developed and also sent to Eni E&P division. 
For any risk identified there are four basic management approaches:  
1. Take/Accept: the risk is tolerated in its basic state with no active controls being applied;  
2. Terminate: the factors which create the risk are eliminated (e.g. replacement of 
dangerous chemicals)  
3. Treat/Manage: apply controls in the form of hardware, software, procedures with the 
effect of reducing the frequency or consequences of the event  
4. Transfer: Insure (only in case of risk for assets). 
QRA (Quantitative Risk Assessment) should be implemented to indentify the risk 
reduction measures, based on the following process:  
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1. Identify hazardous events, considering techniques such as Event Trees;  
2. Consider the accidental loads (e.g. radiation from fires) and, hence, the damage/harm 
deriving from the hazardous event to: an employee, a man of the public (risk to people), a 
plant section (asset risk) etc;  
3. Sum up frequencies of all hazardous events of the same nature (all gas releases, all 
fires, all explosions etc.) with same consequences (harm to an employee, a man of the public, 
a group of people, an area with a given occupancy);  
4. Enter the suitable risk matrix and verify tolerability;  
5. If unacceptable, assess what controls are viable;  
6. Determine if the risk, which is residual after controls, will be manageable;  
7. If still unacceptable, consider further mitigating factors (reduction of % of manning, 
chance of sheltered escape, favorable wind directions, extra controls etc.) to re-conduct the 
event in the acceptable area;  
8. If still unacceptable, consider the “zero option” (“terminate” the risk).  
The remedial measures needed to measure and control each of the high risks, and 
should be based on safe and well established working practices and procedures in order to 
reduce the residual risks to a level which is practicable. If the identified remedial measures are 
not suitable to move into the high – medium region, a detailed QRA, when applicable, shall be 
performed in order to substantiate the final risk level (Eni Professional Instruction).  
Risk reduction measures should include preventive actions (reduction of 
likehood/probability/frequency) and mitigating measures (reduction of severity of 
consequences). Risk mitigation measures include steps to prevent escalation of the 
development of the abnormal situation and to lessen adverse effects on HSE. In this regard, 
barrier management can be considered a classic example of risk mitigation. Risk reduction 
also include such measures as recovery preparedness. An approach widely used is to evaluate 
the effort and cost involved in a number of different risk-reducing measures and to estimate 
the risk-reducing effect of each and then select the best option available (Eni Professional 
Instruction). 
Evaluation of risk reduction should always be based on sound engineering principles 
and common sense. Local conditions and circumstances, the state of scientific and technical 
knowledge as referred to a particular situation, and the estimated costs and benefits (Eni 
Professional Instruction). 
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The following “hierarchical” principle shall be adopted when it comes to risk 
reduction, with the following priority list:  
1) Avoid the risk  
2) Replace hazardous devices/operations with less hazardous ones  
3) Prefer collective safety measures to individual ones  
4) Adopt alternative design/operations  
5) Increase No./effectiveness of controls, supported by the best available practices (HSE 
MSG) and technologies. 
The process stops when efforts to introduce further reduction measures become 
unreasonably disproportionate to the additional risk reduction that will be obtained.  
Hierarchies of risk management emphasize the risk - based approach implemented by 
the company, in a sense that the risk that can involve the biggest impact should be addressed 
first. 
4.4.6 Policy design of Eni regulations 
 
As for the form, the regulations are delegatory. The principle of delegation of the 
responsibility is applied to the company’s branches and subsidiaries and the responsibilities in 
managing the HSE issues and risks. The text of the main regulatory documents clearly proves 
this claim, and this approach was found all the documents analysed. At the same time some 
regulations set goals, procedures and ways of conduct (SCIGR and HSE MSG), while the 
subsidiaries are pretty much autonomous in selecting the ways to comply with these. But the 
other regulatory documents, such as Professional Instructions are more specific and 
prescriptive in many aspects of HSE risk management.  This may be due to the fact, that the 
regulatory system in Eni is as cascade – type system, so the set of regulations are more goal – 
oriented at the management level, but when in comes to the instructions that are applied to the 
subsidiaries and its personnel, the regulations become more specific to ensure the compliance 
in the parts of the company that are small and spread all around the world, and therefore 
harder to control directly from the headquarters. 
 
The main functions of the regulations can be narrowed down to the essentials: to 
maintain high standards of safety and keepin the minimal level of risks in the company and in 
in the activities of all its subsidiaries around the world. This is why the company has also 
implemented the risk clusterization model. To determine whether the regulations are 
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informing or enforcing, we should look at the final beneficiaries of the company’s activities. 
In this case, the beneficiaries might be: The Italian government (Eni pays a certain amount of 
taxes there), and therefore the Italian society, the stakeholders, and consumers of its 
downstream products. So as in the previous case we look and the information regarding HSE 
the company makes publicly available, a series of documents can be found on the company’s 
website under the sections of Governance and Sustainability. However, in this case the 
regulations are enforcing, because the information available on the company’s website is 
general, while no information regarding the HSE risk management and no information on the 
main approaches of the company in assessing and managing risk and safety was found. The 
annual meeting with stakeholders also does not provide any information on these aspects of 
the company’s activities, only general data that is relevant for the company’s investors. 
 
According to the documentation studied, the scope of the application of the regulations 
is very large, because it ecompasses the company, its subsidiaries, and literally every 
employee. This illustrates the importance given to HSE and risk management in the company.  
4.5 Illustrating the main characteristics of Eni regulations of HSE 
The analysis presented in the chapter 4.3.1 - 4.3.5 takes us to a summary similar to that 
in the previous part, concerning the Norwegian regulatory environment. In this case, the 
overriding principles were inferred for the analysis of three documents, which regulate the 
HSE issues in the company – SCIGR, HSE MSG, and HSE Risk Management and Reporting 
Instructions. After a brief summary, these principles are going to be compared to these in 
Norway and a conclusion will be derived, based on the results of this comparison.  
 
 
 
Risk 
«A combination of the likehood of an occurrence 
of a hazardous event or exposure(s) and the 
severity of injury or ill health that can be caused by 
the event or exposure(s)» 
 
Regulatory 
policy design:  
• Delegatory and incentive based/Detalized command 
and control 
• Enforcing 
• Scope is large 
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Aspects of HSE PRINCIPLES REGULATIONS 
General Requirements are 
generalized 
SCIGR, HSE MSG, and Instructions should be 
applied together 
General Partly goal oriented and non 
prescriptive/partly detalized 
and prescriptive 
Characteristic of all regulations 
Management, 
organization 
Hierarchies of risk, risk 
minimization also a general 
target 
HSE Risk Management and Reporting Instructions 
Management, 
organization 
Continuous improvement 
through iterations 
HSE Risk Management and Reporting 
Instructions, Eni HSE Report (2011) 
Management, 
organization 
Communication and 
information (internal) + 
communication and 
consulatation (external) 
One the the core principles in SCIGR and other 
regulations; risk management process 
Management, 
organization 
Internal control system + 
Audits and reporting to the 
headquarters 
Integrated Internal control System and  audits for 
the headquarters  
Management, 
organization 
Delegation of responsibility 
(3 levels) + almost 
automomous subsidiaries 
Risk Management and Reporting Instructions, but 
an overriding principle as well 
Management, 
technology 
Functional and performance 
– based (best practices and 
best available technology) 
SCIGR, Eni HSE Report (2011) 
Management, 
organization 
Quantitative and qualitative 
aspects 
HSE Risk Management and Reporting Instructions 
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Management, 
organization, 
technology 
Precautionary principle Inferred principle related to risk management 
from the set of regulations studied 
Management, 
organization 
Compliance is mandatory SCIGR 
Management, 
organization 
Costs and benefits 
evaluation 
HSE Risk Management and Reporting Instructions 
 
Table 3. The main principles and characteristics of the regulatory framework in Eni 
4.6 Comparison of the two regulatory frameworks. Analysis and 
summary of findings 
 
Norway Eni 
«The consequences of an activity with 
the associated uncertainty» 
 
«A combination of the likehood of an 
occurrence of a hazardous event or exposure(s) 
and the severity of injury or ill health that can 
be caused by the event or exposure(s)» 
 
• Delegatory and incentive – based 
• Informing 
• Scope supposingly large  
 
 
• Delegatory and incentive based/Detalized 
command and control 
• Enforcing 
• Scope is large 
 
Main aspects: technology and 
management 
Main aspects: management and organization 
 
Key features 
Goal oriented and non prescriptive 
Goal oriented and non prescriptive, but 
detalized and prescriptive on the employee 
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level 
Risk - based 
Hierarchies of risk, risk minimization also a 
general target 
Continuous improvement of regulations, 
processes, technology, risk and safety 
level 
Continuous organizational and process’s 
improvement through iterations  
Communication and consultations 
Communication and information (internal) + 
communication and consulatation (external) 
Internal control + Audits as a controlling 
measure 
Internal control system + Audits and reporting 
to the headquarters 
Delegation of responsibility to the 
Operator (responsible party) 
Delegation of responsibility (3 levels) + almost 
autonomous subsidiaries 
Requirements are generalized 
Requirements are generalized 
Functional and performance – based 
(best practices and best available 
technology) 
Functional and performance – based (industry 
best practices) 
Quantitative and qualitative aspects 
Quantitative and qualitative risk assessment 
Precautionary principle 
Precautionary principle 
Compliance to the regulations mandatory 
Compliance is mandatory 
Implementing good solutions without 
running into substancial costs 
Costs and benefits evaluation 
Compliance with the regulations is 
mandatory 
Compliance with the state legislation is 
mandatory 
 
Table 4. Comparison of the HSE risk regulations in Norway and Eni 
As this table shows, Norwegian regulatory framework in HSE  and Eni HSE 
management regulations are very similar in governing principles of management aspect of 
HSE. Additionally, if we look at the Figures illustrating the risk management processes  
adopted in Norway and Eni – it becomes clear that these are identical.  
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These conclusions might have three points of reference: first, the international 
standards that drove the regulatory authorities in Norway and the Board od Directors of Eni 
were the same (in case of risk management it was the ISO: 31000); second, because of the 
complexity of the concept of HSE depicted in the theoretical part of the study, so countries 
and companies are adopting the same standards and approaches since they have shown to be 
reliable, safe, and clearly, represent operational best practices. The third reason for this 
similarity might be the organizational isomorphism studied by Di Maggio and Powell, more 
specifically - coersive isomorphism. Looking back at the theoretical part of the study, the two 
scientists have emphasized that in an established field organizations tend to resemble each 
other in many aspects, and thus the regulation of HSE issues can be one of these aspects. It is 
worth noting, that albeit the principles of the regulations are so similar, the definition of risk is 
different.  
The Eni regulations on the local level of subsidiaries/employees, however, appear to 
be more detalized and prescriptive, and this migh be dictated by the need to ensure 
compliance locally, which can be very difficult with goal-oriented requirements, since the 
company is operating in various parts of the world, employing locals, that might belong to 
different cultural, historical, and organizational environment than that of the employees who 
are accustomed to incentive regulations.  
This is also a manifestation of coersive and partly normative isomorphism, but on the 
level of personnel. This might be an interesting finding, because it the work of Di Maggio and 
Powell only deals with organizational isomorphism. In this case, the pressure of the 
organizational regulations applies directly to a person, making him/her to adjust to the 
company’s regulatory environment and procedures.  
This said, the answer to the main research question obtains a basis: in some cases, due 
to a number of factors, state regulations and company’s regulations of a certain area of 
activity in a cerain field can have points in common. This is contrary to the Hypothesis 1 
mentioned in the Theoretical assessment, that Eni has aligned its regulations to the state 
regulations in Norway, because these are different. Additionally, as emphasized by an 
employee of Eni Norge and other company representatives, according to the company’s 
Management procedures it should in principle comly with the regulations of the state they are 
working in. But what about the internal regulations? According to the findings introduced 
above, these regulate company’s internal procedures and activities, as well as relations with 
external environment, but compliance to these is also required.  
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Figure 20. Hypothetical representation of the state – company interaction over a project 
 Norwegian legislation states, that any company conducting activities on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf must in principle comply with the regulations of this country – 
quite tipical claim, since it's obvious a local or foreign organizational body must follow the 
law. At the same time, according to Eni regulations, all the company's branches and 
subsidiaries must in principle comply with the norms and regualtions of the country they 
operate in. Same for this – it's obvious, no company in the world wants to disobey the laws in 
the markets they are working in. Moreover, several people from Eni and Eni Norge have 
emphasized that the state requirements are a priority for the company. Therefore, in light of 
the Norwegian legislative context it is possible to say, that one of the main objectives on all 
stages of the project was to make sure any activity of the company is in line with the main 
Norwegian regulations, as well as company's internal regulations. 
Additionally, full compliance implies not only compliacne to the regulations 
themselves, but also to the governing principles. It is crucial for two reasons: first, the 
Norwegian regulations are goal – oriented, so one won’t be able to find specific prerequisites 
for oil and gas activities - and that's where one should look at the governing principles to 
understand how to work in this context; the second reason will be addressed further, however, 
it should be noted that it is impossible to provide, say, a PDO or IAS – the basic documents 
for any project on the NCS, without the incorporation of the basic principles. Back to the 
Goliat project, this view on compliance with the regulations will be further taken for granted.  
State: 
concentration on 
management and 
technology being 
implemented
pursuing the goal 
of safety and 
minimal risks in 
HSE
Company: 
focus on the 
organizational 
aspects and 
internal 
management, 
pursuing the goal 
of compliance (to 
internal and state 
regulations and 
optimization
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A look over the two regulations has revealed the main principles established in each 
regulations and it was already mentioned that a number of principles was found to be common. 
Consequently, they can provide the basis for answering the main research question, because it 
is possible to assume that in our case there was already a sort of an institutional common 
ground for state – company communication. The Goliat field had different stages: exploration, 
surveys, exploration drilling, appraisal drilling, development, and production. On every stage 
the company has followed the principles from the Table 4, so these are also expected to be 
present in the relevant documents regarding the operational stage of the project.  
In the Methodology for this study a lot has been said about interaction. Now, in the 
fashion of what has been said in the last paragraphs it becomes clear, that the state – company 
alignment process can be illustrated in the Figure 20. This gives us food for thought and 
further analysis: the main goal of the case study is to find out about the additional 
requirements set to the Goliat project by the authorities in light of the illustrated process. 
Moreover, one should look at what were the points, topics, or project aspects, around which 
this interaction took place and to understand the potential reasons of why they have appeared.  
According the analysis of the Norwegian regulations, the main concerns for the 
governmental watchdogs are management and technology, while according to the assessment 
of the company regulations, the Operator provides an organizational component, as shown in 
the table summarizing the main aspects of the Eni regulations (the regulations mainly are 
mainly concerned with management and organization). The organizational component is 
ways the work is being done and the project is executed. Is this consideration true? This can 
be the final hypothesis, which will be tested in the case study.  
The findings emphasized in this chapter provide a hint to this research: they implicate 
that the state – company’s alignment is an interdependent process, strained along the project 
timeline and stages. The main focus of this study is the operational stage, so it is assumed that 
study of the data related to the case study will provide insights to this process and to maybe 
apply a time – frame to it, in case it will result possible. 
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5 Chapter 5. The Goliat project case study 
5.1 Establishing a context for the case study 
The analysis of the two regulations and the summary from the last chapter can be 
considered the basis for the case study. The research question for this work is «How company 
has aligned its own regulations and procedures to Norwegian regulations and guidelines in 
case of Goliat operations?». The research question was based on the assumption, that as far as 
the regulations refer to two different realities thus the regulations should be different. 
Nonetheless, the analysis of the regulatory frameworks has revealed, that they are to a large 
degree based on the same principles. Moreover, it is a priority for a company to comply with 
the state regulations in Norway. As it was also emphasized by a source in Eno Norge, the 
company has performed GAP analysis between the two regulations to identify discrepancies 
and effectively address them. This affirmation can simplify the task of they case study, since 
now it is necessary to define: a) the main criticalities around which the process of the Figure 
21 appeares; b) how did the company manage additional requirements set by the authorities 
(field-specific requirements); c) securing which aspects of the management/technology the 
company put most emphasis on; d) the scope of the Norwegian regulations.  
Risk management and regulatory roles might be best elucidated in concrete events and 
cases. The regulatory responses can materialize in the documents, that can illustrate in a more 
comprehensive way the process described in the Figure 20. 
However, it is possible to state in advance that the mentioned additional aspects should 
complete the puzzle of the answer to the research question. 
 5.2 Contextual aspects of the oil and gas activities in the Barents 
Sea 
The analysis of the concept of HSE has revealed that the regulations can be to a large 
degree influenced by different contexts: it can be country-specific, company-specific, or 
specific to certain (environmental) conditions or project in tems of complexity. In other words, 
HSE is inseparable from the contexts it is being applied. At the same time, an industrial 
project also can not be separated from the context in which it was thinked, matured, 
developed, and came into reality. The background for the Goliat project, in the author's 
opinion, is twofold: one is the mentioned interdependent process of the state and the company 
interactions concerning the issues of HSE and regulations; while the other is the unique 
climatic and environmental properties of the Barents Sea. One should therefore introduce the 
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environmental context in which the two regulations focalized together in a specific project, 
because as it was already highlighted, the regulations can not be detached from the context. 
Referring to the claim in the methodological part of this study, we achieve humanly-
constructed reality by acknowledging and understanding a human-independent reality. 
There is an ongoing debate on whether the Barets Sea possess critical factors, that 
imply difficulties for oil and gas operations. Moreover, according to some experts, the 
petroleum activities in the Barents Sea should be to a large degree limited or even prohibited. 
The aim of this subchapter is to provide a comprehensive (but, of course, simplified) overview 
of the climatic and environmental context of the Barents Sea, and to investigate, how these 
characteristics might influence a field develpment the project.  
To start off, the proposed oil and gas development projects in the Barents Sea, and 
consequent maritime tanker traffic due to the activities in the High North emphasize the need 
for HSE standards adjusted to additional challenges of the arctic conditions: ice, icing, long 
distances for infrastructure, darkness etc (Barents 2020). According to the same report, 
existing regulations and technical standards does not include specific measures for addressing 
HSE challenges of the arctic, therefore today's technical and design standardards should be 
updated (Ibid). Only together with significantly increased reliance on project specific 
functional requirements by individual operators and down the supply chain, recognised 
international technical standards are applicable in this type of climate (Ibid).  
The preliminary risk study shows that the risks increase when moving the operations 
into cold areas and areas with ice, due to the increase in severeness of consequences of a 
potential accident. The risk increases for all accident categories in the Barents Sea, so the 
project needs to focus on possible measures to reduce the probability of an accident as well as 
the consequence (Barents 2020).  
Indeed, the cold climate is associated by many scientists with more risk and 
difficulties to oil and gas operations than in other areas. It is highly important that any 
offshore activities in the Barents Sea need to take into account all the challenges that Arctic 
climate introduces. The Barents 2020 report done by DNV has identified several challenges of 
the Arctic region that add risks to the existing safety, health, and environemtnal risk picture in 
the North Sea. If oil and gas activities offhore NCS in the Barents Sea ought to be conducted 
with the same safety level as in the North Sea, several factors must be accounted for 
evaluation and implementation of specific technical solutions and operational best practices.
First, significant variations in the climate conditions of the Barents Sea were found: 
according to the recent analyses of the climate of the Barents Sea, the overall conditions were 
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found to be less harsh, than it is considered by the public opinion (Oljevern)10. The western 
part is in many aspects similar to the North Sea in environmental conditions, while additional 
Arctic challenges increase further east: low temperatures, ice, icing, darkness, remoteness and 
vulnerable environment (Barents 2020).  
Moreover, two particular phenomena environmental phenomena were found present in 
the western part of the Barents Sea, and these events might imply serious complications for 
the petroleum activities in this area, compared to those in the North Sea. These fenomena are 
icing and polar lows. These opinions of the researchers are also supported by conclusions 
made by Statoil and Eni Norge on their joint information Internet portal - Oljevern.  
Barents Sea is considered an environmentally vulnerable area. More than 300 species 
of micro algae are registered in the Barents Sea, about 150 fish species (the most important 
commercial fish is cod, capelin and herring), and different types of top-predators such as seal, 
whale and ice bear are also important species in the Barents Sea (Bellona)11. This said, prior 
to any activity a thorough analysis of the impact of oil and gas activities environment and 
species that are living in the area of the field development must take place. Obviously, this 
should be done on every stage of the project. 
 
Figure 21. The ecosystem of the Barents Sea (Source: Bellona)12 
Additionally, nobody can be one totally protected from the so-called Black swan 
events that are «a highly improbable events with three principal characteristics: unpredictable; 
																																																						
10	http://www.oljevern.no/no/ Articles.		
11	http://bellona.no/assets/fil_Chapter_5._Environmental_impact_of_oil_and_gas_activity_in_the_Arctic.pdf 	
12	http://bellona.no/assets/fil_Chapter_5._Environmental_impact_of_oil_and_gas_activity_in_the_Arctic.pdf	
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they carry a massive impact; and, after the fact, we concoct an explanation that makes them 
appear less random, and more predictable, than they were» (Taleb, 2007). These events, 
however, are extremely rare.  
According to the Barents 2020 report, the severeness of the possible hazards might 
increase due to a number of Arctic – specific factors: remoteness, huge distances, and lack of 
infrastructure that make emergency responce more complicated; darkness, which also 
complicates the responce; extreme temperatures and weather; unique and vulnerable marine 
and coastal environment; potentially long down-time of operations after accidents, because of 
seasonal inaccesibility for repair; high public scrutiny to activities in the Barents Sea, low 
public tolerance for accidents with potential serious damage to reputation for all parties 
involved (Barents 2020). This said, these factors should not only be included, but to become 
starting points in the overall risk identification and management process. Moreover, in light of 
the possibility of hazards in the High North, the focus on contingensy plan should be very 
high.  
Due to the mentioned properties of the natural conditions in the Arctic, the main risk 
for the operations in this area is that the consequences of a possible accident might be much 
more severe and/or increase in their extent than in the North Sea. The consequences that are 
considered severe include loss of lives, environmental damage, and consequently serious 
economical loss. It should be noted, that there is lack of data regarding the possible effect of a 
hazard offshore for the ecosystem of the area in general. This said, one should not forget, that 
a certain degree of risk is always present, therefore any discharges resulting in water pollution 
are going to be prohibited in the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea. 
All above implies, that specific solutions must be implemented in order to get people 
working in these conditions more prepared, because safety for people is considered the first to 
come when considering a project in any area of the world. The personnel should be, first of all, 
specifically trained and well educated to work in the arctic conditions. The requirements 
regarding overall health should be high, threfore a primary medical assessment by a 
certificated doctor is a must. When offshore, the effects of cold climate on personnel should 
be taken into account when scheduling work task, shifting, and in work permit system.  
Following their obligations on the 2 degrees target, many countries are now looking at 
reducing the emissions to the atmosphere. Norway has also adherd to these plans, therefore 
requirements for any project in the High North will be very strict in terms of emissions to the 
atmosphere. 
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The international regulators could not be identified in the data, which was collected for 
this study. However, the communication with the relevant HSE personnel in Eni Norge has 
revealed a set of regulations and standards used specifically in this project:  
• ISO Standards (Especially the the ISO 14001 standard) 
• The IPPC directive (EU Directive 96/61) relating to the use of the best available 
technology 
• NORSOK 
• Integrated Management Plan for the Lofoten – Barents Sea area 
• Government White Papers 
a) Government White Paper #10 (2010-2011) 
b) Government White Paper #8 (2005-2006)  
c) Government White Paper #38 (2003-2004) 
 
According a representative from Eni Norge, two context – specific documents were 
also used in the elaboration of environmental risk assessment and impact assessment 
(however, there is no specific information of what was used) - the DNV Barents 2020 report, 
and RU-NO Barents project. 
 
The conclusion that can be drawed from this part is, that despite the alarmist moods 
coming from the science community, there is no lack of operational standards for the Barents 
Sea and for Goliat, and all the necessary requirements are available, however there is a 
common sense that they should be updated to specific conditions of the Arctic – this work is 
already being done. 
 
Additionally this chapter has shown, that there a set of context – specific regulations 
was also applied to this project. 
5.3 The Goliat project 
5.3.1 Introduction 
Goliat is an oil and gas discovery located in Production Licence 229 (PL 229) in the 
south-western Barents Sea, approximately 70 kilometers north of Sørøya in the county of 
Finnmark, and approximately 50 kilometers south-east of the Snøhvit field. The water depth is 
estimated between 320 and 420 metres.The field is located in Blocks 7122/7 and 7122/8 and 
partly in Blocks 7122/9, 7122/10, 7122/11, and 7123/7. The development project proposed 
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involves a production of hydrocarbons from the Realgrunnen and Kobbe reservoirs, and the 
recoverable oil reserves are estimated to be near 28 million Sm^3. During the initial fase of 
production gas will be reinjected to provide the necessary pressure in the reservoir, but it is 
planned to produce this gas during the latest phases of the production. The recoverable gas is 
estimated to be 8,8 Sm^3 (PDO for Goliat, Pt. 2 – Impact Assessment).  
The field consists of 8 seabed templates linked to a circular floating production, 
storage, and offloading (FPSO) installation. A total of 22 wells are planned to be drilled, 
including 12 production wells, 7 water injection wells, and 3 gas injection wells (PDO for 
Goliat, Pt. 2 – Impact Assessment). 
In reference to the Project Schedule it should be noted, that the production start-up 
took place only in mid 2016. 
Submission of the IAS November 2008 
IAS consultation Novenber 2008 – January 2009 
Submission of PDO 1st Quarter 2009 
Approval by the Norwegian Parliament Spring Session 2009 
Detailed Project Design 2009 - 2010 
Building/construction 2010 - 2013 
Drilling 2011 - 2014 
Installation of subsea facilities and pipe systems Summer half – years 2011 and 2012 
Installation of field facility, risers and laying of 
electric cable 
2013 
Production start up 2013 
 
Table 5. Project schedule (Source: Eni IAS for Goliat, 2008) 
5.3.2 Goliat project in light of HSE 
Recalling the specific environmental properties of the Barents area described in the 
first subchapter to this part of the study, the Goliat project was subject to strict environmental 
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requirements before the project development even started, and enormous attention to these 
requests was paid from the very moment of the green light to the project. Several additional 
factors further complicated the task: a) it was expected that the FPSO would be the first 
installation to start production in the Norwegian Barents Sea, which will be close to the coast; 
b) the vulnerability of the environment around the field and climatic properties of the northern 
areas and their potential effect of health and safety of personnel and people in surroundong 
areas; contingency and oil spill liquidation; protection of flora, fauna and the ecosystem in the 
area of the field; c) the project was subject to strict environmental terms which are represented 
in the Integrated Management Plan for the Lofoten – Barents Sea area (at a certain pint it 
was updated and the requirements became almost the same as in other parts of the NCS – 
source in Eni Norge), which are considered areas with the most fragile ecosystems - the 
management plan included such measures, as zero discharge in the sea during normal 
operations and requirements for reinjection or other technology to prevent discharges of the 
produced water; in the event of the operational hazard no more that 5% of the produced water 
may be discharged, on condition that it was purified (specific purification requirements are 
also present); d) the project incorporated several technical and design decisions, that were to 
be used for the first time on the NCS (circular permanently anchored floating unit, direct 
offloading to shuttle tankers. 
The main emphasis on the HSE aspects of the project are delineated in Plan for 
development and operations of Goliat Pt.2, Impact Asessment. Firs of all, explanation is given 
of the selection of the development concept. The FPSO option was given a priority, because 
this concept was found better in the following terms: environmental, energy efficiency, 
maturity of technology, suited for tying in to new discoveries in the area, cost effectiveness. 
The selection of supplier for the construction was carried out by means of tender competition 
between Sevan Marine and Aker Solutions, and a priority was given to the following HSEQ 
criteria (were applied together as a single criteria): 
1. Risk to personnel 
2. Risk to the environment and barriers to prevent serious oil discharges 
3. Routine discharges into the sea and emissions to the atmosphere 
4. Application of risk – reduction principles 
5. Safety-related design 
6. Working environment, design and solutions 
7. Winterization (safety-critical equipment) 
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Even prior to awarding of a license, Eni both individually and in cooperation with 
other companies placed great emphasis on environmental issues connected with possible 
operations in the area: surveying of natural ecosystems and habitats, developing new 
technologiesand environmentally sound practices. The development projects incorporated, 
and were made in accordance with principles inherent in the legislation: risk reduction, 
ALARP, BAT assessments. Additionally, the company has conducted several thematic studies 
specific to Goliat and the development concepts: 
1. Environmental impacts of the evaluated development concepts 
2. Emissions to the atmosphere 
3. Discharges to the marine environment 
4. Physical disturbances 
5. Seismic surveys 
6. Decomissioning 
7. Environmental risk and oil spill protection 
8. Impacts of the evaluated development concepts on commercial activities for fisheries 
and other industries 
9. Social impacts of the evaluated development concepts (socio-economic benefits 
and analysis of impacts on employment and businesses 
10. Sami interests 
11. Heritage sites 
5.3.3 Study of the available documentation 
Following the part and the whole methodological approach, several documents 
provided by Eni Norge, and related to the operational phase of the project will be taken into 
account for this part of the study. The documents represent a part of the long and continuous 
process if applying for licenses and permissions for operations, while this process, on its own 
turn, is a part of the whole – conducting activities on the Norwegian Continental Shelf: 
1. Plan for development and operations of Goliat Pt.2, Impact Asessment 
2. Goliat development project concept definition phase. Unofficial translation of the 
Norwegian parliamentary bill #64 (yy. 2008-2009). Development and operations of the Goliat 
field 
3. Application for permission to carry out activities pursuant to the Norwegian  Pollution 
Control Act in connection with the operation of Goliat field, PL 229 
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4. Permit pursuant to the Norwegian Pollution Control Act for production and operation 
at the Goliat field by Eni Norge AS 
These files will be assessed in the same order as in the previous paragraph, and only 
the essentiall information directly related to the research question will be presented in this part 
of the study.    
5.3.3.1 Project development stage requirements: The Parliamentary Bill 
The Parliamentary Bill emphasizes, that the IAS was submitted for consultive 
consideration in 2008, about 70 consultative bodies have consequently submitted comments 
on the Impact Assessment, and any circumstances which suggest the project should not be 
implemented were not found. However, the Bill itself include the evaluation of the NPD, 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, and that of the Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion. A 
number of recomendations are consequently being proposed (terms and conditions), 
supposingly elaborated collectively with other bodies.  
The document belongs to an earlier stage of the project, however it may provide a hint 
on how the overriding principles are actually being applied in practice. There are several 
claims that will be expressed here in a detailed way, because they may also provide additional 
information about the project and the requirements of the authorities. 
«The need for an assessment of the possibility of increasing the capacity of the 
underwater cable used for the power supply of the installation from the mainland and 
additinal arrangements to ensure that it will be possible to install an additional power 
transmission cable  from land». In the Bill the authorities have emphasized that power supply 
from land shall be considered for all development and major redevelopment project on the 
NCS. Consequently, the Operator has evaluated several energy supply concepts, including 
power and heat generation entirely on the facility, partial electrification from land, and full 
electrification from land. In response to the Ministry's guidelines, it was decided that Goliat 
will receive power from land, combined with gas and liquid fuelled turbine on the facility, 
that will satisfy energy requirements of the field from production start up. This concept also 
differenciates from the others in carbon footprint: the system is expected to contribute to 
reduce emissions from the NCS by an average of 115000 tonnes CO2 per year during the 
lifetime of the field. Additionally, the company has planned arrangements to reduce the power 
generated on the facility by adding another cable from land to the installation, also in line with 
the Ministry's requirements. Additionally, the local grid in Finnmark had to be upgraded. In 
reference to the power supply, the operator will submit an application for a license pursuant to 
the Norwegian Energy Act and Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate.  
	 119	
 
«The licences on estimated full power consumption linked to the full electrification in 
2017 should be submitted to Statnett SF». Moreover, in case of a positive outcome of the 
licence application, the power grid in Hammerfest had to be augmented. As soon as the power 
distribution in the area will be increased, the Licensees had to submit a plan to the Ministry on 
increased utilisation of power from land. The Ministry made an assessment and consulted the 
Licensees whether further measures shooul be taken to increase the levels of power utilisation 
from land.  
«The Operator must no longer that 2 years prior to start of the operations submit a 
plan for gas exploitation».  
«The contingency strategies must be assigned very high priority due to the particular 
challenges of the northern areas. The Operator should evaluate the infrastructure of the area 
of influence of potential polluting emissions and discharges. The Operator should implement 
measures aimed at unification of the oil spill contingency strategies in the potentially affected 
municipalities: Måsøy, Hasvik, and Nordkapp. The measures and requirements will be 
specified during the consultation process with the Norwegian Coastal Administartion».  
It should be noted, the the Operator has had already provided a thorough contingency 
strategy. As stated previously, the Operator had to incorporate the particularities and 
challenges of oil spill protection in the Barents Sea: strong wind and breaking waves, poor 
daylight conditions in the polar night (should therefore incorporate technology for locating oil 
on the sea surface in conditions of reduced visibility, forms of remote measurement can be 
downloaded to the vessels taking part in the operation), low temperature combined with 
strong wind  (important to take care of health and safety aspects). Moreover, according to the 
High North Strategy, the Operator had to establish special observation and communication 
systems to enable efficient monitoring of potentially polluting discharges.  
 
The authorities have also specified that the oil spill contingency plans should be at 
least as good as elsewhere on the Norwegian shelf. The primary objective nontheless had to 
be a minimization of consequences of a possible discharge. The contingency plans are stated 
to be described in detail in the applications for licences for production drilling and oprations, 
which had to be submitted to the Norwegian Pollution Control authority (hereafter SFT). The 
SFT was to decide what specific requirements for preparedness against serious pollution are 
to be applied. Environmental risk and contingency analysis form the basis for contingency 
strategy, provided in the company's Impact Assessment, and although the environmental risk 
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without this strategy is found to be low, the SFT required the contingency analysis to be 
updated in relation to the ongoing activity on the field.  
 
The Operator had guaranteed, that in addition to all the requirements, it would also 
build on contingency concepts established by the Coastal Adimistration, NOFO and inter-
municipal groups responsible for addressing serious pollution. Moreover, the Operator had 
stated, that it would reinforce collaboration between public and private actors to achieve an 
integrated and improved contingency startegy. It would provide training initiatives built on 
the existing base of training providers in oil spill protection. The courses were aimed for 
representatives from Finnmark County by offering training or job placement in existing 
contingency organizations or in Eni to represenatives of the municipalities, companies, or 
other organizations, and will be accessible whenever possible and arranged locally.  Local 
fishermen were also involved in the described activities, in order to integrate local skills and 
knowledge, and additionally make use of the small fishing vessels in oil spill protection 
operation in coastal areas. It was stated, that the Operator had to consult with the Coastal 
Administration (in Finnmark county) with regard to the development of oil spill contingency 
plans.  
Nonetheless, additional requirements and consultations were found to be necessary. 
This indacates an extremely high priority on the contingency plans for the Norwegian 
authorities.  
«The Operator should follow up measures to promoto local and regional spin-offs 
from the Goliat development project». The total list of specific measures is presented in 
document. 
These requirements were introduced in 2009, that was prior to the operational stage, 
and were supposingly subject to a number of additional documents and consultations. 
However, it is not directly implied by the data. However, the requirements provide a number 
of relevant insights for this study.  
First of all, it is evident, that the Ministries not only do their own evaluations of the 
propositions, they also consult with a number of independent organizations, which provide 
their considerations on propositions and opinions/evidence on whether the proposition should 
be satisfied or not. In fact, the consultations take place on all stages of the project, prior to any 
issuing of permits or satisfying the operator’s applications. Evidence of that is also provided 
by the Plan for development and operations of Goliat Pt.2, Impact Asessment, where the 
company provides a list of independent bodies in charge. This said, not only we see another 
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player that assesses compliance – the independent bodies, but also the communication 
established between the Ministries, organizations, and the Operator – the “threepartite 
communication”.  
Based on the evidence it can also be assumed, that the independent organizations 
assume their role only in reference to specific documents, such as, for example, the IAS, 
because such documents are the representation of what the operator actually proposes. Finally, 
in several cases it was stated, that the Operator should “communicate” with the authorities. 
Semantically, the notion used does not have any coersive component, but instead implies a 
“dialogue”.  
In addition, it should be noted, that strong emphasis is put on the contingency strategy 
in case of a spill, and measures applied to the discharge of polluted water or other chemicals 
in process on normal operations, as well as a hazard. It is thus clear that according to the 
Norwegian authorities, any possibility of pollution, except for that of the CO2 emissions (that 
will also be minimized to a maximum possible level), must be extremely low or zero.  
It is important to mention, that document also provides an insight on what the 
company did in order to secure the challenges of this project are met and addressed: «The 
Operator has prepared a strategy regarding organizational structure, work procedures and 
management systems to suit the challenges of the Goliat field». This said, it can be concluded 
that primary to any activities, Eni has established a sound management system and procedures. 
Mentioned only in one sentence, this affirmation might be one of the key components of the 
answer to the research question. 
5.3.3.2 The environmental requirements: Permits 
The next document - the Permit pursuant to the Norwegian Pollution Control Act for 
production and operation at the Goliat field by Eni Norge AS was issued in connection with 
the preparation, installation, and production start of the Goliat FPSO. The permit was applied 
to the use of chemicals and discharges to the sea and air, and the use of chemical dispersal 
agents for combatting oil spills in case of such an event. This document is really important for 
this study because it relates to the operational stage of the project and describes the proces of 
application, consultations and decision – making. 
In the document it is stated, that the reference incident taken for the risk analysis and 
assessment of environmental risk is the loss of well control leading to a blowout. This was 
also confirmed by a representative of Eni Norge. This is the direct application of the worst 
case scenario approach.  
	 122	
The environmental risk in the production phase has been analysed in accordance to the 
principles of MIRA METODE FOR MILJØRETTET RISIKOANALYSE (MIRA, 
REVISJON 2007). According to this analysis, the selected ecosystem components, both 
individually and collectively lie within the company's acceptance criteria by a good margin. 
The rest of the measures taken by the company a related to the emissions to the 
atmosphere, discharge of water (95% reinjected, 5% discharged, but purified according to the 
requirements), the usage and discharge of chemicals during the production, contingency plans 
(mechanical recovery + dispersal using vessels and aircraft, plans for procedures for detection 
and remote monitoring of spills.  
During the processing of the application, the nature conservation organizations 
(Naturvernforbundet, Natur og Ungdom, and Bellona) were given the opportunity to comment 
on the company’s plans. These actors were against the production start of the field, mainly 
because, in their opinion, the project goes against Norway’s commitment to reduce climate 
change, the company didn’t take into account the potential changes in ecosystem as a result of 
climate change (therefore, the company used the outdated knowledge in its environmental risk 
and contingency analysis), and lower level of ambition regarding discharges to the sea. 
However, they gave recommendations in case the permit would be granted anyway: 
• Before any permit can be granted, Eni must explain the consequences of potential 
changes to the ecosystem resulting from climate change 
• In consideration of vulnerable and unspoilt natural resources of the Barents Sea, the 
target of zero physical emissions shall be maintained (discharges of purified 5% in case of a 
malfunction allowed pursuant to the Government White Paper #10, 2010-2011) 
• The zero emission for black and red category chemicals13 must be maintained (black 
and red category chemicals were planned to be used in tracers, hydraulic fluids and 
firefighting foam). No form of dispensation must be granted for the use and discharge of 
environmental toxins 
• If chemical dispersal is included as a potential barrier for combating oil spills, Eni 
must submit a separate application setting out which dispersal agents it wishes to use. This 
application must be processed by NEA before permission can be granted pursuant to the 
Pollution Control Act 
The statements were sent to the company, and its reaction included the following 
statements: 
																																																						
13 Pursuant to the section 63 of the Activities Regulations, chemicals shall be classified into colour categories based 
on the inherent eco-toxological properties of the substances in question  
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• Both the environmental risk and contingency analyses were revised in connection with 
the application, and most up to date environmental data were used as input. 
• The claims regarding the Norwegian climate commitments, potential changes in 
ecosystems, and issues regarding management and control of the Barents Sea goes over and 
above the operator's responsibility. 
• Resulting from a revision of the management plan for activities in the Barents Sea zero 
discharge of produced water is no longer a requirement. 
• The risk – based assessment was taken into account when determining the priority of 
HSE initiatives and deciding on the use red and black category chemicals (in line with Section 
11 of the Framework Regulations). Safeguarding life and health is a priority in consideration 
of the environment and installations. Therefore, it is right to plan for the use of a chemical 
(with fluorine compounds, which are in the black category), which satisfies the the technical 
requirements for operations in temperature down to 20 degrees (in Application for permission 
to carry out activities the minimal winter temperature in winter is expected to be -15, so 
obviously a worst case scenario has been taken as the basis for the usage of chemicals. 
However, Eni has emphasized its plans to initiate a qualification process to find a firefighting 
foam without the black category compounds that can be used at temperatures around minus 20. 
If such option will be found, Eni will replace the existing foam. Additionally, the firefighting 
foam is planned to be used only in relation to the actual incident. 
• In compliance with the official requirements Eni must test the fire extinguishing 
systems, so it is inevitable that small amounts of chemical compounds will enter the sea. 
However, the company will endeavor to reduce the time necessary for testing to a minimum. 
• The contingency starategy emphasize plans for the usage of a dispersal agent, which 
was tested through various approaches and has satisfied the requirements demanded by the 
environmental organizations. 
Then, the Environmental Agency stipulated its terms and conditions, based on 
pollution – related drawbacks, assessment of what can be achieved implementing the best 
available technology, and precautionary principle.  
The issues that were evaluated according to these principles were: discharges to the 
sea, use and discharge of chemicals (the discharges of black and red category chemicals were 
found very low and distributed over a long period of time), discharges of oil-containing water 
(the purification system was found compliant with the regulations, although the operator 
should adhere to a documented objective to further reduce the oil content of the water and to 
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make a maintenance and inspection program to ensure high efficiency of the purification 
system), injection, emissions to the atmosphere (the principle sources on Goliat are power 
generation, flaring, cold ventilation and diffuse emissions, from storage and offloading of 
crude oil, from diesel engines (all sources of emissions were found to correspond to BAT, 
however it is stated that the level of emissions is something the industry should work on 
continuously and is subject to NEA’s inspections); energy management (in line with BAT); 
contingency requirements with the requirement of response time of 3/12 hours (notably, the 
remote monitoring strategy include process monitoring and pressure monitoring, oil detecting 
radar with IR and video cameras, each seabed templates equipped with four capacitative 
sensors and three acoustic sensors, supply ships equipped with ODR, IR, video cameras, AIS 
buoys, and ROV’s, the tank vessels equipped with three SECurus and one ODR radar, and the 
installation and vessels all connected to TCMS server, which is is connected to SECurus, 
ODR radars, and satellite systems enabling all of them sharing information internally and 
externally, and finally the helicopters equipped with IR, video, downlink, radar and satellite 
systems); combatting pollution (the general requirements are of 3 barriers and the overriding 
principle of combatting pollution as quickly as possible, as close as possible to the source of 
discharge, and with a system resulting in as less as possible pollution). The NEA expects the 
operator to consider the significance of new information regarding the relationship between 
chemical dispersals and risks to organisms in water column, and revise the environmental risk 
analyses if necessary. According to the Agency, the operator also has to weight up mechanical 
and chemical combatting methods in an emergency situation. The NEA will further perform 
audits to make sure the stipulated requirements are respected. 
The Permit pursuant to the Norwegian Pollution Control Act for production and 
operation at the Goliat field by Eni Norge AS summarize the requirements for the issues listed 
above by NEA, in reference to which the audits are to be performed. 
5.4 Discussion of results of the case study and conclusions 
In this part of the study, which will also be the last one, we should sum up the findings 
to which this research has led us and to draw conclusions. Usually, the conclusive part of any 
body of text is a reminiscence of ideas and suggestions from the first part – the introduction.  
What was the plan? Becides all, the intention was to do a practical, hands-on study. 
Did we reach this objective? For this research, the two bodies of regulations were analysed 
and presented accordingly to a predefined approach. Moreover, several documents, which are 
directly related to the case in matter were retrieved and assessed. The author has established 
continuous communication with the personnel that were directly involved in the project and 
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the company in question. However, the study has faced some limitations. The author has been 
able to conduct only one interview, because the thesis was written in Russia, whereas the 
company and the project are placed in Norway. Moreover, the author wasn’t able to establish 
a contact with representatives of the Norwegian authorities: an additional interview with one 
of the representatives would have been helpful for this study, but not essential. All in all it is 
possible to say, that the thesis has obtained the stated practical and real-life case appeal and 
filling. 
The stated purpose of this study is to provide an overview of the regulatory regime and 
main practices in addressing HSE issues in Norway and Eni, and to emphasize the main 
differences of these. It is possible to claim, that the purpose of this study has been fulfilled in 
the Chapter 4. Does and will this analysis create any value for the companies, which consider 
working on the Norwegian Continental Shelf? This is something to verify in the future, while 
it will also depend on whether the quality and value of this research will be recognized by the 
institution it will be submitted in. However, the study has reached several important results 
that will be presented further. 
Following the methodological approach allowing different hypotheses to pop up from 
the data and the presented information, this study has addressed several of these. The first one 
was tested in the analysis of the regulations, which has shown, that the two regulations are 
similar in many aspects. The second hypothesis regarding the focus on technology and 
management of the Norwegian regulations and, therefore, authorities appears right, which will 
be emphasized further in this chapter. Finally, the last hypothesis regarding the state - 
company regulations and interaction was also right. All in all, the further analysis shows, that 
the process illustrated in the Figure 21, which was a hypothetical process, of course, because 
no eveidence of that was present, found its proof in the case study.   
What is it possible to emphasize from the information presented in the case study? 
First of all, it is possible to fulfill the gap, which appeared in the Chapter 4 concerning the 
scope of the Norwegian regulations – it is very large. While it is not explicitly stated in the 
text of the regulations themselves, the responcible organs (the PSA, NEA), oversee the 
compliance to the requirements and many other aspects on all stages of the project, from the 
seismic exploration to decomissioning.   
Secondly, the case study has revealed what are the most important regulatory aspects 
in the real-life project on the NCS. Basing on the analysis above, there are several of them, 
and they will be emphasized further. As for now, it is necessary to remember, that in the 
Methodological analysis it was said, that in the development of a project of this complexity an 
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interaction between the company and state realities, involving a third component – location of 
the project, might be present. The study gas revealed, that this interconnection is present, first, 
in the regulatory aspects, and then, after analising a project itself, it is evident that there are 
clearly tree interconnected and interdependent realities (3 FACTORS) that have influenced 
the project up to its core. This consideration constitutes Finding 1 of this study (illustrated in 
the next Figure). 
 
 
 
Figure 22. Representing the interdependent realities (3 FACTORS) that have influenced the 
Goliat project.  
 
It is, however, hard to say whether this relationship is influenced by the regulations or 
the general approach, demonstrated by the Norwegian regulatory organs. But it is clear, that 
the alignment process involves not only state regulations and these of a company, but also 
properties of a particular location.  
What might potentially connect these three realities? While the previous Chapter has 
covered only the principles of the regulations, now, after the thorough assessment of the case, 
we aplify the picture to the overriding principles of oil and gas activities in the Barents Sea. 
Goliat 
project
Location:
Environmet
Climate
Ecosystem
Company: 
focus on the 
organizational aspects 
and internal 
management, pursuing 
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(to internal and state 
regulations), optimization 
and safety to personnel
State: 
concentration on 
management and 
technology being 
implemented
pursuing the goal of 
safety and minimal 
risks in HSE
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And, in fact, these might represent the connections between the state-company-location. 
Finalizing this discussion, it is also possible to add, that the realities represented in the Figure 
above are not only regulatory, but also can be characterized by presence of certain “properties” 
or “criteria”, that in the end influence the whole project and, therefore, risk management 
processes.  
So what are these must-have properties, that can be found somewhere inbetween these 
three realities?  
Finding 2.  
As emphasized previously, the compliance with the regulations is an imperative; 
therefore, one should consider that this principle is present by default, because it is the basis 
for any activity. Moreover, as the analysis shows, another imperative principle is safety of 
people, which in the Barents context finds additional components and becomes amplified to 
nature and ecosystem. These two principles can be considered fundamental and aboveall for 
any petroleum activities in general, and especially in the Nowegian High North. 
Retrieving the information from the interview and combining it with the 
considerations and conclusions from the analysis of the documents related to the Goliat 
project, it is now possible to cover other aspects and overriding principles to be applied in a 
Brents Sea project. 
I. Communication 
Maybe the most important and the fundamental principle on every stage of the project. 
The Regulations and the PSA themselves emphasize the importance of this principle, but this 
study has revealed its actual scope, and it is enormous.  
Analysis of the documents has shown that сertain requirements were placed by the 
independent bodies with which the consultations were carried out – this fact is extremely 
relevant for this study. It illustrates the principle of communication, established in the 
Norwegian regulation. Additionally, this principle is taken further to the threepartite 
communication. Evidence of this was found in all four documents: Goliat PDO (the list of the 
organizations with which consultations will take place is provided by the company itself); 
Goliat development project concept definition phase - translation of the Norwegian 
parliamentary bill #64 (2008-2009): Development and operations of the Goliat field; and in 
the Permit pursuant to the Norwegian Pollution Control Act for production and operation at 
the Goliat field by Eni Norge AS. The last document provides a clear illustration of the whole 
process.  
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The Operator, following the main Statutury Regulations and guidelines submits to the 
relevant authorities a set of documents, equal to applications for permissions to carry out a 
certain activity. The application is supported by plans, data, and various benchmarks of what 
the operator actually aims to do. The Ministry or other responsible authority establishes a 
threepartite communication and evaluates feedback form both sides, and decides whether the 
Permit should be granted or the proposition are not in line with the main regulations. No 
activities are allowed before the consultations and the decision of the responsible authority is 
available. The Permit itself is granted based on the fact that the plans are in line with the main 
regulations and requirements and the consultations. If the third parties are against the issue of 
the permit, they should provide their evidence of why a permit should not be granted. The 
Operator also presents its considerations on the requirements set by the independent parties. 
Then, the Ministry decides which side to take although additional reccomendations might be 
placed. From an outsider point of view, the process resembles a bit a court hearing. It is 
possible to conclude, that the communication with the authorities took place throughout the 
project and on all of its stages. The project probably would not have existed or would be 
largely different from what we can observe today, if it wasn’t for this principle. All in all, the 
threepartite communication undoubtedly respresents a fundamental concept for the 
Norwegian regulatory framework.  
The informant from Eni Norge has also emphasized a strong collaboratory spirit of the 
Norwegian regulations, and this principle is obligatory in all activities. The main tools for 
communication with the authorities are L2S (lisence to share), meetings, e-mails and phone 
calls. Moreover,  according to the source, «in Norway there is in general an open and 
constructive dialog with the authorities and all documents sent to the authorities can be 
considered available for the public domain. If anyone in the public do request a document 
names and sensitive information can in some cases be omitted». In case of the Goliat project, 
the communication with the authorities was established both on technical and management 
levels. Interestingly, the company has requested for exemptions, but these requests were not 
approved by the authorities and so the company had to modify the design/installations. 
II. Continuous improvement 
This characteristic can be considered a “twin brother or sister” to the previous one, 
because it would not have existed without it. The continuous improvement principle is 
reflected in the fact, that the project, even facing delays, gets better and better, since 
additional requirements and recommendations are set by the authorities.  
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Starting from the IAS and the consequtive Parliamentary Bill, there was a continuous 
emphasis on certain aspects of the project. These include contingency strategy, oil spill 
protection, reduction and minimization of consequences of emissions and discharges, 
minimization of HSE risk. This focus was due to the environmental characteristics of the 
Barents Sea and the zone the project found its “home” in. All this led to a pretty outstanding 
set of results: the contingency plan presented by the company, implementing a state of art 
technology acting as a single system, which is one of a kind in the Norwegian Barents Sea and 
on the NCS in general. Emissions and discharges are reduced to minimum levels – the 
discharges to sea are expected to be extremely low, with the quantity of chemical compounds 
reduced to 10-ppm, and minimal emissions to the atmosphere. The last property of the project 
is quite an achievement, considering the plant uses reinjection technology, which is usually 
considered to contribute to increased emissions of the installation.  
As a representative of Eni Norge AS has mentioned in the interview, the company 
sometimes had to review and correct such documents, as, for example, the environmental risk 
assessment study, based on the feedback coming from the communication with the authorities 
as well as third parties. The source has also emphasized, that Eni Norge updated risk 
assessment according to pre-defined milestones and in related to other relevant changes in the 
project. 
Moreover, evidence of new requirements and lifted requirements was found. It is 
emphasized, that these implications are in line with the main regulations. Both document were 
made after consultations with independent bodies.  
Summing it all up, the principle of continuous improvement is, as in the previous case, 
a basic principle. Nonetheless, it may be as general, as case specific.  
III. Technical parameters 
The Table 2 shows, that labeling the main features of the Norwegian regulations leads 
to the idea, that there might be a technical focus. The documents analysed in relation to the 
case study suggest, that there was mainly a strong emphasis on barriers, contingency plan, 
and discharges. This inference, according to a representative from Eni Norge was right, 
because he also emphasized that there was a high focus among others on environmental issues, 
oil spill contingency and winterisation. This focus, according to the source, is due to the 
location of Goliat. This is also suppoted by the fact, that the HSEQ department is given a high 
priority and it reports directly to the Managing Director.  
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According to the documents provided by the company, the main principle related to 
the decisions on technology to be implemented is the best available technology. 
In the Methodological elaboration it was emphasized, that there might be sort of a 
«clash» between the regulatory reality and external reality. This might be a clear 
representation of this idea, because following the main principles of communication and 
continuous improvement, the authorities have placed a clear emphasis on several specifically 
technical issues the project should fulfill. In addition to this claim, these aspects were due 
only to the location, environmental, and climatic aspects of the area.  
IV. Organization 
It is evident, that addressing the difficulties of the project, as well as the mentioned 
principles of the Norwegian regulations the company has established organizational and other 
internal procedures and systems. As shown in the Table 3, the Eni regulations themselves 
have a strong organization and management component. Moreover, the company has 
guaranteed compliance to the regulations on all stages of the project, and cngruent internal 
measures were introduced.   
As for the project, the Goliat Development project did have its own HSE unit working 
exclusively on Goliat. In addition, the main HSE department did spend the majority of its time 
on Goliat. 
Combining all information, can we now answer the research question for this study: 
How company has aligned its own regulations and procedures to Norwegian regulations 
and guidelines in case of Goliat project operations? Yes, we can. 
As the research of the regulations and the case study has revealed, the company has 
produced 10 main actions in order to start producing in the Norwegian Barents Sea. 
 
1. Safety of personnel was given the main priority 
2. Secured full compliance with Statutory regulations and the main principles of 
the Norwegian regulations (the company uses GAP analysis) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 G.O.
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3. Followed the overriding principles of the Norwegians regulations and its own 
regulations, which are in many aspects similar 
4. Established an organizational structure, work procedures and management 
systems to suit the challenges of the Goliat field. Especially, high priority was given to the 
HSE department, which spect the majority of time on Goliat, the project had its own HSE unit. 
5. Paid enormous attention to field and location - specific issues, such as 
environmental issues, contingency plan, winterization 
6. Followed up communication with the authorities on all stages of the project. 
Main tools: L2S, emails, meetings, phone calls 
7. Followed up audits (technical/organisational issues, general/specific) 
8. Followed up internal control system and internal reporting 
9. Reviewed/corrected plans/design and installations following to the 
consultations 
10. Proactively addressed additional requirements arising from the consultations 
with the authorities and meetings with the third parties 
The author considers it possible to claim, that the processes illustrated in the 
Figures 20, 22, and the 10 actions of the company are nothing else than representation of 
the company's alignment process to the state regulations. 
Additionally, the mentioned set of principles and actiones can be viewed as a brief 
«instruction» to any company that is planning to go for a project in the Barents Sea – this was 
the motivation and the target of the report. In line with the main approach for this study, this 
illustration aims at finally making a complex subject simple – the second aim of the report. 
Moreover, in the author's opinion, the conclusion for this study provides enough information 
for a, let's say, brief presentation for a smaller non-Norwegian company, that it considering a 
project in the Barents Sea in general, and especially in it's Norwegian part. 
After the research question was answered and the relevant findings were presented, 
this study has reached its end in terms of content, logic, and relevant information and 
considerations of the author. The main goals and objectives this study had to achieve were 
reached. What's possible to say in conclusion? This was the author's first experience in 
research, while it is also his first experience studying HSE and risk management, not to 
mention exploring technical and design aspects of an actual FPSO. The topic of the study 
involves two complex, «sensitive» concepts: risk and HSE.  
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5.5 Final statement 
All in all, the path towards the end of this study was not the easiest one. First of all, the 
mentioned concepts had first to be deconstructed in order to be understood, that's why the 
theoretical framework has so many smaller subchapters. Secondly, the aspect of regulations, 
their legislative and institutional nature and overriding principles had to be presented. And 
finally, the author had to face a struggle of putting all these pieces together and find out, how 
all of this applies in a real case scenario and in a real project. Noticeably, the author has 
reached a conclusion, which is in line with all the previous parts of the research, corresponds 
to the aim of the study, and actually provides new knowledge about HSE risk management in 
the Barents Sea, provides new knowledge for the oil and gas activities in the Arctic and 
contributes to future studies in this area.  
5.6 Suggestions for further research 
 The results of this report imply several possibilities for further research: 
1. Similar research with a different methodology to check whether the results of this 
study were right 
2. Quantitative research related to this or another project (the aim could be, for instance, 
to define a correlation between the types of regulations in 2-3 different countries and 
the budjet of a project) 
3. A comparative research of IAS's and PDO's in countries with different types of 
regulations (for instance, Russia and Norway) 
4. Study on similar topic (international company + local regulations + real project), but 
in another geographic area (for example, Venezuela, Brasil, or African countries) and 
to check whether the realities that have influenced the Goliat project can be the same 
in another areas (state-company-location) of the globe and the company shows similar 
actions. 
5. A study to draw a correlation between different types of regulations (incentive vs 
command and control) and the actions of a companies, operating in these countries and 
define, whether the alignment is similar or different 
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Appendix 2. Interview guide 
I. Questions regarding organization 
• How many people are there in the HSEQ department? 
• How many teams are there? What are they responsible for? 
• Department is equal to others or has priority for top management? 
II. Questions regarding the Goliat project 
• A bit about the history of the project, how much time involved personally in the 
project 
• Did you do risk reassessment each time the regulators turned off the production start? 
• Among the possible HSE risks, what was the most important issue to solve?  Did it 
take most of the concentration of the department? 
III. Authorities and requirements 
• What was the main tool of communication with authorities? 
• What are other authorities involved?  
• What are the main tools the department uses for internal reporting? 
• Is there a priority in internal/external reporting? 
• How many times the PSA did the auditing?  
• Tell me more about the communication with authorities 
• Is it representative of the Norwegian legislative principles? 
• Tell me more about audits, what is usually included? Only technical parameters? 
• Tell be about a situation what you could not come to an agreement? Was there a 
situation like this? 
• Tell me more about internal control system, how is it implemented in eni Norge? 
• Did the communication with authorities and other parties influence the whole project 
process? How? Positive or negative? Who is usually responsible for 
communication,Norwegians or expats? 
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• External vs internal regulations, what was prioritized in this project? Was there a 
priority? 
• Were there any new regulations or requirements added to the project? Did it happen 
because of the communication with the authorities?  
• If there was not any communication with the authorities, how do you feel about the 
project? Do you think there could be any differences in design, etc.?  
• In the documents you gave me there was a strong emphasis on barriers, contingency 
plan, and discharges by the authorities. Did they place any specific requirements for 
these aspects, other that you can find in general regulations and guidelines? I mean, 
something specific and prescriptive, for example the contingency plan should include 
the radars, IR and so on...  
• The only specific requirement regarding these aspects I found was the zero discharge 
goal, but this was lifted. Could you please explain why it was no longer a requirement, 
what was the evidence to lift it? 
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